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VE Nourset
Of all the oppositions that artificially divide social science, the
most fundamental, and most ruinous, is the one that is set up be-
tween subjectivism and objectivism.'
The law of self-defense has rarely produced as much academic or
popular heat as it has in the past two decades. Widely publicized trials,
such as the Goetz and Menendez cases,2 have generated deep-seated
fears of a law unmoored from principle. Those fears have generated a
standard public critique-that the criminal law has become too soft
and subjective, too wedded to syndrome science and prone to weak-
kneed affection for defendants. The criminal law has lost its "objectiv-
ity," so the argument goes. The poster child, and even the alleged cause
4
of this development, is the battered woman.
In this Article, I present evidence that much of this public debate
is misdirected: the charge of subjectivity and abuse, if not a deception,
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I Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice 25 (Stanford 1980).
2 See George P Fletcher, Domination in the Theory of Justification and Excuse, 57 U Pitt
L Rev 553,571-76 (1996) (discussing the controversy surrounding the trial of Lyle and Erik Me-
nendez). For a general discussion of the Goetz case, see George P Fletcher, A Crime of Self-
Defense: Bernhard Goetz and the Law on Trial (Free Press 1988).
3 See, for example, James Q. Wilson, Moral Judgment: Does the Abuse Excuse Threaten
Our Legal System? 62-66, 101-12 (Basic 1997) (urging that the criminal law has become too
"subjective" and reflects undue sympathy toward disadvantaged "groups"). See also Donald
Alexander Downs, More Than Victims: Battered Women, the Syndrome Society, and the Law 6-7
(Chicago 1996) (decrying the development of a "syndrome" society); Alan M. Dershowitz, The
Abuse Excuse and Other Cop-Outs, Sob Stories, and Evasions of Responsibility 18-19 (Little,
Brown 1994) (decrying the increasing number of "abuse" excuses).
4 See Wilson, Moral Judgment at 63 (cited in note 3) (arguing that battered woman claims
are examples of the criminal law's unwarranted affection for "subjective" defenses); David L.
Faigman and Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of Science, 39 Ariz L Rev
67, 79 (1997) (arguing that "[t]he integrity of legal doctrine has suffered immensely" from the
spread of syndrome evidence aimed at aiding battered women); Downs, More Than Victims at 3-
50 (cited in note 3) (arguing that battered woman syndrome claims have helped to nurture a
"syndrome" society); Dershowitz, Abuse Excuse at 17, 25 (cited in note 3) (arguing that some
battered woman claims may be classified as an abuse excuse).
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is a diversion. The problem with the law of self-defense is neither new
nor limited to the battered woman; it is as old and as persistent as the
law's search for an objective meaning for necessity. Based on a survey
of twenty years of self-defense cases,5 I sought to "test" claims of ob-jectivity by focusing on what purports to be one of the most objective
of self-defense rules: the requirement that the threat must have been
"imminent" for the defendant's response to have been permissible.6
Time is not something legal scholars generally study.' I chose to study
imminence, however, because it seems the quintessential definition of
"objectivity," the hard case. Perhaps more importantly, there is no
more controversial element in the law of self-defense. As George
Fletcher has put it: "The central debate in the theory of self-defense
for the last decade has been whether we should maintain a strict re-
quirement of imminence."
My survey shows that the important question is not whether the
law has become too soft or subjectified but what we mean by its objec-
tivity. The case law shows that imminence has many meanings; indeed,
imminence often operates as a proxy for any number of other self-
defense factors-for example, strength of threat, retreat, proportional-
ity, and aggression. Perhaps more importantly, my survey shows that
5 My survey includes all self-defense cases between 1979 and 1999 that discuss or note the
issue of imminence as an issue at trial or on appeal. My focus is not on battered women, but self-
defense cases in general. Moreover, my empirical claim is only that the law's image of immi-
nence, to the extent it is tied to a particular factual pattern (defendants who wait to kill), is highly
unlikely to be representative of self-defense claims. For an article focusing specifically on the
battered woman cases, see Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Mis-
conceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U Pa L Rev 379 (1991) (offering a different em-
pirically based study of self-defense).
6 Self-defense law typically requires a showing of an "imminent" threat. Wayne R. LaFave,
Criminal Law § 5.7(d) at 495-96 (West 3d ed 2000) (describing the imminence requirement). On
the "objectivity" of this requirement, see Fletcher, 57 U Pitt L Rev at 561 (cited in note 2)
("[I]nuninence, necessity and proportionality-speak to the objective characteristics of" self-
defense claims.).
7 There is one important exception to this in the criminal law: Mark Kelman's brilliant ar-
gument about "time framing," which may be found generally in Mark Kelman, Interpretive Con-
struction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 Stan L Rev 591 (1981). His argument shows, I be-
lieve, that the meaning of time in the criminal law is incomplete. Here, my claim is that time's
completeness and its coherence depend upon undeclared social norms about the relationships
between the defendant and the victim and between the defendant and the state.
8 Fletcher, 57 U Pitt L Rev at 567 (cited in note 2). Many assume that battered woman
cases routinely fail the imminence requirement. See, for example, Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Excuse
of Self-Defense: Correcting a Historical Accident on Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 Am
U L Rev 11, 43 (1986) (stating that "[miost battered woman's defense cases involve situations in
which the defendant was not, in fact, in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm at her
victim's hands"). See also note 30. There is reason to doubt this assumption. See Maguigan, 140
U Pa L Rev at 388-97 (cited in note 5) (presenting empirical evidence challenging this view).
Much of the legal commentary on self-defense has focused on the imminence requirement. See,
for example, Fletcher, 57 U Pitt L Rev at 556-58 (cited in note 2) (arguing that imminence is es-
sential to self-defense doctrine).
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the conventional image of imminence may be incorrect. It is widely
believed by scholars that the "problem" of imminence is one of too
much time between the threat and the killing. If my survey is right,
however, most judicial opinions raising imminence do not involve long
periods of time between the threat and the killing. They are cases of
weak threats and extended fights, cases in which the defendant is
struggling with the victim, is faced with a gun, believes that the victim
is advancing, or hears a stranger in the woods outside his home.9 This
should confound traditional doctrinal understandings of the term
"imminence" (which presume imminence as relevant only in noncon-
frontational "waiting" cases). Indeed, it presents strong evidence sup-
porting my hypothesis-that imminence carries undeclared meanings.
This has important implications for both the law of self-defense
as well as our image of the problem of battered women. The law of
self-defense, if I am right, is far from as settled or coherent as it is as-
sumed to be; its meaning and theory remain, in my view, largely unre-
solved. What seems so objective-the status quo-turns out to be a
good deal more complex and contingent than has been assumed. In-
deed, it is even possible that the law, through imminence, contradicts
itself: for example, if imminence is really asking whether the defen-
dant had a means to escape the violence, it may function as a retreat
rule in jurisdictions that do not require retreat.'0 What is more inter-
esting is that this failure of objectivity-the potential for contradic-
tion-predicts the possibility of injustice in the battered woman cases.
It turns out that the battered woman cases in my survey, like their
male counterparts," raise imminence most often in confrontational
situations, where the defendant kills when she sees a gun, where the
victim is advancing, or during an actual brawl.2 If that is right, then the
9 See, for example, Commonwealth v Stonehouse, 521 Pa 41, 555 A2d 772, 780 (1989) (de-
scribing claim in which defendant asserts that when she shot, the defendant was pointing a gun at
her); State v Negrin, 37 Wash App 516, 681 P2d 1287, 1290 (1984) (describing claim in which
defendant shoots into woods because he hears rustling in the bushes); Commonwealth v Watson,
494 Pa 467,431 A2d 949,951 (1981) (describing claim in wt ich parties were struggling).
10 Jurisdictions are divided on whether a legitimate c aim of self-defense requires that the
defendant have "retreated" once the attack has begun. A majority of jurisdictions do not require
retreat. See LaFave, Criminal Law § 5.7(f) at 497-99 (cited in note 6) (discussing the retreat
rule). For a discussion of the history and importance of this issue, see Dan M. Kahan, The Secret
Ambition of Deterrence, 113 Harv L Rev 413,429-35 (1999).
11 This Article does not address at length the question of the battered woman who, in fact,
does "wait" to kill. This is not an evasion, but simply a recognition that concentration on these
cases may well have occluded more serious problems in the law of self-defense, both for battered
women and for others.
12 See, for example, State v Sallie, 81 Ohio St 3d 673,693 NE2d 267, 270 (1998) (recounting
defendant's testimony that the victim "attacked her and, as he was choking her, threatened to kill
her," and she responded); Smith v State, 268 Ga 196,486 SE2d 819,821 (1997) (describing defen-
dant's claim that, during the fight, victim continued to hit and hold a metal can over her head just
before she shot him); Commonwealth v Dillon, 528 Pa 417, 598 A2d 963, 965 (1991)
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problem of the battered woman case may not be one of fact, but of
law. We do not ask of the man in the barroom brawl that he leave the
bar before the occurrence of an anticipated fight, but we do ask the
battered woman threatened with a gun why she did not leave the rela-
tionship." If, when courts are saying "imminence," they import mean-
ings that demand retreat before the confrontation, they are applying a
rule that the law itself disavows (for any defendant). 4 And, if that is
right, we need not subjectify the law for the disfavored; instead, we
must deal with the potential for objective rules to contradict them-
selves, to perpetuate meanings that they disavow.
This is not only an argument about the law of self-defense but
also an argument of objective, yet constitutive, feminism-an argu-
ment that uses traditional claims of objectivity to predict the ways in
which the law embraces social meaning and thus constitutes gender
inequity. We might have known from other disciplines, or even the his-
tory of the criminal law, that time "works," that it has meaning in the
law of self-defense. It should be no surprise, really, that if the objective
rules have meaning, that they may absorb social meanings and that
those meanings may incorporate assumptions about women's rela-
tionship to men.
("[A]ppellant testified that the decedent ... grabbed her by the arm, pushed her, punched her
and told her he was going to kill her just prior to her stabbing him."), affd in part, vacd in part as
Commonwealth v Miller, 430 Pa Super 297,634 A2d 614 (1993).
13 See, for example, Stonehouse, 555 A2d at 783 (noting that the prosecutor "stressed to the
jury in his closing argument that if appellant had truly been an innocent victim she could put an
end to the relationship"), revg Commonwealth v Stonehouse, 358 Pa Super 270,517 A2d 540,544
(1986) (stating that "[t]he continued relationship between appellant and the victim further points
to how unreasonable appellant's assertion of self-defense is. Appellant had ample time and op-
portunity to have the victim arrested."). The facts of the case are lengthy, but see Stonehouse, 555
A2d at 780 ("As she leaned over the railing, appellant saw Welsh on the ground below aiming his
gun at her. Believing that she heard a shot, appellant fired her gun twice.").
14 Do not confuse this with a statement about the law of retreat-a minority of jurisdic-
tions demand that the defendant leave the scene of confrontation once it has begun. It has never
been the law of self-defense, however, that a defendant who is being choked should be denied
the defense because he was "in the wrong place" at the wrong time-whether in a violent town
or bar or street corner, much less in the wrong home. See text accompanying notes 235-39 (dis-
cussing this principle at greater length). Moreover, courts have consistently disavowed the notion
that "leaving the relationship" is the proper legal standard in battered woman cases. See text ac-
companying notes 223.
15 My intellectual method here is, admittedly, not a method of engagement but of distance.
I am attempting to "step back from our initial view" of the topic of self-defense and subjectivity
and "form a new conception which has that view and its relation to the world as its object."
Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere 4 (Oxford 1986). This is not a recommendation for all
legal studies or an insult to the many wise and wonderful approaches that emphasize experien-
tial or multiple viewpoints. It is a means, self-consciously chosen, to challenge an orthodoxy by
the very methods that it chooses and the only methods that it recognizes. At the same time, the
argument I am making is, like much feminist scholarship, constitutive: it asks how law constitutes
the relation of woman to others and to the state.
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And yet we continue to argue about all this in terms that make
the rules' absorption of social meanings very difficult to see. In self-
defense and elsewhere, the discourse of subjectivity and objectivity
gives challengers only one way to disagree (special rules)," and then
brands the argument as unfair and partial. Objectivity, alone, tells us
nothing-it is radically incomplete without a specification of the ways
the law incorporates and creates social meanings. " Without that con-
tent, the debate about subjectivity and self-defense becomes an empty
exercise, a set of vague assertions of power and charges of lawlessness.
Part I of this Article explains the legal issues of imminence and
the law of self-defense as well as the construction of the legal debate
as a question of subjectivity. Part II presents the results of my survey
and its method. Part III argues that the so-called objectivity of con-
temporary doctrine is belied by its content; that doctrine we call "ob-
jective" leaves open many questions and risks the embrace of contra-
dictions. This Part traces these failures to a basic theoretical disagree-
ment about the meaning of necessity in the law of self-defense. Part
IV argues that "subjectivity" cannot resolve these questions. It argues
that even the apparently most subjective aspects of self-defense law-
such as battered woman syndrome-may rest on objective legal
propositions. Finally, Part V questions whether a discourse of objectiv-
ity and subjectivity really helps us understand the criminal law, in self-
defense or the many other places it may be found.' " I argue that if
there is a problem with the law of criminal defenses today, it is not
with syndromes or subjectivity, but with a criminal law that purports
to be neutral and precise but remains full of contested meanings.
I. THE MODERN CONSTRUCTION OF SELF-DEFENSE
It is widely assumed today that the law of self-defense is quite
settled and that the hornbook elements of a self-defense claim are
well-established. As a general rule, a defendant makes out a claim of
self-defense when he shows that he was confronted by a serious threat
of bodily harm or death, the threat was imminent, and his response
was both necessary and proportionate.' This general principle is then
16 See, for example, Fletcher, 57 U Pitt L Rev at 554 (cited in note 2) (posing the question
as "whether special rules should apply on behalf of women who kill those who have persistently
battered them in the past").
17 See Nagel, View from Nowhere at 6 (cited in note 15) (arguing that objectivity "cannot
by itself provide a complete picture of the world, or a complete stance toward it").
18 In its focus on objectivity and subjectivity, the law of self-defense is hardly unique. One
can see similar debates on a variety of legal topics within the criminal law, including cases on
provocation or negligence, or in other disciplines entirely. But, in the law of self-defense, it is
thought that much hangs upon the distinction. Indeed, it is thought that the most controversial
cases, although small in number, depend upon it.
19 See LaFave, Criminal Law § 5.7(a)-(d) at 491-96 (cited in note 6).
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qualified by two features that may bar some claims: if the defendant
provoked the violence or was the "initial aggressor," he may lose his
right to claim self-defense.'° More controversially, in a substantial mi-
nority of jurisdictions, the defendant will lose a self-defense claim if he
fails to retreat in circumstances where it was safe to do so."
A. Time, Subjectivity, and Self-Defense
If there is a debate within the criminal law academy about self-
defense today, it does not focus on the content of the doctrine. Instead,
it focuses on whether the legal standard should be more "objective""'
or "subjective."2 Conventional wisdom has it that the principal issue in
self-defense cases is whether we should apply a rule that focuses on
the particular defendant or one that imposes the standards of the
"reasonable person."2 This apparent dichotomy has had an enormous
influence on modern teaching and case law. In many a self-defense
case, defendants argue that the jury instructions granted were too "ob-
jective," the State responds that they were "subjective" enough,5 and
20 See id § 5.7(e) at 497.
21 See id § 5.7(f) at 497-99.
22 I use "objectivity" here in ways that are traditional in legal literature. For a thoughtful
account, see George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 504-14 (Little, Brown 1978) (attempt-
ing to dispel prevailing "confusion [regarding] the notions of objectivity and subjectivity in the
theory of liability"). I am not using this term in the relatively more disciplined sense used in phi-
losophical debate. For a general discussion, see Judith Jarvis Thomson, Self-Defense, 20 Phil &
Pub Aff 283 (1991) (exploring the question of when killing in self-defense might be justified
through a series of illustrative examples). See also Russell Christopher, Self-Defense and Objec-
tivity:A Reply to Judith Jarvis Thomson, 1 Buff Crim L Rev 537,538 (1998) (arguing "that a care-
ful analysis of Thomson's approach yields conclusions diametrically opposite to those which she
claims").
23 The "subjectivity" to which I refer in this Article is that associated with its meaning in
criminal law, not its meaning elsewhere (including feminism or postmodernism). For an example
of the traditional criminal law distinction between subjectivity as "state of mind" versus objectiv-
ity as an external "judgment" of conduct, see Kenneth W. Simons, Self-Defense, Mens Rea, and
Bernhard Goetz, 89 Colum L Rev 1179, 1186-88 (1989) (reviewing Fletcher, A Crime of Self-
Defense (cited in note 2)). The precise nature of subjectivity is an interesting and difficult ques-
tion and one debated and discussed at length among feminists and others. See, for example,
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 34 Stan L Rev 703 (1982) (reviewing
Ann Jones, Women Who Kill (Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1980)).
24 This is often reflected in casebooks and appellate opinions. See, for example, cases cited
in notes 25 and 26. See also John Kaplan, Robert Weisberg, and Guyora Binder, Criminal Law:
Cases and Materials 630-38 (Little, Brown 3d ed 1996); Sanford H. Kadish and Stephen J. Schul-
hofer, Criminal Law and Its Processes: Cases and Materials 801-26 (Aspen 6th ed 1995).
25 See, for example, State v Bellino, 31 Conn App 385, 625 A2d 1381, 1383-84 (1993) (not-
ing the defendant's argument that the trial court's jury instructions "regarding the subjective as-
pect of the self-defense inquiry" were erroneous; rejecting this argument on the ground that the
jury must determine not only the "subjective" belief of the defendant but must also "determine
whether that belief was reasonable").
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the court most often concludes that the standard requires both objec-
tivity and subjectivity.2
This dichotomy between subjective and objective approaches has,
in turn, come to shape our vision of the problems of self-defense law.
In an attempt to generate discussion about the wisdom of a more or
less subjective standard, casebooks routinely juxtapose a case involv-
ing a battered woman claiming a subjective rule with a case that
pushes that rule to encompass a far less sympathetic defendant." The
central image of the debate is often the sad tale of Judy Norman, or a
case like hers, of a woman who killed her partner while asleep or
hours after the last bout of violence. Often, the foil to this drama is the
unpalatable racist, such as Bernhard Goetz, the subway vigilante."
Students who sympathize with the battered woman are questioned
about whether they are prepared to defend a subjectified legal stan-
dard if they know that this will mean aid for those, such as Goetz, to
whom they are generally unsympathetic.
The debate over the "subjective" is often associated with an em-
pirical assumption about the nature of battered woman cases-that
the facts don't quite measure up. In particular, the facts are thought
not to "measure up" primarily because they fail to meet the legal doc-
trine's requirement for an imminent threat.8 Given this, it is not sur-
26 See, for example, id at 1384 ("It is settled that a jury's evaluation of a claim of self-
defense has both subjective and objective elements."). See also State v Walker, 136 Wash 2d 767,
966 P2d 883,886 (1998) ("With both subjective and objective aspects taken into account, the trial
judge must determine whether the defendant produced any evidence to support his claimed
good faith belief that deadly force was necessary and that this belief, viewed objectively, was rea-
sonable."). As Holly Maguigan notes, appellate courts sometimes obscure this dualism by using
misleading terms for their own standards, using the term "subjective," for example, to describe a
standard that is both subjective and objective, or using the term "objective" to describe a similar
standard. Maguigan, 140 U Pa L Rev at 410 (cited in note 5) (stating that "[t]he combined nature
of the standard actually used by a majority of the states is sometimes obscured by the label a
state's highest court has attached to it").
27 See, for example, Ronald N. Boyce and Rollin M. Perkins, Criminal Law and Procedure
940-54 (Foundation 8th ed 1999) (contrasting a battered wife case with that of Bernhard Goetz);
Kaplan, Weisberg, and Binder, Criminal Law at 609-36 (cited in note 24) (same); Phillip E. John-
son, Criminal Law: Cases, Materials, and Text 379-88 (West 5th ed 1995) (contrasting a battered
wife case with a case in which the defendant killed his Asian neighbor, irrationally fearing a mar-
tial arts attack).
28 Norman killed her husband while he was asleep, hours after the last bout, after enduring
years of degrading abuse in which she was prostituted, deprived of food, made to sleep on the
floor, and driven to attempt suicide. The North Carolina court denied a jury instruction based on
self-defense. State v Norman, 324 NC 253, 378 SE2d 8, 9-10, 19 (1989). Legal scholarship has
been at pains to try to grapple with Norman; entire symposia have been conducted on the theory
that Norman's problem is the central problem of battered women and the law of self-defense.
See, for example, Symposium, Self-Defense and Relations of Domination: Moral and Legal Per-
spectives on Battered Women Who Kill, 57 U Pitt L Rev 461 (1996).
29 For a general discussion of the Goetz case, see Fletcher, Crime of Self-Defense (cited in
note 2).
30 See, for example, David L. Faigman, Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-
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prising that the legal concept of imminence has come to occupy a
"central" place in the debate over the law and theory of self-defense.3'
That debate, as currently envisioned, pits "objectivists," who argue that
a strict imminence requirement is important to the law of self-
defense,32 against "subjectivists," who appear to argue that the law
should be "loosened" for battered women."
B. Time as Meaningful
Much of this debate appears to proceed on the assumption that
the meaning of the term "imminence" is self-evident. Treatises and law
reviews tell us that "[t]he requirement of imminence means that the
time for defense is now. The defender cannot wait any longer." Simi-
larly, force is "imminent" if it will occur "almost immediately,.3 "upon
the instant," or "at once." "Legitimate self-defense must be neither
too soon nor too late."" Although the Model Penal Code sought to
change this rule, and potentially soften it, by shifting the requirement
from the threat (as "imminent") to the response (as "immediately
necessary"),-" this approach has done little to change the basic assump-
tion that we are still talking about temporal matters.
Defense: A Legal and Empirical Dissent, 72 Va L Rev 619, 621 (1986) ("Frequently, however, a
battered woman kills her mate after an attack has ended or at some time when, seemingly, no
immediate threat is present."); Rosen, 36 Am U L Rev at 13 (cited in note 8) (noting that, often,
"[d]espite the defendant's long-term victimization, she most likely would not have been killed or
subjected to serious bodily injury on the occasion when she killed her abuser"). In fact, appellate
judges have repeated these claims. See, for example, State v Koss, 49 Ohio St 3d 213, 551 NE2d
970, 977 (1990) (Holmes concurring), quoting Rosen, 36 Am U L Rev at 43 (cited in note 8)
("Most battered woman's defense cases involve situations in which the defendant was not, in
fact, in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm at her victim's hands.").
31 Fletcher, 57 U Pitt L Rev at 567 (cited in note 2).
32 See id at 561 (describing imminence as an objective characteristic of self-defense law).
See also id at 554 (framing the question raised by feminists as whether "special rules" are neces-
sary to protect battered women).
33 See LaFave, Criminal Law § 5.7(d) at 496 (cited in note 6) (discussing the conventional
debate about imminence and battered woman syndrome, citing relevant authorities).
34 Fletcher, 57 U Pitt L Rev at 556 (cited in note 2) (emphasis added).
35 LaFave, Criminal Law § 5.7(d) at 495 (cited in note 6). Indeed, some of the most well-
known appellate decisions in this area have appeared to turn upon the difference between the
terms "immediate" and "imminent." See, for example, People v Aris, 215 Cal App 3d 1178, 1187,
264 Cal Rptr 167, 173 (1989) ("Defense counsel's objection was that the terms 'imminent' and
'immediate' must be differentiated, defining immediate as 'something next in order, about to oc-
cur' and 'more happening right away' and defining imminent as 'more of a threatening and im-
pending ... and impending is something that might or is about to occur."'), overruled in part by
People v Humphrey, 13 Cal 4th 1073, 921 P2d 1 (1996). See also State v Hundley, 236 Kan 461,
693 P2d 475, 478 (1985) ("Thus, the question is whether the instruction allows the jury to con-
sider 'all the evidence' or whether the use of the word 'immediate' rather than 'imminent' pre-
cludes the jury's consideration of the prior abuse.").
36 Joshua Dressier, Understanding Criminal Law 206 (Matthew Bender 2d ed 1995).
37 Fletcher, 57 U Pitt L Rev at 556 (cited in note 2).
38 MPC § 3.04 (ALl 1962). See Paul H. Robinson, 2 Criminal Law Defenses § 131(c) at 78
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There is reason to doubt the confidence with which the conven-
tional notion of imminence as "the now" is asserted, either as a gen-
eral matter or as a matter of criminal law. To students of other disci-
plines-philosophy, history, and even physics-the notion that time
has meaning is far from odd. Social scientists, for example, have shown
us that different cultures have very different ideas of time,4 indeed,
that different institutions and occupations create different "norms" of
time.' Scientists have explained that the meaning of time may depend
upon our reference point and that space and time may be inevitably
conjoined.4 Behavioral economists have shown that the sense of time
and rewards may be crucial in assessing and predicting behavior.43 So-
cial theorists have explained that temporal frameworks give social
practices "form," that time gives social practices their "direction and
meaning." Philosophers have argued that the idea of the "now" is es-
sentially incomplete from an objective point of view.5
Moreover, there is a very ancient tradition in which time carries
meaning in the criminal law, in particular the law of murder and self-
defense. Although categories like imminence in self-defense and
"cooling time" in provocation are principally nineteenth-century crea-
tions, time was essential to the early common law of murder, drawing
the line between murder and manslaughter.4 The malice necessary for
(West 1984) (explaining the MPC's preference for the "immediately necessary" language over
"imminent" alternative, taken by "[miany states").
39 For modern efforts in this regard, see generally Michael G. Flaherty, A Watched Pot:
How We Experience Time (NYU 1999) (social and cultural perceptions of time); Philip Turetzky,
Time (Routledge 1998) (history of the philosophy of time); Robert Levine, A Geography of Time
(Basic 1997) (social psychologist's view of time); Barbara Adam, Timewatch: The Social Analysis
of Time (Polity 1995) (how individuals and culture address time). Einstein's relativity theory has,
of course, put time into contention even in the sciences.
40 For a general discussion, see Adam, Timewatch (cited in note 39); Levine, Geography of
Time (cited in note 39); Flaherty, A Watched Pot (cited in note 39).
41 See, for example, Cynthia Fuchs Epstein et al, The Part-Time Paradox: Time Norms, Pro-
fessional Life, Family, and Gender (Routledge 1999) (analyzing a study of the experiences law-
yers in different types of practices have had with part-time work).
42 For a general discussion, see Albert Einstein, The Meaning of Relativity (Princeton 5th
ed 1956).
43 Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law
and Economics, 50 Stan L Rev 1471, 1538-39 (1998) (arguing that criminals tend to calculate
costs and benefits over time in deciding whether to commit criminal acts, though suggesting that
the calculating rationality is bounded by "problems of self-control").
44 Bourdieu, Logic of Practice at 98 (cited in note 1). See id at 106 ("[T]ime derives its effi-
cacy from the state of the structure of relations within which it comes into play.").
45 Nagel argues:
There is no room in a fully objective description of the world for the identification of a par-
ticular time as the present.... Yet the fact that it is now the particular time that it is seems
to be a fundamental truth which we cannot do without. The tenseless description of the
temporal order is essentially incomplete, for it leaves out the passage of time.
Nagel, View from Nowhere at 57 n 1 (cited in note 15).
46 See, for example, Sir Matthew Hale:
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unexcused homicide was taken to be a "settled anger (which requires
some length of time). 4' By contrast, manslaughter was a killing upon a
sudden affray or upon a sudden passion. ' Even today, this is still the
line-a line conceived in time-that marks the difference between
provoked homicide and first-degree murder in many jurisdictions.
Time has particular historical importance not only for the law of
murder but also for the law of self-defense. Indeed, temporality is cen-
tral to the common law distinction between excused and justified self-
defense. Blackstone 9 imagined two classic self-defense situations-in
one, the defendant prevented a felony and was justified; in the other,
the defendant was in the midst of a fight and was merely excused.,O
The upstanding citizen who sought to prevent a felony was not only
blameless but deserved commendation;" as an agent of the law, he was
If A. and B. fall suddenly out, and they presently agree to fight in the field, and run and
fetch their weapons, and go into the field and fight, and A. kills B. this is not murder but
homicide [Hale defines homicide as something less than murder], for it is but a continuance
of the sudden falling out, and the blood was never cooled, but if there were deliberation, as
that they meet the next day, nay, tho it were the same day, if there were such a competent dis-
tance of time, that in common presumption they had time of deliberation, then it is murder.
Sir Matthew Hale, 1 The History of the Pleas of the Crown *453 (Professional 1971) (emphasis
added) (originally published 1680).
47 R. v Oneby, 92 Eng Rep 465 (KB 1727) (Holt).
48 See Hale, 1 History of the Pleas of the Crown at 449 (cited in note 46) ("Murder and
manslaughter differ not in the kind or nature of the offense, but only in the degree, the former
being the killing of a man of malice prepense, the latter upon a sudden provocation and falling
out.") (emphasis added).
49 William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries on the Laws of England *182-86 (Chicago 1979)
(originally published 1769). My account here focuses on Blackstone, a principal influence in
America, but its history is consistent with earlier English common law writers on the split theory
of self-defense. See, for example, Hale, 1 History of the Pleas of the Crown at *491-95 (cited in
note 46) (distinguishing between se defendendo and killings of felons).
50 The justificatory form of self-defense law was called "prevention of a felony"; the excuse
form was deemed a plea of "se defendendo." Scholars have known of this two-headed version of
self-defense for some time but have differed on their interpretations of Blackstone, mostly con-
cerning the necessity of retreat. Beale, at the turn of the century, claimed that retreat should be
applied to both excused and justified self-defense. Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Retreat from a Murderous
Assault, 16 Harv L Rev 567, 580-82 (1903). Perkins disputed this understanding (rightly in my
view), arguing that retreat, in Blackstone's view, was limited only to those situations in which
there was "fault" for entering the affray. Rollin M. Perkins, Self-Defense Re-examined, 1 UCLA L
Rev 133,139-45 (1954).
51 This was not the only version of "justified" self-defense; also justified were homicides
that Blackstone dubbed as ones for the "advancement of public justice." See Blackstone, 4 Com-
mentaries at *178-82 (cited in note 49) (listing as "justified" homicides those committed by an
executioner, those committed by an officer of the government, and those that involve "pre-
vention of any forcible and atrocious crime" by a private party); id at *183-84:
Homicide in self-defence, or se defendendo, upon a sudden affray, is also excusable rather
than justifiable, by the English law. This species of self-defence must be distinguished from
that just now mentioned, as calculated to hinder the perpetration of a capital crime; which
is not only a matter of excuse, but of justification.
52 For this reason, Blackstone would go so far as to say that one who killed to prevent a
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unbound by special rules about "sudden" affrays, or retreating to the
wall.53 Not so the brawler whose claim was one of culpable necessity."
The brawler needed to show that he killed for the right motives and
without offense to legal authority, to negate his partial responsibility
for entering into mutual combat." Suddenness featured prominently in
that calculus.56 The sudden affray excused the brawler's failure to seek
"recourse to the proper tribunals,"57 suggested that he had not killed
out of a "previous malice and concerted design," and confirmed that
felony, to thwart a robbery or a burglary or even an unjustified attack, was "in no kind of fault
whatsoever, not even in the minutest degree; and is therefore to be totally acquitted and dis-
charged, with commendation rather than blame." Id at *182.
53 Retreat was specifically aimed, in the case of the brawler, to temper the defendant's cul-
pability for entering the affray. See, for example, People v Fowler, 178 Cal 657, 174 P 892, 897
(1918) (stating that "[tiwo men being in the wrong, neither can right himself except by retreating
to the wall") (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Perkins, 1 UCLA L Rev at 139-45
(cited in note 50) (discussing the relationship between fault and retreat at early English common
law).
54 Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at *186-87 (cited in note 49). Comparing se defendendo
with misadventure, Blackstone states:
And as to the necessity which excuses a man who kills another se defendendo, Lord Bacon
entitles it necessitas culpabilis, and thereby distinguishes it from the former necessity of kill-
ing a thief or a malefactor. For the law intends that the quarrel or assault arose from some
unknown wrong, or some provocation, either in word or deed: and since in quarrels both
parties may be, and usually are, in some fault; and it scarce can be tried who was originally
in the wrong; the law will not hold the survivor intirely [sic] guiltless.
Id (citation omitted).
55 Because the defendant was partially at fault, his plea did not lead to automatic exonera-
tion, but conviction with a likely pardon (as a matter of grace). See Thomas A. Green, The Jury
and the English Law of Homicide, 1200-1600,74 Mich L Rev 413,425 (1976); Perkins, 1 UCLA L
Rev at 141-42 (cited in note 50). Both se defendendo and provoked manslaughter rely upon the
notion of chance-medley. See Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at *184 (cited in note 49) (noting the
difficulty of distinguishing homicide upon chance-medley and manslaughter).
56 Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at *184 ("But the self-defence, which we are now speaking
of, is that whereby a man may protect himself from an assault, or the like, in the course of a sud-
den brawl or quarrel, by killing him who assaults him.") (emphasis added).
57 Id (emphasis added):
[Flor, instead of attacking one another for injuries past or impending, men need only have
recourse to the proper tribunals of justice. They cannot, therefore, legally exercise this right
of preventive defence, but in sudden and violent cases; when certain and immediate suffer-
ing would be the consequence of waiting for the assistance of the law.
58 Id at *185 ("And, as the manner of the defence, so is also the time to be considered: for if
the person assaulted does not fall upon the aggressor till the affray is over, or when he is running
away, this is revenge, and not defence.") (emphasis added). Jeremy Horder notes that se de-
fendendo attempted to square a homicide with the presumed "impurity of will" of one who
killed:
For a defendant who only struck when his back was to the wall could be presumed to have
acted without a corrupt intention. It could be presumed that he acted either 'with sorrow of
heart' or 'from fear and instinctively' ... [thereby] purifying the defendant's will, tainted as
it was by the deliberate character of the violence employed.
Jeremy Horder, Provocation and Responsibility 20 (Clarendon 1992).
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the threat was serious.9 If the affray was sudden, there was no time for
the king and his courts, no time for the defendant to contemplate re-
venge, no time for the victim to put down his weapon. In other words,
time had common law meaning. °
II. SURVEYING THE MEANING OF IMMINENCE
Given that sources both outside and inside the law suggest that
time is neither transparent nor without content, I sought to study the
meaning of "imminence" in self-defense doctrine. My survey of twenty
years of case law challenges the basic image we have of the problem
of imminence in the law of self-defense.
A. Assumptions Reconsidered
When I first began this study, I assumed that a search for cases
raising the issue of imminence would yield a fairly small complement
of opinions, similar to the Judy Norman decision, where the defendant
waited to kill her sleeping husband. My research assistants, however,
soon disabused me of the notion of small numbers of cases as well as
their similarity to the "waiting" fact pattern. (Ultimately, we reviewed
hundreds of cases, although only a small portion turned out to be rele-
vant to the imminence question.) I soon came to realize that the prob-
lem was with my view of "the problem." Because of the very powerful
force that sleeping-man cases have on the legal imagination about
self-defense -and because my findings tend to challenge this as our
view of the standard "imminence" case-it is important, at the start, to
ground this discussion in a different image of the problem. Admittedly,
the example that follows (like Norman) may present an unusual fact
pattern, but the insight it provides-that imminence has meaning-is
not unusual.
Barbara Watson killed her common law husband while she was
struggling with him.61 And yet the trial court rejected her claim of self-
defense on the grounds of imminence.62 Why? Not because of time.
59 See Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at *184 (cited in note 49) ("Wherefore, to excuse homi-
cide by the plea of self-defence, it must appear that the slayer had no other possible [or at least,
probable] means of escaping from his assailant.").
60 Much of this meaning has been obscured by the tendency to push temporal matters into
the minds of defendants. See MPC § 3.04 (stating that "the use of force ... is justifiable when the
actor believes that such force is immediately necessary"). See also Part V.B (discussing the his-
tory of Holmes's use of imminence to resolve the retreat question).
61 Commonwealth v Watson, 494 Pa 467,431 A2d 949, 951 (1981) (relating eyewitness tes-
timony that the victim had the defendant "around" the neck or was on top of her when she shot;
trial court finds no imminent threat, a finding reversed on appeal).
62 The appellate court emphasized the centrality of imminence to the trial court's reason-
ing and to the case: "The central issue in this case stems from the trial court's finding that appel-
lant's belief-that she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm at the time of the
1246 [68:1235
2001] Self-Defense and Subjectivity 1247
This was not the killing of a sleeping man hours after the last bout.
There was a clear confrontationo -eyewitnesses testified that the vic-
tim had jumped on top of Mrs. Watson and that he had her "around
the neck."" The trial court based its imminence finding in part on the
following: the threat was not imminent because of "the parties' rela-
tionship involving 'a long course of physical abuse."' Put another way,
the threat was not imminent because the victim had been battered, 6
that is, because Mrs. Watson should have left the relationship before
the final attack. 7 Imminence represented a judgment not of fact6' but
shooting -was unreasonable." Watson, 431 A2d at 951 (emphasis added).
63 Watson, 431 A2d at 951. Later cases have made quite clear that Watson was a confronta-
tional case. See Commonwealth v Grove, 363 Pa Super 328,526 A2d 369,373 (1987) (citing Wat-
son and recounting the violent confrontation that took place there).
64 Watson, 431 A2d at 951. The appellate court reported the testimony of the defendant
and a friend who was walking thirty to forty feet behind the defendant and the victim. Id. The
friend, testifying for the state, reported that the victim, Mr. Black, "hit [Watson], knocked her
down and jumped on top of her before the shooting." Id. The friend stated: "I know one time he
got her around the neck some kind of way or another. And that's when I heard the shots, when
he got her around the neck." Id. Watson testified at trial:
So we was walking, you know, up the street. And he just hauled off and grabbed me around
the neck and shoulders and started choking me. And he had me down on the ground. And I
was scared. And he said, "You black bitch, I should have killed you a while ago when we
was at the house." And I was scared. It was me or him. I didn't know what to do, I was so
scared. I was scared he was going to kill me, because he told me he was going to kill me. So
that's why I shot him. I don't know how I managed to get to the gun. I was just scuffling
down on the ground. It was me and him.
Id.
65 Id. The trial court also seemed to believe that the deadly response was disproportionate
or overly aggressive, noting that the victim had no weapon. Id. It is well-established self-defense
law, however, without regard to battered women, that a physical struggle, particularly where the
parties are of unequal size, may be met with deadly force. See, for example, In the Interest of D.S.,
694 S2d 565, 567 (La App 1997) ("[A] killing may be justified to prevent the infliction of great
bodily harm. While weapons may be used to inflict such harm, it is often the case that an oppo-
nent who is physically large, powerful or skilled at fighting will inflict great bodily harm upon a
weaker adversary.") (emphasis added). As the appellate court in Watson noted: "The fact that
Mr. Black [the victim] possessed no weapon at the time of the shooting did not render appel-
lant's belief that she was in danger any less reasonable, since it is beyond question that manual
strangulation can result in serious bodily injury, if not death." 431 A2d at 952. It is possible, of
course, that the trial court conflated threat and imminence, concluding that the prior abuse un-
dermined Mrs. Watson's claim to a reasonable expectation of serious violence. But that, again,
would mean that a woman struggling on the ground had no reasonable expectation of a serious
threat, precisely because she had been battered.
66 The appellate court rejected the trial court's assumptions on the question of imminence.
Id at 951-52:
A woman whose husband has repeatedly subjected her to physical abuse does not, by
choosing to maintain her family relationship with that husband and their children, consent
to or assume the risk of further abuse. That woman faces a difficult choice: she must decide
whether to endure continued abuse, or... leave her home.
67 Lest there be any confusion, this finding cannot be rationalized as an appropriate "re-
treat" rule in the guise of imminence; retreat is not required, as a general rule, before the con-
frontation. For the difference between a pre-retreat rule (not generally required) and a retreat
rule (required in some jurisdictions), see note 14.
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of norm. 69 Mrs. Watson was found guilty of manslaughter by the trial
court, a sentence the appellate court reversed on the facts.0
Watson shows in a particularly dramatic way that imminence may
have meaning and that its meaning may be normative and contestable.
Of course, Watson is not a common type of self-defense case in many
ways: battered woman cases are rare self-defense cases and rarer
when reversed on appeal. Indeed, the clarity of the fight makes it
unlike many self-defense cases in my survey (whether they involve
male or female defendants). But Watson is not unusual in one impor-
tant respect: in its challenge to our assumption that imminence should
arise only in cases where the defendant "waits" for substantial periods.
Imminence can, and does, find a home in cases where there appears
no substantial time gap between the threat and the killing-in con-
frontational claims." In fact, my survey shows that imminence arises
most often in confrontational rather than nonconfrontational cases.
That should confound traditional expectations; indeed, it provides
strong evidence that imminence may mean something more than the
treatises and the law reviews tell us, more than simply "now," "upon
the instant," or "at once."72
68 Oddly, this version of imminence actually inverts the timing requirements, extending the
time frame into the past.
69 Although it is impossible to tell, Watson may well be an example of the upward mobility
of racial as well as gender norms. The trial court found that Mrs. Watson was too aggressive in
circumstances that run contrary to the law of proportionality. See note 65. The question this
raises is whether stereotyped norms about the aggressiveness of African-Americans informed
this finding. On this stereotype and its potential influence in self-defense cases, see Jody D. Ar-
mour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negro-
phobes, 46 Stan L Rev 781,781-85 (1994). For evidence that Mrs. Watson was African-American,
see Watson, 431 A2d at 952 (recounting her testimony in which she reports that the victim [her
common law husband] called her a "black bitch").
70 The court reversed for insufficient evidence. Watson, 431 A2d at 951 ("Appellant cor-
rectly asserts that there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
shooting of her husband was not done in self-defense.").
71 Lest Watson seem too far outside the norm, it is far from the only case in this survey in
which a battered woman's claims are clearly confrontational, along the lines of the standard "fist-
fight" or "gun battle." See, for example, State v Sallie, 81 Ohio St 3d 673, 693 NE2d 267, 270
(1998) (relating defendant's testimony that the victim "attacked her and, as he was choking her,
threatened to kill her," and she responded); Smith v State, 268 Ga 196,486 SE2d 819,821 (1997)
(relating defendant's claim that during the fight the victim hit her and held a metal can over her
head, just before she shot him); Commonwealth v Dillon, 528 Pa 417, 598 A2d 963, 965 (1991)
("[A]ppellant testified that the decedent ... grabbed her by the arm, pushed her, punched her
and told her he was going to kill her just prior to her stabbing him."), affd in part, vacd in part as
Commonwealth v Miller, 430 Pa Super 297, 634 A2d 614 (1993); Commonwealth v Stonehouse,
521 Pa 41,555 A2d 772,780 (1989) (relating defendant's claim that, when she shot, the defendant
was pointing a gun at her).
72 See notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
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B. The Method
My study proceeded in two steps.? I first sought a sample of
twenty years of homicide cases involving self-defense claims 4 in which
the term "imminence" appeared repeatedly in an trial or appellate
opinion." This search was limited to those opinions most likely to be
generated by a standard computer search. The second iteration of the
study expanded this sample to achieve, as nearly as possible, a uni-
verse of cases in which imminence was stated to be an issue at trial or
on appeal." The first iteration was limited to those cases using the
term "imminence" repeatedly; the second iteration was not-a single
reference to imminence in an opinion was sufficient if one could de-
termine that imminence was considered an issue in the case. Com-
bined, the first and second iterations yielded a dataset approximating
the universe of homicide self-defense cases raising imminence as an
issue and reported between 1979 and 1999.
Cases were included in the dataset only if they were "imminence-
relevant." To qualify as an "imminence-relevant" case, more was re-
quired than mere discovery of the word "imminence" in the case, or a
repetition of jury instructions, or standard boilerplate references to
the law of self-defense. Opinions referring to imminence in a general
discussion of the "three requirements of the law" of self-defense or
repeated in a set of jury instructions were marked as irrelevant. In an
imminence-relevant case, the concept of imminence had to appear
relevant to the court's decision, the parties' arguments on appeal, or
an issue at trial or on appeal. At the same time, it is important to re-
member that these cases typically do not discuss the meaning of im-
minence at any length. Very few judicial opinions deal straightfor-
wardly with imminence as a legal question; to qualify as an issue for
the purposes of my study, it was only necessary that the opinion raise,
in some form, a legal question about imminence, even if it were rele-
gated to a footnote. By "an issue," then, I do not mean the issue on ap-
peal. An imminence-relevant case may, for example, be a case that
presents itself primarily as one about evidentiary matters, or the stan-
73 A far more complete methodology and statistical analysis appears in the Appendix.
74 Included within the coverage of a "self-defense" claim were claims involving imperfect
as well as perfect self-defense. Defensive force claims based on the "defense of another" were
excluded because of various doctrinal differences. Also, these claims had to arise in a homicide
prosecution; claims involving assaults, attempted homicide or conspiracy to commit homicide
were excluded. See Appendix.
75 For a discussion of how this search was conducted, see Appendix.
76 Note that this search focused on the term "imminent," not "immediately necessary,"
which is the relevant statutory term in a minority of jurisdictions. On this issue, see Appendix.
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dard of review on appeal, or questions to eyewitnesses. Relevance was
determined not by the holding of the case but by the legal discussion."
Opinions were first coded for their factual allegations. The ques-
tion asked was whether the facts of the case, as alleged by the defen-
dant, involved a substantial delay between attack and killing. I defined
as a confrontational case any claim made by the defendant that the
killing was prompted by violence that was either present or within
minutes of the killing. All other claims were classified as nonconfron-
tational.'8 Doubts about the facts were called in favor of classifying a
case as nonconfrontational 9 If there was no judicial recitation of the
facts, determinations about whether a claim was confrontational were
based on the defendant's allegations. ° It is these allegations that
would be relevant at trial and on appeal to determine the propriety of
a jury instruction on self-defense.' These judgments were made based
on the facts as reported and, of course, ambiguity is a source of poten-
tial classification error 2 Moreover, let me emphasize at the start that
77 For example, a case that discussed imminence in the context of the admission of battered
woman syndrome evidence would be an "imminence-relevant" case, as would a case that dis-
cussed imminence in the context of a jury instruction claim or an appeal on the sufficiency of
evidence. Indeed, there is even a case in my dataset in which the appeal arises from the denial of
witness fees. Thus, the grounds for appeal or the legal holding is not the measure of the relevancy
of imminence used in this survey.
78 There are, of course, many ways in which one might draw the line between "confronta-
tional" and "nonconfrontational" claims. It should be noted, for example, that my definition dif-
fers from that used by Professor Maguigan. See Maguigan, 140 U Pa L Rev at 391-94 (cited in
note 5). Unlike Maguigan, for example, I made no attempt to determine, from the sparse facts
reported in appellate opinions, whether the defendant was the "initial aggressor" who provoked
the violence, or whether the victim was in a "harmless" position.
79 I resolved doubts in favor of a nonconfrontational designation because this tended to
support the conventional view of the imminence problem and thus to operate against my
hypothesis.
80 For example, in People v Trevino, 200 Cal App 3d 874, 246 Cal Rptr 357 (1988), the ap-
pellate opinion reported that the defendant and the victim had been in a fight several hours be-
fore the victim's death. The state claimed that the victim "was asleep when [the defendant] in-
flicted the first stab wound," while the defendant admitted stabbing the victim but claimed the
victim was awake and had again assaulted the defendant at the time of the stabbing. Id at 358.
This is an unusual case. Consistent with my method to base the claim on the defendant's allega-
tions, however, it was classified as a "confrontational" case. It is the defendant's allegations, not
the state's theory, that is the basis for a judgment of a defendant's success-his ability to get to a
jury.
81 A reviewing court must view the defendant's allegations in their most favorable light in
determining the availability of the jury instruction she claims was omitted at trial. See, for exam-
ple, Cannon v State, 615 S2d 1285, 1287 (Ala App 1993) ("In determining whether to charge the
jury on self-defense, 'evidence most favorable to the defendant should be considered."'), quoting
Byrd v State, 257 Ala 100, 57 S2d 388, 391 (1952). Of course, not all cases involving only instruc-
tional claims were cases in which the imminence discussion related to an instructional claim.
Consistency, however, demanded that I take one approach to all cases; relying upon the defen-
dant's allegations provided a standard reference point that did not require the reader to evaluate
the evidence from the standpoint of a juror.
82 Appellate cases only provide limited facts; moreover, the facts are likely to be slanted in
favor of the defendant. See note 81. One might argue that this will lead to a result biased in favor
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this definition of confrontation is not the same as used elsewhere. Be-
cause my study focused on the question of imminence, the idea that
the victim was in an innocent position at the time of the killing does
not necessarily render the case one of nonconfrontation in this sur-
83
vey.
Opinions were then coded for the meanings adopted by the au-
thor: both nonconfrontational and confrontational cases were re-
viewed to determine the meaning of imminence used. Cases were
coded for the meaning of imminence based on statements made in the
opinions themselves-how the judges explained imminence as an is-
sue. After a pilot survey, the coding categories were based loosely on
the elements of self-defense: threat, proportionality or aggression, re-
treat or alternatives, motive or emotion, and other." As one might ex-
pect, some courts' discussions of imminence reflect multiple or con-
flicting meanings. If the meaning could not be determined, the case
was coded as "unknown." If there was more than one meaning, the
case was so coded.
Coding did not proceed on the assumption that time has no ob-jective meaning. I have no doubt that many of the judges who wrote
these opinions, like the trial judge in Watson, believed that they were
referring to the clock. Even if every case had been more successful in
this association than Watson, the problem would still remain. We may
readily assume, as the survey does, that imminence carries the mean-
ing of time-as-clock in all of the opinions, and still ask whether immi-
nence carries other, more problematic, meanings for the law of self-
defense.
The point of this exercise was not to provide a statistically valid
claim about the relative incidence of particular arguments (immi-
of defendants, one in which the claims look more "confrontational" than they are in fact. That
may be true and would be an appropriate critique if I were attempting to mirror reality. I am not,
however, attempting to provide a statistical claim about whether self-defense cases are confron-
tational (in fact). Instead, I am arguing about the meaning of imminence. Given that most aca-
demic commentary on that issue is based on the facts rendered in appellate opinions, I justified
this approach as maintaining consistency with the claims my study sought to challenge.
83 A claim, for example, that the defendant killed an attacker during a brawl when the vic-
tim was in fact restrained does not amount, for these purposes, to a nonconfrontational claim
since my definition of "confrontation" depends on the question of time, as measured by the
clock, not on whether the defendant was the aggressor. See, for example, State v Buggs, 167 Ariz
333,806 P2d 1381,1382-83 (Ariz App 1990) (relating that defendant was brawling, got a weapon,
and fired it; not classified as "nonconfrontational" even though the court reported that the vic-
tims of the attack were not advancing toward the defendant).
84 Although many standard formulations of self-defense omit it, jurisdictions often explic-
itly or implicitly emphasize the need to show the defendant's fear of, rather than malice toward,
the victim. See, for example, Trevino, 246 Cal Rptr at 360 (upholding a jury instruction requiring
that the defendant acted on "fear alone," and stating that the defendant may feel "anger or other
emotions" toward the victim, but they "cannot be causal factors" in the killing to be justifiable
self-defense).
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nence)' or particular kinds of claims (confrontational or not). A
sample of trial and appellate opinions cannot tell us what happens at
plea negotiations or at a trial that never result in a written opinion. As
such, the survey carries with it enormous dangers in terms of generali-
zations about trial practice or real world plea negotiations.8 At the
same time, this approach has one major advantage: it can provide an
assessment of theoretical claims that purport to rest on a sample of
judicial opinions. My claim is directed at the academic vision of immi-
nence, as presented by casebooks, treatises, law review articles, and
other sources that rely upon trial and appellate opinions. Put another
way, a survey of twenty years of trial and appellate opinions is, rela-
tively speaking, far better than the sample of one or two afforded in
the standard legal treatment. That does not mean that ten cases are
always better evidence than one, but simply that this argument tests
present assumptions about case law. It should not be interpreted as an
empirical study of self-defense practice as a whole.
A final caveat is in order. This is a survey of self-defense cases
raising the question of imminence, not claims based on gender or
claims by women only. For that reason, this survey should be distin-
guished from differently focused work, such as Holly Maguigan's im-
portant study of battered woman claims. Some time ago, Maguigan of-
fered significant evidence that battered woman claims tend to be con-
frontational rather than nonconfrontational.M My survey does not at-
tempt to redetermine that issue (although my findings, for a limited
subset of imminence-relevant cases, are consistent with her conclu-
sions). It is, instead, a survey of the legal meaning of imminence in
self-defense law, and was so constructed. Therefore, it cannot and
should not be taken as a measure of the factual nature of all self-
defense cases or cases involving battered women.
C. The Findings
The conventional wisdom has it that imminence should arise as a
legal issue only in cases where the defendant waits to kill. This study
suggests that this assumption cannot be supported by judicial opin-
85 I do not know how often, for example, imminence arises in self-defense cases as a
relevant issue. To assess that, I would have had to determine the number of imminence-relevant
cases in proportion to the total number of self-defense cases for this period. A rough approxima-
tion to that may be obtained by comparing the number of imminence-relevant cases (233) to the
total number of self-defense cases for the same period, but that would only yield a number rele-
vant to appellate practice.
86 I have enumerated these dangers elsewhere at much greater length. See Victoria Nourse,
Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 Yale L J 1331, 1349-
50 & n 108 (1997) (discussing such dangers in research concerning appellate cases on provoca-
tion).
87 Maguigan. 140 U Pa L Rev at 379 (cited in note 5).
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ions. The vast majority of imminence-relevant cases in my survey look
like the "standard" self-defense case-a case, for example, in which
the defendant alleged that he saw a weapon," the victim was advanc-
ing,'9 or there was a fight.' Cases where there was a substantial tempo-
ral lapse were quite rare. Eighty-four percent (196/233) of the immi-
nence-relevant cases were coded as confrontational cases. Sixteen per-
cent (37/233) were cases that had allegations of significant time delay.
Based on standard statistical methods, we can say with significant con-
fidence that the conventional assumption about imminence-that it
arises (or should arise) only in connection with cases of long time
lags-is unlikely to describe case law.'
The same can be said of cases involving claims by a battered
woman. Battered woman cases were relatively uncommon-less than
a third of the total (70/233, or 30 percent). Nonconfrontational bat-
tered woman cases were even rarer, making up less than 10 percent of
the total set of imminence-relevant cases (21/233, or 9 percent). The
conventional wisdom has it that most battered woman cases fail be-
cause they fail an "objective" imminence standard:" for example, the
defendant kills the victim in his sleep, or there is a significant time lag
between threat and killing. One would expect, then, that if one gath-
ered all the cases involving a battered woman in which imminence was
raised, that those cases would involve claims of a threat involving a
significant time lag. Instead, just the opposite was found. As was true
of all self-defense cases, the vast majority-almost three quarters-of
battered woman cases in which imminence appears raised confronta-
tional claims (49/70, or 70 percent).93 Most battered women did not
claim that they killed when the man was asleep or long after the last
bout; they claimed they killed when they saw a gun, when he was lung-
ing forward, or when they were in the middle of a fight-and yet im-
88 Cannon v State, 615 S2d 1285, 1286 (Ala App 1993) (reporting that "appellant testified
that [the victim] was aiming his pistol at him and preparing to shoot as the vehicle approached").
The opinion reverses for failure to grant a self-defense instruction. In characterizing the issue,
the opinion states: "Whether an accused was in imminent danger when he used deadly force
against a victim ... is a question of fact for the jury." Id at 1288 (emphasis added).
89 See State v Spaulding, 298 NC 149,257 SE2d 391,396 (1979) ("There was testimony that
when the two of them went out into the yard, Simmons advanced on defendant with his hand in
his pocket.").
90 See, for example, Cooper v United States, 512 A2d 1002, 1003, 1006 (DC App 1986)
(reporting a quarrel between two brothers in which the victim "hit [the defendant] in the head
with a small radio" just prior to defendant's shooting the victim; defendant objects to jury
instructions on retreat; court invokes imminence to resolve the retreat issue).
91 We can say with 95 percent confidence that the conventional hypothesis is unlikely to be
true. Calculations on file with author.
92 See note 8.
93 Although the studies are not comparable for a variety of reasons, it is interesting to note
that Holly Maguigan found that 75 percent of battered woman cases in her survey involved con-
frontations. See Maguigan, 140 U Pa L Rev at 397 (cited in note 5).
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minence still figured in some way in the legal understanding of the
14
case (just as it does in cases involving male defendants). Again, we
can say with significant confidence that the general assumption that
imminence should arise only in battered woman cases that involve al-
legations of long delays is unlikely to describe case law. '
Only if one looks solely at the very small subset of nonconfronta-
tional cases do battered woman cases tend to appear in larger propor-
tions. Still, even in nonconfrontational imminence cases, claims by bat-
tered women were slightly more than half of all nonconfrontational
cases (21/37, or 57 percent). It turns out that nearly 40 percent of non-
confrontational claims were brought not by battered women, but in-
stead by men and male children (14/37, or 38 percent).9 If we elimi-
nate claims made by male children, however, the nonconfrontational
battered woman cases (twenty-one) substantially exceed the male
cases (six), but both represent extraordinarily small percentages of the
total universe of cases in this survey.9'7 As might be expected, battering
claims-whether made by men or women-heavily dominated the
small nonconfrontational universe (31/37, or 84 percent).
In interpreting these findings, three caveats should be taken into
account. First, it is important not to misconstrue my definition of con-
frontation. It is standard practice to conflate issues of time and threat.
Perhaps there is a dispute at trial: the defendant is claiming that the
victim reached for a gun but the state argues, to the contrary, that
there was no gun. The factual dispute in this case is a standard one, but
it is not a factual dispute about temporal matters; it is a factual dispute
about the quality or seriousness of the threat faced by the defendant.
If the state is right, the time does not expand-there simply is no
threat.
Second, another common conflation is between the likelihood of
the threat and temporal distance. It is common to use imminence as a
measure of the probability of a victim's actions. For example, a defen-
dant may claim that the victim's prior actions (shooting a gun) or prior
threats ("I'll kill you") made it more probable that the victim posed a
94 See, for example, Smith v State, 268 Ga 196,486 SE2d 819,821 (1997) (reporting that the
victim "continued to hit her and held a metal can over her head in a threatening manner,"
whereupon the defendant grabbed a pistol and shot the victim). Imminence arises in the context
of the court's discussion of the defendant's claims about battered woman syndrome. Id at 821-26.
95 We can say with 95 percent confidence that the conventional hypothesis is unlikely to be
true. Calculations on file with author.
96 Of the thirty-seven nonconfrontational cases, twenty-one were brought by a battered
woman, one by a battered female child, eight by battered male children, and one by a battered
man. Of the six remaining claims that did not involve battering, five defendants were male, and
one was female.
97 The nonconfrontational battered woman cases amounted to 21/233, or 9 percent of the
total; the nonconfrontational male and male children cases represented 14/233, or 6 percent of
the total.
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deadly threat at some later time. Again, this is a standard dispute, but
one which is less about the clock than about the likelihood of the vic-
tim's threat. If time is an issue in such cases, it is an issue of the past.
Presumably, a court worried that the jury might rely only on prior
conduct could so instruct the jury (without focusing on imminence at
all).
Finally, I am not arguing that time, as measured by the clock, is ir-
relevant to all of these cases. Few of the cases in the survey are as
clear as Watson in showing a contemporaneous fight based on undis-
puted evidence. There may well be cases here in which the state be-
lieves, quite rightly, that time as measured by the clock is an issue. But
if that were to occur in all of these cases, it would fail to explain the
findings of this survey. For if time has meaning in these cases because
the prosecutor is making an argument based on the clock, that does
not explain why time is found to have other meanings-meanings
other than the clock-in the vast majority of cases in my survey.
D. Finding the Meaning of Imminence
My survey shows that imminence is used as a proxy for other self-
defense factors-in some cases openly fault-based factors-in both
confrontational and nonconfrontational cases. When the court hears
an argument about jury instructions on the question of imminent
threat, courts often are considering the severity of the threat: was the
threat imminent in the sense of whether it was serious or probable to
arise?9 In other cases, they are considering the necessity of the re-
sponse or the possibility of retreat: was the threat imminent in the
sense that there were no alternatives to a deadly response? '°° In still
others, the court is concerned with the defendant's motive or emo-
tions: was the threat imminent in the sense that the defendant was act-
98 See, for example, State v Hundley, 236 Kan 461,693 P2d 475 (1985).
99 See, for example, McCracken v State, 914 P2d 893, 895, 898 (Alaska App 1996) (describ-
ing situation in which man in wheelchair killed caretaker after caretaker threatened to knock
him out of the wheelchair and caretaker "leaned forward as if to stand up"; at trial the "disputed
issues" involved whether defendant believed he was responding to an "imminent" threat); People
,v Martinez, 206 I1l App 3d 813, 564 NE2d 1271, 1279-80 (1990) (suggesting that the defendant
used disproportionate force to repel an attack of the victim, and then concluding that prior
threats were "insufficient evidence to establish a reasonable belief that [defendant] was in dan-
ger of imminent deadly or great bodily harm").
100 See, for example, State v Williford, 49 Ohio St 3d 247, 551 NE2d 1279, 1282-83 (1990)
(noting state's claim that the defendant did not prove imminence and emphasizes the fact that
the jury appears to have found the defendant had alternate means to escape besides the use of
force); Cooper v United States, 512 A2d 1002, 1004 (DC App 1986) (concluding that the jury
could consider whether the defendant could retreat in determining whether he was "'actually or
apparently in imminent danger'), quoting Gillis v United States, 400 A2d 311, 313 (DC App
1979).
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ing out of fear rather than malice? ' Finally, imminence also appears
as a question of aggression or provocation: was the threat imminent in
the sense that the victim (rather than the defendant) was the principal
aggressor? ' 2
1. The confrontational cases.
By far the most common way in which time carries meaning in
this survey is through the severity of the victim's threat. Indeed, the
vast majority of confrontational cases were ones in which imminence
appeared as a measure of the severity of threat or proportionality of
violence (140/196, or 71 percent). Typical of such cases are ones in
which the court concludes that there was no imminent threat because
the victim was unarmed, '°  was not in a physical position to pose athreat,'°' or was turning away or had gone."' In one sense, this is not
101 See, for example, In re Christian S., 13 Cal Rptr 2d 232, 235 (Cal App 1992) (reporting
that the trial court "focused on the substantial interval during which Christian aimed at Elliott
[the victim] before firing [in an ongoing confrontation], concluding he [the defendant] had suffi-
cient time to carefully consider what he was doing"), superseded on other grounds, 7 Cal 4th 768,
872 P2d 574 (1994); State v Jackson, 22 Ohio St 3d 281, 490 NE2d 893, 897 (1986) (concluding
that the jury believed testimony that showed the defendant "did not believe he was in imminent
danger" but instead that "appellant acted out of jealous anger toward the victim rather than out
of fear for his life").
102 See, for example, Ellis v State, 708 S2d 884, 888 (Miss 1998):
Even assuming that Ellis did in fact see Banks [the victim] flash a gun a few minutes earlier,
Ellis had clearly made himself the aggressor by continuing to chase down a victim running
for his life.... Under the facts of the present case, there is no reasonable probability that a
jury would have concluded that Ellis was in imminent danger.
103 See, for example, State v Spinks, 1998 Wis App LEXIS 306, *13-14 (holding defendant
"could not have reasonably believed ... that he was in danger of imminent death or great bodily
harm.... There was no evidence that [the victim] had a weapon or in any way posed a serious
threat to [the defendant].") (emphasis added); State v Gayden, 259 Kan 69, 910 P2d 826, 836
(1996) (finding no evidence Of imminent threat in a barroom brawl case because "[t]here was no
evidence that [the victim] was armed or displayed a weapon," only that he struck "one blow
against defendant with his hand") (emphasis added); People v Hoover, 250 Ill App 3d 338, 620
NE2d 1152, 1161 (1993) ("Although defendant claimed that she saw a shiny object on the floor
of the passenger side of the car, she admitted that she did not see Barker [the victim] with a
weapon. Therefore, defendant cannot claim that she was in imminent fear.") (emphasis added).
104 See, for example, State v LeFaber, 77 Wash App 766, 893 P2d 1140, 1146 (1995) (Schul-
theis concurring in part, dissenting in part) (stating that "the jury could have found that Mr. Le-
Faber reasonably believed Mr. Stephens [the victim] intended great personal injury, but that in
fact there was no imminent danger because Mr. Stephens was unarmed, still outside the house and
the police were presumably en route") (emphasis added), revd, 128 Wash 2d 896, 913 P2d 369
(1996); State v Blackman, 875 SW2d 122, 133 (Mo App 1994) (stating that the defendant "pos-
sessed both his own firearm and the victim's firearm and the victim had been shot in the chest
and in the hand. He [the defendant] was no longer in imminent danger."); State v Correa, 437 Pa
Super 1,648 A2d 1199, 1202 (1994) (noting that "Correa could not have believed that he was in
imminent danger from behind a locked door").
105 See, for example, People v Horton, 233 Ill App 3d 22, 598 NE2d 452, 455 (1992) ("The
defendant, however, was not in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm ... because Sulli-
van [who provoked the fight, although he was not the victim] had already left the premises.");
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surprising. The connection between imminence and threat is quite
common in everyday discourse. Indeed, it seems difficult to speak of
imminence without the notion of danger or threat or harm. On an-
other level, however, this should be surprising since imminence seems
to serve little doctrinal purpose here. If these cases do not involve
allegations of long waits between threat and killing, but of
spontaneous fights and confrontations, then the question raised is
whether imminence is simply superfluous.
If imminence operated only as a proxy for the threat's severity,
we might conclude that the terms "imminence" and "threat" were
inevitably conjoined, reinforcing each other, and that there was an
easy remedy in more economical prose. But many confrontational
cases show that other meanings are at work alone or in addition to the
severity of threat (120/196, or 61 percent).' Imminence may be con-
structed in the image of the defendant's motives, emotions (29/196, or
15 percent), or perceptions (63/196, or 32 percent), the defendant's
ability to exercise alternatives (28/196, or 14 percent), or the defen-
dant's responsibility for the confrontation (aggression or provocation)
(29/196, or 15 percent).'7
To see how imminence might operate as a proxy for these kinds
of issues, consider In re Christian S., r a case involving a juvenile who
was being taunted by a skinhead named Elliott.' There was no dis-
pute that the defendant, Christian, had killed Elliott after an extended
set of confrontations on a beach, each time pointing the gun but then
running away. The question was whether the presence of malice afore-
thought had been sufficiently established in the trial court." To the
trial judge, time implied malice. It was the "substantial interval during
which Christian aimed at Elliott before firing" that convinced the
court of Christian's malice: the defendant "had sufficient time to care-
fully consider what he was doing."' Reversing, the appellate court in-
State v McCarter, 820 SW2d 587, 590 (Mo App 1991) ("[The eyewitness's] testimony would not
support a finding of imminent danger.... Rather, the testimony shows no visible signs [the vic-
tim] possessed a weapon; [the victim's] direction of movement was away from defendant; and
that defendant started to leave and shot as [the victim] headed for the house.").
106 Cases involving threats alone constituted 76/196, or 39 percent, of the total, leaving most
cases to have some meaning other than threat (120/196, or 61 percent).
107 If there is a good deal of evidence that time-talk is really a surrogate for questions of
fault, it is unsurprising to see not only cases in which imminence stands in for other self-defense
factors but also cases in which time disappears as a factor when fault is clear. See, for example,
Hart v State, 637 S2d 1329, 1336-38 (Miss 1994) (stating that in a case in which the defendant
clearly pursued the victim and provoked the confrontation, the defendant cannot claim self-
defense no matter how imminent the ultimate threat).
108 20 Cal App 4th 1210, 13 Cal Rptr 2d 232 (1992), superseded on other grounds, 7 Cal 4th
768,30 Cal Rptr 2d 33,872 P2d 574 (1994).
109 13 Cal Rptr 2d at 233.
110 Id at 235-36.
111 Idat235.
2001] 1257
1258 The University of Chicago Law Review [68:1235
terpreted the meaning of time rather differently, finding lack of mal-
ice...2 "Elliott's repeated threats and his continued pursuit of Christian
in the face of his request to be left alone confirmed the immediacy of
thaf risk.""3
Notice what has happened here: the clock did not change, but its
meaning did. There was no dispute between the trial and appellate
courts about the actual temporal lapse between the threat and the
shooting. To the trial court, time signified Christian's malice, his mo-
tive or emotion. To the appellate court, it signified a different set of
emotions and a lack of motive-Christian's fear of Elliott's taunts."
For both courts, imminence served as a proxy for emotion and motive,
fear or malice." '
If the motive/emotion cases make clear that imminence can ab-
sorb meanings that seem far more "interior" and "personal" -even
subjective-than the clock, cases linking imminence and alternatives
show how time may cast more than one meaningful shadow. In these
cases, a finding of no imminence was a way of saying that the defen-
dant did not really "need" to kill, in that there were easily available
choices other than deadly violence. The defendant might have left
through the kitchen door, he might have simply "locked" his home,
112 Id at 238.
113 Id.
114 In re Christian S. is not alone in its equation of imminence with motive and emotion. See,
for example, Commonwealth v Pike, 428 Mass 393, 701 NE2d 951, 956 (1998) ("This testimony
indicates that the defendant threw the radio at Holmes [the victim] out of a feeling of anger or
revenge resulting from the first stage of the altercation. It does not support at all the contention
that he acted out of fear of 'imminent danger of death."'), quoting Commonwealth v Barros, 425
Mass 572,682 NE2d 849,853 (1997); State v Jackson, 22 Ohio St 3d 281,490 NE2d 893,897 (1986)
(concluding that the jury believed the state's witnesses when they said that the defendant did not
believe in an imminent threat because "testimony showed that appellant acted out of jealous an-
ger toward the victim rather than out of fear for his life"); People v Trevino, 200 Cal App 3d 874,
246 Cal Rptr 357,360 (1988):
The party killing is not precluded from feeling anger or other emotions save and except
fear; however, those other emotions cannot be causal factors in his decision to use deadly
force.... But if the only causation of the killing was the reasonable fear that there was im-
minent danger ... then the use of deadly force in self-defense is proper regardless of what
other emotions the party who kills may have been feeling but not acting upon.
115 The trial court emphasized the interval of time before the shooting to support a finding
of malice by equating time with deliberation. 13 Cal Rptr 2d at 235. The appellate court con-
cluded that the threat did not have to be imminent to negate malice; all that was necessary was a
finding that the defendant had a sincere (even if unreasonable) fear of an imminent threat. Like
the trial court, then, the appellate court transformed time into a question of mind (a belief in an
imminent threat) and emotion (fear). Id at 238.
116 Although I believe the equation of retreat and imminence should be more controversial
given that the retreat issue has caused great division in the law of self-defense, it is hardly the in-
vention of my imagination. It can be found in Black's Law Dictionary 676 (West 5th ed 1979)
(defining "imminent danger" as being "such as cannot be guarded against by calling for the assis-
tance of others or the protection of the law") (emphasis added).
2001] Self-Defense and Subjectivity 1259
waited for the police, or avoided the confrontation after it began. "7 As
one judge explained, "[t]he existence of alternatives to homicide ...
goes to the reasonableness of the defendant's belief that he was in
imminent danger of death or great bodily harm. ' .8
Indeed, in some states, the link between imminence and alterna-
tives has been acknowledged openly. Some courts, for example, have
rejected jury instructions that specifically equate time and alternatives
on the ground that this re-creates a rule of retreat. In Craig v State,"9
where the killing resulted from a physical fight, the court rejected, as
inappropriate, a jury instruction defining an imminent threat as one
"so urgent that there is no reasonable mode of escape except to take
life" on the theory that there was no rule requiring retreat in that ju-
risdiction.'O Other jurisdictions appear to have taken the opposite
view. In New Jersey and Ohio, for example, courts define imminence
as requiring a judgment of appropriate alternatives, as a danger "that
could only be forestalled or escaped by a resort to the use of force."'.
In State v Kelly,' for example, the New Jersey Supreme Court made
clear that the imminence rule requires that an actor "who reasonably
fears that her life will soon be endangered .. . leave the danger
zone."'  Whether imminence is seen as reinforcing an existing retreat
requirement or as creating a new one, this survey makes clear that
such doctrinal links are not isolated cases. '
117 For examples of cases in which courts explicitly equate imminence and alternatives, see
State v Renner, 1994 Tenn Crim App LEXIS 581, *18-21 (affirming prosecution's right to ques-
tion defendant on whether "he could have left through the kitchen door and avoided confronta-
tion" even though there was no duty to retreat because "leaving through the kitchen door" was
relevant to the credibility of defendant's fear and thus, to the "imminen[ce of] danger of death or
serious bodily injury") (emphasis added); State v Williford, 1988 Ohio App LEXIS 1906, *24-25
(rejecting the state's argument-that defendant was not entitled to a self-defense instruction be-
cause the danger was not imminent and "appellant had alternative means of escape, presumably
to lock his front door behind him"-even though acknowledging defendant was not required to
retreat); State v Williams, 470 S2d 617,620 (La Ct App 1985) ("The evidence shows that the de-
fendant did not believe himself in imminent danger of receiving great bodily harm. He could eas-
ily have returned to his own house, which was next door, and avoided any confrontation with the
victim."), revd, 483 S2d 999 (La 1986) (concluding that the defendant did act in self-defense).
118 Patterson v State, 682 P2d 1049, 1053-54 (Wyo 1984) (Rose concurring) (affirming lower
court's refusal to provide a jury instruction on self-defense).
119 660 S2d 1298 (Miss 1995).
120 Id at 1299-1300.
121 State v Eng, 1994 Ohio App LEXIS 4655, *6.
122 97 NJ 178,478 A2d 364 (1984).
123 Id at 385 n 23.
124 See Bechtel v State, 1992 Okla Crim 55,840 P2d 1, 12 (1992) (stating that there is a "pre-
sumption in imminence that the defender may find an alternative to the use of deadly force," and
therefore the court found it "necessary to address the duty to retreat, which duty is implicit in
said presumption") (emphasis added). Similarly, in the District of Columbia, imminence is part
of the "retreat" calculation. In Cooper v United States, 512 A2d 1002 (DC App 1986), the defen-
dant alleged that he killed his brother after an altercation in which the brother had hit him over
the head with a radio; the defendant objected to the failure to give a favorable no-retreat instruc-
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2. Battered woman confrontational cases.
If time carries multiple meanings in self-defense cases in general,
the question becomes whether this also occurs in the smaller subset of
cases involving a battered woman defendant. My survey shows that
imminence can be found operating as a surrogate for motive, alterna-
tive, and aggression in battered woman confrontational cases, as it
does in cases not involving battering. Many of the battered woman
cases in this survey involved what I will term "weak" prompting
threats in a violent context-a claim that the defendant believed the
victim was moving toward a gun, that the victim had his "hands
raised" as if in attack, or that the victim was moving suspiciously or
threateningly. 1 25 In this sense, these cases look similar to many standard
self-defense claims, where the male defendant hears a "noise like
branches shaking,"26 believes "the guy was reaching like he was reach-
ing for a weapon,' '27 or believes that "there was a shiny object. '  Like
their male defendant counterparts, the battered woman cases often in-
clude arguments in which imminence serves as a proxy for the seri-
ousness of the threat, the proportionality of the defendant's response,
or the available alternatives.
tion. Id at 1002. The court refused to decide the retreat question, preferring a "middle ground" in
which alternatives were to be considered under the rubric of "imminence." Id at 1006. There are
individual cases, and judges, in other jurisdictions that appear to make the same connection. For
example:
The jury must evaluate such perceptions in context.... Therefore, if they would "induce a
well founded belief..." that immediate defense against the impending danger was the only
means of escape from great bodily injury or death, the law of self-defense justifies use of
whatever force is necessary to "avert the threatened peril."
People v Humphrey, 13 Cal 4th 1073,921 P2d 1,14 (1996) (Brown concurring) (emphasis added),
quoting People v Scoggins, 37 Cal 676,684 (1869).
125 See, for example, State v Hodges, 239 Kan 63,716 P2d 563,564-65 (1986) (reporting that,
after beating, defendant killed upon being threatened), disapproved in part, State v Stewart, 243
Kan 639,763 P2d 572 (1988); State v Osbey, 238 Kan 280,710 P2d 676,678 (1985) (reporting that
defendant killed when victim reached behind record albums; defendant claimed she believed he
was reaching for a weapon). Of course, there were cases involving stronger threats. See note 71
(describing such cases).
126 State v Negrin, 37 Wash App 516, 681 P2d 1287, 1290 (1984) (describing claim in which
defendant shoots into woods because he finds evidence of a burglary and hears rustling in the
bushes and a loud stomping; a self-defense instruction was given at trial).
127 State v Bellino, 31 Conn App 385,625 A2d 1381,1385 (1993) (describing instructions and
indicating that a self-defense instruction was given at trial).
128 State v Fuller, 297 SC 440,377 SE2d 328,331 (1989) (reversing for failure to instruct that
the defendant could have acted in self-defense based in part on the fact that he saw the victims
"open the trunk of their car and also thought he saw a shiny object in [the victim's] hand"). See
also People v Spencer, 51 Cal App 4th 1208,59 Cal Rptr 2d 627,632 (1996) (describing claim that
the defendant shot when the victim "reach[ed] down to the floorboard of the car," believing the
victim "was pulling out a gun").
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Consider State v Hundley.'21 There, the victim had fled to a hotel
because of battering by her husband. "' Earlier in the day, he had
threatened to kill her. That night, he broke into her hotel room and
proceeded to brutalize and rape her." ' After it was over, he pounded a
beer bottle (a source of injury in the past) on the table and ordered
her to get him cigarettes.132 She felt threatened and reached for a gun
she had brought for protection. "Carl laughed tauntingly and said,
'You are dead, bitch, now!' . . .[and] reached for the beer bottle. 3 She
shut her eyes and fired.'34 The issue on appeal was whether the trial
court had properly instructed the jury in requiring an "immediate"
rather than an "imminent" harm.'35
Interestingly enough, of course, there really was no issue of im-
minence in this case if by imminence we mean a significant time gap
between the threat and the killing. No sleeping husband was present
in Hundley. At least temporally, Hundley's allegations are very far
from Judy Norman's. If Hundley's allegations are believed,13 she was
presented with a confrontational situation much like those of the
standard barroom brawl in which there is a fight or a threat and the
victim is "reaching for a beer bottle"'37 or pool cue, gives a hostile look
129 236 Kan 461,693 P2d 475 (1985).
130 The past history of violence was not disputed by the appellate court, which recounted
that the defendant's husband
had knocked out several of her teeth, broken her nose at least five times, and threatened to
cut her eyeballs out and her head off. Carl [the victim] had kicked Betty [the defendant]
down the stairs on numerous occasions and had repeatedly broken her ribs. Mrs. Hundley
[the defendant] suffered from diabetes and, as part of his abuse, Carl prevented Betty from
taking her required dosage of insulin ... [n]eedless to say, Betty Hundley went into diabetic
comas on those occasions.
Id at 475-76.
131 Id at 476. State v Stewart, 243 Kan 639, 763 P2d 572, 578 (1988) (summarizing the
Hundley facts):
Several weeks prior to the shooting, Betty [the defendant] had moved to a motel. Carl [the
victim] continued to harass her and threaten her life. On the day of the shooting, Carl
threatened to kill her. That night he forcibly broke into Betty's motel room, beat and
choked her, painfully shaved her pubic hair, and forced her to have intercourse with him.
132 Hundley, 693 P2d at 476.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 See id at 477-78.
136 See id at 477 ("None of appellant's evidence was controverted. The State's case was de-
pendent upon the jury believing from appellant's evidence there was no immediate threat to
appellant.").
137 See State v Hill, 242 Kan 68, 744 P2d 1228, 1232, 1236 (1987) (reversing for failure to in-
struct on self-defense in a case where an eyewitness claimed that the victim "raised her hand like
she had [an unknown object] in it with which she was trying to hit [the defendant]"); State v
Kelly, 131 Kan 357, 291 P 945, 946-47 (1930) (affirming the self-defense instruction given in a
case where the defendant said the victim gave him a "mean look" and withdrew his hand from
his pocket). These are cases in which a weak threat becomes a good deal stronger in the context
of an ongoing fight or threats of violence.
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and reaches into his pocket, or seems to have a "shiny object."'" In-
deed, it is not surprising that ultimately the appellate court in Hundley
resolved the threat issue in the defendant's favor, concluding that, in
the context of their relationship, Carl's threat ("you are dead") "was
no less life-threatening with him sitting in the motel room tauntingly
playing with his beer bottle than if he were advancing toward her. '39
As the Kansas Supreme Court later described the case, the defendant
was "clearly threatened in the moments prior to the
shooting[ ].,,.40
The important point to see here, for our purposes, is that despite
the appellate court's extended discussion of the difference between
the terms "immediate" and "imminent, 1 . the questions in Hundley
were not really about time. Instead, imminence served as a proxy for
the severity of the threat and the opportunity for withdrawal-
questions, in short, about proportionality, threat, and retreat. For ex-
ample, the state's answer to the defendant's claim was not about tim-
ing as much as it was about the banging of a beer bottle and whether
that was a severe threat.'2 Similarly, the dissenting judge equated time
with alternatives, concluding that the majority was incorrect because
Hundley had an opportunity to retreat. If only she had complied with
her attacker's demands and left to get the cigarettes, the dissenter ar-
gued, Hundley would have had a five-minute head start. '
If the battered woman confrontational cases were similar to the
rest of the population in the sense that imminence had meaning, these
cases also diverged in some respects. Often, the argument on appeal
was evidentiary: whether the trial court properly refused to permit
battered woman syndrome testimony.'" On *appeal, the court would
138 See, for example, Spencer, 59 Cal Rptr 2d at 632 (describing claim that the defendant
shot when the victim "reach[ed] down to the floorboard of the car" and the defendant believed
the victim "was pulling out a gun"); Fuller, 377 SE2d at 331. See also note 128.
139 Hundley, 693 P2d at 479.
140 Stewart, 763 P2d at 577.
141 Hundley, 693 P2d at 478-81.
142 Id at 477. At trial, the state argued that there was "no immediate threat." Id. Since there
was no time lag between the death threat/banging of the beer bottle and the shot, the argument
had to be one about the severity of the threat. On appeal, the state claimed that Hundley was
seeking to apply a subjective standard, implying that the death threat/beer bottle was not an ob-
jectively sufficient threat under the circumstances. Id at 478.
143 Hundley, 693 P2d at 481 (McFarland dissenting) (concluding that the harm to the defen-
dant could not have been imminent because of available alternatives and therefore the differ-
ence between imminent and immediate was harmless in this case). See id at 480, quoting Black's
Law Dictionary 675-76 (5th ed 1979) for the proposition that "imminent danger" means "such as
must be instantly met, such as cannot be guarded against by calling for the assistance of others or
the protection of the law."
144 See, for example, State v Koss, 49 Ohio St 3d 213,551 NE2d 970,974-75 (1990) (overrul-
ing prior Supreme Court of Ohio precedent that prohibited the use of battered woman syn-
drome evidence to support self-defense as an affirmative defense).
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discuss imminence but would do so in the context of the meaning of
syndrome evidence. Almost half of the battered woman confronta-
tional cases raised imminence in the context of a discussion of bat-
tered woman syndrome (24/49, or 49 percent). Indeed, it was a stan-
dard appellate account in which battered woman syndrome was con-
sidered relevant because of imminence-on the theory that a battered
woman has a different "perception" of the imminence of serious vio-
lence.' 5
More significantly, the battered woman cases diverged from the
general population in the degree to which they showed courts equat-
ing imminence with alternative courses of action: the defendant could
have called the police,'o had the victim arrested,' 7 or taken advantage
of a five-minute head start. ' There was a significantly greater per-
centage of battered woman confrontational cases in which imminence
appears as a surrogate for alternatives (47 percent) than other con-
frontational cases (20 percent). 14 9 At least some of these cases seemed
to equate imminence directly with retreat. When they asked the ques-
tion of imminence, courts asked not about time but whether killing
"was the only means of escape from great bodily injury or death.'' O
145 See id at 973 ("Expert testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome can be admit-
ted to help the jury not only to understand the battered woman syndrome but also to determine
whether the defendant had reasonable grounds for an honest belief that she was in imminent
danger when considering the issue of self-defense."); Smith v State, 268 Ga 196, 486 SE2d 819,
821-26 (1997) (battered woman syndrome as relevant to imminence); Bechtel v Oklahoma, 1992
Okla Crim 55, 840 P2d 1, 12 (same); Commonwealth v Dillon, 528 Pa 417,598 A2d 963, 966-67
(1991) (Nix concurring) (same), affd in part, vacd in part as Commonwealth v Miller, 430 Pa Su-
per 297,634 A2d 614 (1993). Occasionally, a court would note the disconnect between a claim of
"imminence" and a confrontational situation and, on that basis, rule against the battered woman
defendant. See, for example, State v Sallie, 81 Ohio St 3d 673, 693 NE2d 267, 269-71 (1998) (de-
nial of ineffective assistance claim for failing to introduce battered woman syndrome testimony
on the theory that defendant's claim was "confrontational" and therefore the evidence would
have been inadmissible as "unnecessary").
146 See, for example, State v Moore, 568 S2d 612,617 (La App 1990) ("[The defendant] may
have been in some danger, but it was not imminent danger. Although the telephone was not in
perfect working order, it was still functional and could have been used to call for assistance.").
147 Commonwealth v Stonehouse, 358 Pa Super 270, 517 A2d 540, 544 (1986) ("At the time
he was gunned down the victim did not present a threat of imminent danger of death or great
bodily harm." Given the parties' relationship, physical separation at the time of the shooting, and
status as police officers, "[a]ppellant had ample time and opportunity to have the victim ar-
rested."), revd on other grounds, 521 Pa 41,555 A2d 772 (1989).
148 Hundley, 236 Kan 461, 693 P2d at 480-81 (1985) (McFarland dissenting) (arguing that
defendant could have had a "five-minute head start" if she had "failed to return with the ciga-
rettes" as the victim had demanded).
149 We can say with 95 percent confidence that the contrary hypothesis is unlikely to be
true. Calculations on file with author. There may be a number of reasons for this finding: it may
be, for example, that alternatives are arising more in these cases because battered woman syn-
drome evidence is more likely to be considered, and one of the "purposes" of such evidence is to
rebut the notion that "she could have left." For an explanation, see note 223 and accompanying
text.
150 People v Humphrey, 13 Cal 4th 1073,921 P2d 1,14 (1996) (Brown concurring) (emphasis
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Other courts equated imminence and alternatives via battered woman
syndrome testimony-the syndrome attempts to rebut the notion that
"she should have left" and the syndrome was viewed as relevant to the
legal question of "imminence. ' .5'
3. The nonconfrontational cases.
This leaves us with a small minority of nonconfrontational cases
(37/233, or 16 percent). 2 Interestingly enough, even though clock time
is an issue in these cases, courts did quite a bit more than simply refer
to the temporal. Indeed, in almost all of these cases (28/37, or 76 per-
cent),'53 courts made arguments similar to the ones we have seen
above in the confrontational cases, arguments based on other self-
defense factors. They claimed not only that the time was too long, or
that the attack was preemptive, but also that the defendant had time
to premeditate or to choose lawful alternatives, and that there was no
real threat or a disproportionate response. The nonconfrontational
cases, then, only serve to confirm what the confrontational cases tell
us: that imminence has a tendency to serve as a proxy, a convenient
added), quoting People v Scoggins, 37 Cal 676, 684 (1869). See also cases cited in notes 146-48.
Occasionally, a defendant's attempt to take reasonable alternatives to avoid the violence will be
used to support a finding of imminent threat. See, for example, State v Lynch, 436 S2d 567, 569
(La 1983) (noting with favor, in concluding that the defendant was faced by an imminent threat,
that the defendant "was trying to retreat and asked [the victim] to leave her alone") (emphasis
added).
151 See, for example, Bonner v State, 740 S2d 439,440 (Ala Crim App 1998) (noting that bat-
tered woman syndrome evidence may be admitted to "dispel the ordinary lay person's percep-
tion that a woman in a battering relationship is free to leave at any time"), quoting State v Koss,
49 Ohio St 3d 213,551 NE2d 970,973 (1990); State v Williams, 787 SW2d 308,313 (Mo App 1990)
(stating that "[t]he [battered woman syndrome] evidence rejected was necessary for a jury to
understand the defendant's perceptions of her situation, particularly her feelings that no escape
was possible, and her resultant conclusion that killing [the victim] was an act of self-defense");
Ibn-Tamas v United States, 407 A2d 626,633-34 (DC App 1979) (emphasis added):
[T]he government implied to the jury that the logical reaction of a woman who was truly
frightened by her husband (let alone regularly brutalized by him) would have been to call
the police from time to time or to leave him. In an effort to rebut this line of attack by the
government, the defense proffered Dr. Walker's [expert] testimony to ... [among other
things] provide a basis from which the jury could understand why [the defendant] perceived
herself in imminent danger at the time of the shooting.
152 For examples of such cases, see generally Ha v State, 892 P2d 184 (Alaska App 1995)
(holding that reasonable fear that the victim would someday kill the defendant did not constitute
fear of "imminent" harm for purpose of the defendant's self-defense claim); People v Aris, 215
Cal App 3d 1178, 264 Cal Rptr 167 (1989) (holding no self-defense where wife killed husband in
his sleep), overruled in part by People v Humphrey, 13 Cal 4th 1073, 921 P2d 1 (1996); State v
Stewart, 243 Kan 639, 763 P2d 572 (1988) (holding homicide not justified as self-defense by bat-
tered wife where no evidence of deadly threat or imminent danger); Jahnke v State, 682 P2d 991
(Wyo 1984) (upholding voluntary manslaughter conviction of son who killed father because son
premeditatedly attacked father without immediate provocation).
153 Even if we eliminate those cases in which threat alone is at issue, a majority of noncon-
frontational cases still use imminence as a proxy for other factors (21/37, or 57 percent).
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one-word symbol for a variety of legal arguments, arguments that seek
to adjudicate the relative responsibility of the parties for the conflict
(and, as we will see later, their relationship to the state). This occurred
in cases of male defendants" and female ones as well as in cases in-
volving battering " ' and those that did not. '
The nonconfrontational cases, like their confrontational counter-
parts, suggest important caveats for the traditional objectivist position
on imminence. Courts often say that imminence means that the vio-
lence must be "now," "at the instant," or "presently," but when pushed
to explain their results these courts often seem to refer to factors
bearing on the relative responsibility of the parties for the violence.
The defendant in Ha v State"7 had twelve hours between the fight and
killing, time measured not only in hours and minutes, but in the time
to change his course and to summon the constable. When he did not,
his act was deemed one of revenge.I" Similarly, the defendant in Peo-
ple v Aris,"9 who killed her husband in his sleep, had time to leave her
husband and move in with her aunt;'6' and for all we know, he might
have changed his mind about beating her again. 16 Of course, once ex-
pressed this way, we can begin to see that time has proceeded very far
from the clock. We only get to these questions, however, if we consider
the possibility that, even in cases where time has an objective referent,
it may also carry other meanings.
154 See, for example, Ha, 892 P2d at 195 (equating time with the time to seek legal redress:
"The evidence at Ha's trial shows that Ha [the defendant] had ample opportunity to inform oth-
ers of his conflict with Buu [the victim] and to seek their assistance.") (emphasis added). See also
id, equating a twelve-hour time gap between fight and killing with emotion (lack of fear).
155 Aris, 264 Cal Rptr at 173 (equating time with seriousness of threat: an immediate, rather
than a prior threat, is required "because it may be that the party making the threat has relented
or abandoned his purpose, or his courage may have failed, or the threat may have been only idle
gasconde [sic], made without any purpose to execute it"); id (equating time with alternatives: an
imminent threat is one "so urgent as to afford no reasonable mode of escape other than by kill-
ing"), quoting People v Fowler, 178 Cal 657, 174 P 892, 898 (1918). The Aris court further argued:
The law of self-defense, whether perfect or imperfect, does not provide an alternative means
of resolving the battered woman's problem. For resolution of that problem, a battered
woman must look to other means provided by her family, friends, and society in general
such as restraining orders, shelters, and criminal prosecution of the batterer.
264 Cal Rptr at 174 (emphasis added).
156 See generally Ha, 892 P2d 184.
157 892 P2d 184 (Alaska App 1995).
158 See id at 195 (stating that the defendant had ample opportunity to seek legal redress); id
at 196 (explaining that the defendant had no reasonable fear of imminent danger when he
"hunted Buu [the victim] through the streets of Dillingham and then shot him from behind").
159 215 Cal App 3d 1178,264 Cal Rptr 167 (1989), overruled in part by People v Humphrey,
13 Cal 4th 1073, 921 P2d 1 (1996).
160 264 Cal Rptr at 174 ("The law cannot allow her to shoot her husband instead of, as was
the case here, inconveniencing her out-of-state aunt by moving in with her.").
161 See note 155.
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III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DOCTRINE AND THEORY
OF SELF-DEFENSE
If my survey is right, then it should no longer be sufficient to
wave one's hand at the clock and insist that the justificatory principles
of self-defense depend upon an "objective" imminence requirement
without, at the same time, explaining precisely what the imminence
requirement means. Nor should it be sufficient to conclude that the
problem of imminence is relegated to the relatively rare battered
woman case. Instead, it should be seen for what it is-a problem that
affects all self-defense cases. My argument is not that time has no ob-
jective meaning in the law or in life; it is that the assertion of its objec-
tivity is too often incomplete. By studying the meaning of imminence,
we may shed light not only on the problems of this particular doctrinal
rule, but more generally on the debate about subjectivity and objectiv-
ity within the criminal law.
In this Part, I consider some of the implications of my findings for
the doctrine and theory of self-defense. In Part III.A, I argue that im-
minence may take back with one hand what the law provides with the
other hand in other self-defense rules (particularly, the retreat doc-
trine). In Part III.B, I urge that these contradictions reflect conflicting
models of necessity. Finally, in Part III.C, I argue that this is not ex-
plained or resolved by the ever-present debate about excuse and justi-
fication in the law of self-defense.
A. Doctrinal Disarray
If my survey is right, the law is routinely (if not invariably) impos-
ing a rule it considers to be about "time" in cases where "time" may
not matter. When a man is involved in a brawl or suspects an attacker
is in the bushes, or sees a flash of a gun, and kills, time (at least as
measured by the clock) is not really the issue.6' Even if courts are sim-
ply using the term "imminence" loosely, there should be more concern
about this odd usage. There are obvious costs of misdirection-risks
that the law's apparent meaning is not its real one. Moreover, there
are risks of "double-counting," or "intensifying," accomplished by a
rule of imminence that simply repeats other factors (if imminent
threat simply means a grave threat, what do we gain by saying "grave
threat" twice?).' 6 But these costs are not simply ones of indeterminacy
and redundancy but also of potential inconsistency. If imminence
162 Instead, the question is one of threat: was the flash in the woods a serious threat, serious
enough to provoke deadly violence, either as a matter of a reasonable perception in the situation
or without regard to the defendant's position?
163 Of course, if this were a measure of doctrinal tests, which are notoriously repetitive, then
that would not be much of a critique.
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serves as a proxy for other self-defense factors -questions of motive
and emotion and retreat-then scholars of self-defense should be
worried not only that imminence is sloppy but also that, as applied,
imminence invites doctrinal confusion. Indeed, they should be worried
that, despite the conventional wisdom that the elements of self-
defense are well-established and coherent, in fact the law of immi-
nence reflects deep conflicts in the law of self-defense.
This becomes particularly clear when one compares rules on
imminence with those on retreat (although potential inconsistencies
are not limited to retreat rules). For approximately 150 years, the law
of the United States has been in some conflict about retreat. 1 The ma-
jority view is that retreat is not required,", that in the words of an an-
cient Ohio decision, the "true man" may stand his ground in response
to an unlawful attack.f In a substantial minority of jurisdictions, how-
ever, the defendant must retreat if it is safe to do so. Both sets of juris-
dictions tend to restrict this rule to public places; retreat in the home
is not required in the vast majority of states, although some jurisdic-
tions make an exception for persons who reside together."' Now con-
sider how imminence may affect retreat rules. If, as my survey shows,
imminence serves as a proxy for "alternatives" (at least in some non-
trivial set of cases) then imminence may operate as a retreat rule-
even in those jurisdictions or situations that do not require retreat. A
court that asks whether the threat was imminent and means by this
question whether the defendant had any better, lawful choice is de-
manding the kind of second-guessing of alternatives that no-retreat
jurisdictions do not demand. The jury, told that it need not ask why the
164 For a survey of this debate, see Kahan, 113 Harv L Rev at 429-35 (cited in note 10).
165 LaFave, Criminal Law § 5.7(f) at 498 (cited in note 6) (stating that "[t]he majority of
American jurisdictions holds that the defender ... need not retreat"). Perhaps in a bit of wishful
thinking, academics have tended to downplay this rule, occasionally writing as if retreat were the
majority rule. See, for example, Paul H. Robinson and John M. Darley, Justice, Liability, and
Blame: Community Views and the Criminal Law 54 (Westview 1995) (noting that "codes typically
oblige a person to retreat before using deadly force"). Indeed, most scholars, following Beale
(great enemy of realists), seem to believe that any rule other than a retreat rule is positively un-
civilized. See, for example, LaFave, Criminal Law § 5.7(f) at 498 (cited in note 6) (stating that re-
treat "might be regarded as a more civilized view"); Joseph H. Beale, Retreat from a Murderous
Assault, 16 Harv L Rev 567, 582 (1903) (concluding that law exists to control individuals' uncon-
trolled impulses, "both forcibly and by putting an end to the necessity for their exercise"). Re-
treat goes to the core of the theory of necessity on which self-defense must rest; one cannot sim-
ply assume the proper theory by picking retreat over nonretreat. On competing ideas of neces-
sity, see text accompanying notes 179-200.
166 Erwin v State, 29 Ohio St 186,199-200 (1876) (stating that the "true man" cannot be ex-
pected "to fly from an assailant, who, by violence or surprise, maliciously seeks to take his life or
do him enormous bodily harm").
167 LaFave, Criminal Law § 5.7(f) at 498 (cited in note 6) (noting that "even in those juris-
dictions which require retreat, the defendant need not retreat ... from his home"); id § 5.7(f) at
499 n 72 (noting that the "majority view" does not require retreat of co-occupants).
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defendant did not go through the kitchen door, is still invited to ask
the same question, albeit in temporal form'-did the defendant have
the time to go through the kitchen door?... Thus, in the same case, a
jury may be told to ignore the fact that the defendant could have run
through the door (no retreat rule) and, at the same time, that they
must deny the defense if he could have run through the door (immi-
nence rule).
This risk of silent contradiction (imminence taking back what the
law gives in other guises) is not limited to a bare majority of jurisdic-
tions that never apply retreat rules. The risk of contradiction operates
even in those jurisdictions that typically require retreat. Imagine a
case in a retreat jurisdiction in which the court concludes that it will
not instruct on retreat because retreat could not be conducted in
complete safety or because, as in almost all retreat jurisdictions, re-
treat is not required in the home."0 The court instructs on imminence.
We are back again at the same potential inconsistency and, indeed, it
has become worse. For, here, the court has specifically concluded that
the jury should not be second-guessing alternatives and yet, having in-
structed on imminence, it may invite the jury to ask that very question.
Indeed, the jury may find that the defendant in the confrontational
situation should have "run through the door" and reject self-defense
even though the court has specifically found that running through the
door was dangerous.
Lest this seem academic, consider Ohio's tortured experience
with retreat and imminence."' Ohio is a retreat jurisdiction... but, like
many such jurisdictions, makes an exception for "the home" (the
home is a man's "castle" from which he should not be required to re-
treat). 3 At the same time, Ohio defines "imminence" in terms that
168 Since, by definition, time is not an issue in a confrontational case, the jury may well dis-
count the reference to time and simply ask whether there were alternatives.
169 These questions are not, of course, identical. But that is all the more reason to worry
whether "time" is serving a covert function as a retreat or other rule.
170 See LaFave, Criminal Law § 5.7(f) at 498-99 (cited in note 6).
171 Ohio is not the only jurisdiction where imminence and retreat have been explicitly con-
joined. See, for example, Cooper v United States, 512 A2d 1002,1004 (DC 1986) (concluding that
the jury could consider whether the defendant could retreat in determining whether he was "ac-
tually or apparently in imminent danger"). See also notes 117-24 (citing cases and jurisdictions)
accompanying text.
172 State v Thomas, 77 Ohio St 3d 323,673 NE2d 1339, 1342 (1997):
In Ohio, the affirmative defense of self-defense has three elements: (1) the defendant was
not at fault in creating the violent situation, (2) the defendant had a bona fide belief that
she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that her only means of es-
cape was the use of force, and (3) that the defendant did not violate any duty to retreat or
avoid the danger.
173 Id at 1342-43 (citations omitted):
[Tihere is no duty to retreat when one is assaulted in one's own home .... This exception to
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lower courts have acknowledged sound like a retreat rule: the "immi-
nence" requirement in Ohio is explicitly defined to mean a threat the
response to which was the "only means of escape,""' a threat that
"could only be forestalled or escaped by a resort to the use of ...
force.'". In most cases, this "imminence-as-retreat" rule may simply
seem a redundancy or perhaps an intensifier, requiring retreat "twice"
(once in the form of imminence and again in the form of retreat). But,
when retreat is not required (for example, when the killing is in the
home) conflict can easily arise, with imminence requiring retreat
where retreat rules do not. Lower courts have noted this issue but it
116
appears not to have been resolved. Indeed, the Ohio Supreme Court
has actually exacerbated the potential field of conflict by expanding
exemptions from retreat while, at the same time, endorsing an immi-
nence rule that seems to define imminence as retreat.1
the duty to retreat derives from the doctrine that one's home is one's castle and one has a
right to protect it and those within it from intrusion or attack. The rationale is that a person
in her own home has already retreated "to the wall," as there is no place to which she can
further flee in safety.
174 State v Williford, 1988 Ohio App LEXIS 1906, *22 (noting that "the slayer has a bona
fide belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that his only means
of escape from such danger was in the use of such force") (emphasis added).
175 State v Eng, 1994 Ohio App LEXIS 4655, *5-6 (stating that "the Defendant had an hon-
est belief that she or a member of her family was in imminent danger of death or great bodily
harm that could only be forestalled or escaped by a resort to the use of such force") (emphasis
added). And yet Ohio courts perceive retreat and imminence as separate requirements. See, for
example, State v Alvis, 1997 Ohio App LEXIS 3859, *9 (stating that "[blefore the jury can reach
the duty to retreat issue, they must determine if the defendant is in imminent danger of death or
great bodily harm").
176 As one court put it: "The [imminence] instruction ... in saying that it must find that de-
fendant's 'only means of escape from such danger was the use of such force' . . . places the bur-
den of retreating upon the defendant." State v Wolfe, 1985 Ohio App LEXIS 5696, *5. See also
State v Garrette, 1983 Ohio App LEXIS 13965, *6-7 (noting defendant's argument that the im-
minence instruction was inconsistent with the idea that she had no duty to retreat in her home;
appearing to agree that the imminence instruction implies a duty to retreat). It is worthwhile to
note that these cases were unpublished because they involved the controversial question
whether the courts should require retreat for cohabitants, a rule that was disputed primarily (but
not exclusively) by battered women. That controversy was esolved only much later by the Ohio
Supreme Court. See Thomas, 673 NE2d at 1343 (holding that a person attacked within the home
has no duty to retreat).
177 See Thomas, 673 NE2d at 1343. Early attempts to avoid this potential conflict found that
there was a duty to retreat even in the home. See State v Scott, 1995 Ohio App LEXIS 3880, *12-
15 (unpublished opinion) (rejecting a battered woman defendant's challenge to inconsistent in-
structions that she had no duty to retreat in the home, but that she had a duty to "avoid the dan-
ger"); Garrette, 1983 Ohio App LEXIS 13965 at *6-7 (rejecting a battered woman defendant's
claim that an imminence instruction impermissibly imposed a duty of retreat on the theory that
the defendant had a duty of retreat in the home). Ohio courts later reversed the position that
there was a duty to retreat in the home, first in a case of male-on-male combat, State v Williford,
49 Ohio St 3d 247, 551 NE2d 1279, 1282 (1990) ("there is no duty to retreat from one's home"),
and only seven years later (after innumerable cases) in a battered woman's case involving co-
habitants. Thomas, 673 NE2d at 1343.
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The skeptic might insist that the conflict between retreat and im-
minence means little because retreat is only one possible source of
contradiction. However, the risk applies as well to other self-defense
factors. Consider a case, for example, where imminence operates as a
surrogate for motive or emotion. A jury finds, in ruling on a premedi-
tated murder charge, that the defendant did not deliberate, but then,
in the course of ruling on self-defense, finds itself concluding that
there was no imminent threat because the defendant acted out of re-
venge rather than fear. A jury has thus found both that the homicide
was not deliberate (when it considers mens rea) and deliberate (when
it considers imminence). Similar difficulties apply in the case of ag-
gression and provocation. Aggressors are generally denied a self-
defense claim. "8 Juries are typically instructed that they must deter-
mine whether the defendant is in fact the "aggressor." Now imagine a
jury that concludes that the defendant is not the "aggressor," but that
there was no "imminent threat" because the threat was the defen-
dant's own responsibility (he acted first). The jury will have found
both that the defendant was not an aggressor and that he was. And
these theoretical possibilities are all heightened by the fact that the
clock may be unavailable as an objective referent for "imminence."
Remember, in this survey, the vast majority of self-defense cases on
appeal raising the imminence issue involved confrontational allega-
tions. In such cases, the law that focuses on imminence simply invites
judges and juries to read imminence as a proxy for other factors.
B. Questions of Theory
Some have suggested that the way out of the imminence dilemma
is to focus on "necessity.'.. 9 Professors Schulhofer and Robinson, for
example, have argued that we eliminate the imminence requirement
altogether." Others have urged that necessity takes priority over im-
178 See LaFave, Criminal Law § 5.7(e) at 497 (cited in note 6) (stating that an aggressor
generally "may not avail himself of the defense of self-defense").
179 The skeptic might also argue that all I have found is a small subset of the total set of ap-
pellate self-defense cases and imminence cases are likely to be a relatively small problem. This is
possible, but unlikely. If imminence were limited to cases involving time gaps, it would present a
small problem, but this is not how courts appear to be using the requirement. And, even if the
relative portion of a full appellate sample were smaller than my survey shows, the critic would
still have to show that this kind of confusion does not affect the case at other stages-during
charging, jury deliberation, etc.
180 Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Gender Question in Criminal Law, 7 Soc Phil & Pol 105, 127
(Spring 1990) (arguing that "the traditional insistence on a literally 'imminent' infliction of great
bodily harm must be abandoned outright" because the correct inquiry is the necessity of the bat-
tered woman's action rather than "imminence per se"). See also Robinson, Criminal Law De-
fenses § 131(b)(3) at 76-77 (cited in note 38) (stating that "proper application of the necessity
requirement would seem adequate to prevent potential abuse of a justification defense in cases
where the force is not imminent").
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minence. '8' Unfortunately, these moves do not resolve the potential for
conflict in the law of imminence; they simply transform the question
of the meaning of imminence into the meaning of necessity, bringing
us to the most fundamental, yet unresolved, questions in the theory of
self-defense.
If, as some have asserted, imminence is a "translator" of a neces-
sity principle,' it translates two opposing views of necessity-
necessity as aversion to violence (one needs to avoid violence at all
costs) and necessity as liberty and right (one needs to respond to
wrongful threats). Those theorists, like George Fletcher, who urge that
an imminence requirement is essential to a justified self-defense claim,
do so based on a theory of self-defense that is heavily invested with
pacifism and social responsibility toward the victim's interest in life. '
The idea is that a defendant's act is justified when necessary, where
necessity means that the defendant had "no" alternative but to kill.'
But this is not the only available view of necessity. Theories of self-
defense that focus on autonomy do so on the basis that "[r]ight need
never yield to wrong.''85 The argument is that the killing is "necessary"
when it serves to right the wrong of a deadly attack.
These ideas of necessity, in turn, present two conflicting theories
of self-defense: one theory I will dub "pacifist," the other "libertar-
ian."' The pacifist stresses a view of necessity that depends upon the
181 Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their Batterers, 71
NC L Rev 371, 406 (1993) (arguing for a "procedure" that "would retain the imminence re-
quirement in those cases in which it is a translator of the necessity principle, but would remove it
when it acts as a potential inhibitor").
182 See id at 380 (stating that "imminence has no significance independent of the notion of
necessity"; it is, "in other words, a 'translator' of the underlying principle of necessity, not the
principle itself"); Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses § 131(b)(3) at 76 (cited in note 38) (noting
that imminence should be viewed as a "modification of the necessity requirement").
183 See Fletcher, 57 U Pitt L Rev at 560 (cited in note 2) (discussing the "social point of
view" that requires a proportionality rule sensitive to the "competing interest" in life of the ag-
gressor); Fletcher, A Crime of Self-Defense at 33 (cited in note 2) (discussing the "social variation
of justifiable self-defense").
184 See Fletcher, 57 U Pitt L Rev at 559 (cited in note 2) ("Necessity speaks to the question
whether some less costly means of defense ... might be sufficient to ward off an attack.").
185 See Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law § 10.5 at 865 (cited in note 22) (describing the
German theory of autonomy).
186 1 have excluded, for textual economy's sake, a comprehensive list of theories of self-
defense, including one of the most popular, the lesser evil approach. See Robinson, Criminal
Law Defenses § 131(a) at 69 (cited in note 38) (stating that "[d]efensive force justifications rely
on [a] balancing of evils"). The "lesser evil" approach assumes what I am trying to put into ques-
tion. It gives us a method-consequentialism-without giving us much to go on in terms of the
substance of the "costs" and "benefits" at stake. See Fletcher, A Crime of Self-Defense at 34
(cited in note 2) (attributing to reformers of the 1950s and 1960s the impetus to look for the
"costs" and "benefits" of self-defense). Once we begin to consider the "costs" (for example, self-
help overkill and self-preference) versus the "benefits" (for example, protection of freedom of
action), we are back to considering the two elements of the theory considered here-avoidance
of violence and autonomy. However, we also have an added "commensurability" problem-how
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need for the defendant to avoid violence. The libertarian suggests, to
the contrary, that self-defense protects the rights of citizens to respond
to unlawful aggression. Unfortunately, neither the libertarian nor the
pacifist can claim to have won the debate about self-defense. Neither
theoretical position actually describes the law of self-defense."a
Although the pacifist position has become almost orthodoxy, in-
fluencing the work of Professors Fletcher,'89 Schulhofer,'9" Robinson,9'
and Ashworth," the law of self-defense remains to the contrary. Doc-
trine, as well as public opinion, is far more willing to insist on the pre-
rogatives of one wrongfully attacked than the pacifist theory suggests
or its adherents would hope.'93 The law positively permits self-help
remedies in the majority of jurisdictions, which allow the defendant to
"stand his ground" against an attack. Indeed, all jurisdictions permit
what might be considered excessive violence in some cases: no juris-
diction, as far as I am aware, limits the right of self-defense to deadly
threats. They all include threats of "serious" or "grave" bodily harm.'
are we to measure these features against each other? On these and other theories, see generally
Joshua Dressier, Justifications and Excuses: A Brief Review of the Concepts and the Literature, 33
Wayne L Rev 1155 (1987) (distinguishing forfeiture, rights, lesser harm, and public benefit theo-
ries). Perhaps more importantly, I have purposely sought to rephrase available theory to empha-
size the relation between defendant and state, which is important to my claim.
187 See A.J. Ashworth, Self-Defence and the Right to Life, 34 Camb L J 282, 289 (1975)
("This might be termed the 'human rights' approach... [and it] would result in a general duty to
avoid the use of force where non-violent means of self-protection are reasonably open to the
person attacked."). It also has affinities with Fletcher's "social variation of justifiable self-
defense" to the extent that it recognizes the rights of the aggressor. See Fletcher, A Crime of
Self-Defense at 34 (cited in note 2) ("Recognizing the humanity of the aggressor implies that in
some situations the defender must absorb an encroachment on his autonomy rather than inflict
an excessive cost on the aggressor."). In theory, I would argue that the pacifist position actually
goes much further than the legal academy has thought. It asks whether it is ever possible to be
morally justified in killing someone who also has a right to live. See generally Cheyney C. Ryan,
Self-Defense, Pacifism, and the Possibility of Killing, 93 Ethics 508 (1983).
188 In a sense this should not be surprising since both positions, one by emphasizing the de-
fendant's relationship to society and the other the defendant's relationship to the victim, focus
on different aspects of a defense. It also makes sense because these theories, taken to their logi-
cal extreme, would mean either a sharp curtailment of the defense (in the case of the pacifist
theory) or an extraordinary expansion (in the case of the libertarian theory).
189 See generally Fletcher, A Crime of Self-Defense (cited in note 2).
190 See generally Schulhofer, 7 Soc Phil & Pol 105 (cited in note 180).
191 See generally Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses (cited in note 38).
192 See generally Ashworth, 34 Camb L J 282 (cited in note 187).
193 Professors Robinson and Darley express consternation that "Americans [] stereotypi-
cally 'stand their ground,' and our subjects seem to want them to even when the legal codes say
they should not." Robinson and Darley, Justice, Liability, and Blame at 60 (cited in note 165).
194 See note 65. Although acknowledging this, treatises routinely attempt to reconcile the
"bodily harm" rule with a pacifist view of necessity by arguing that there is an additional "neces-
sity" element that modifies the bodily harm rule. See LaFave, Criminal Law § 5.7(b) at 492 (cited
in note 6) (stating that "deadly force" may be used when the attacker "is about to inflict unlawful
death or serious bodily harm" but qualifying the statement by requiring "that it is necessary to
use deadly force to prevent it"). Again, from my view, this simply assumes that which is to be
proven-the idea of necessity upon which self-defense should be built. Necessity is not a sepa-
Self-Defense and Subjectivity
If the law were to take seriously the notion that the defendant should
"avoid" violence, why does it not require that defendants warn, an-
nounce, or shoot in the air if they could do so safely? And yet there
has never been a general "shoot-in-the-foot-first" rule-a defendant
need not shoot to disable to sustain a self-defense claim."' If necessity
were to mean what the pacifist theory suggests, it would effectively
require retreat in every jurisdiction, a state of affairs that does not ac-
cord with present doctrine. In short, the law's necessity is not always
as "necessary" as it may seem, if by necessary we mean that the de-
fendant must choose the "least violent" or "most pacifist" alternative.
The libertarian claims a far different idea of necessity. This argu-
ment emphasizes the wrong inflicted on the defendant and his right to
respond. The implicit claim is that the law of self-defense must recog-
nize society's interest in preventing "private warfare," but that if we go
too far in discouraging self-help, the citizenry will become the defense-
less prey of the violent-that, as A.V. Dicey put it, "loyal subjects [will]
become the slaves of ruffians.' Under the libertarian theory, the vic-
tim's provocative violence constitutes an assertion of superiority over
the defendant which must be answered if for no other reason than to
support the notion of the "right" -to acknowledge the defendant's
acts as those of the law-abiding.'"
Like its pacifist opponent, however, the libertarian theory fails to
describe current doctrine. The law in most jurisdictions refuses to look
solely to the "wrong" of the victim/aggressor as the sole measure of
rate element of self-defense; it is a theory which must consistently modify the entire defense.
195 Indeed, courts of the nineteenth century explicitly declined to adopt such a rule. See
Rowe v United States, 164 US 546, 558 (1896) ("[lIt was error to make the case depend in whole
or in part upon the inquiry whether the accused could, by stepping aside, have avoided the at-
tack, or could have so carefully aimed his pistol as to paralyze the arm of his assailant without
more seriously wounding him."); Baltrip v Texas, 30 Tex App 545, 17 SW 1106, 1107-08 (1891)
("Upon the subject of self-defense the [trial] court charged 'that the killing would not be justifi-
able by self-defense if the apprehended danger of serious bodily harm or death could have been
prevented by the use of less violence than taking the life of the deceased.' Under repeated deci-
sions of this court, this charge is erroneous."). This principle is part of Justice Holmes's most fa-
mous opinion on self-defense, Brown v United States, 256 US 335,343 (1921) ("[I1t is not a condi-
tion of immunity that one ... should pause to consider whether a reasonable man might not
think it possible ... to disable his assailant rather than to kill him.").
196 A.V Dicey, Law of the Constitution 489 (8th ed 1915):
The rule which fixes the limit of self-help must, from the nature of things, be a compromise
between the necessity, on the one hand, of allowing every citizen to maintain his rights
against wrongdoers, and the necessity, on the other hand, of suppressing private warfare.
Discourage self-help, and loyal subjects become the slaves of ruffians. Over-stimulate self-
assertion, and for the arbitrament of the courts, you substitute the decision of the sword or
the revolver.
197 See generally Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jean Hamp-
ton, eds, Forgiveness and Mercy 111 (Cambridge 1988) (describing punishment (and by analogy
violence) as defeat).
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self-defense. Instead, doctrine has consistently conceived of the rules
of self-defense in terms that demand that citizens defer to public
authorities. Almost all the rules of self-defense can be reconceived not
simply as rules that identify "real wrongs" (real threats, real lack of
options) but, as well, as rules that create a system that protects society
from vigilantism. Rules of proportionality and threat and retreat and
imminence insist that, in many situations, defendants walk away, call
the constable, and refuse to "substitute the decision of the sword or
the revolver" for that of the law."8
If the law has never really embraced either the pacifist or liber-
tarian vision of necessity, perhaps it should not be surprising to find
both these ideas unresolved in doctrine, submerged in places, like im-
minence, where they are difficult to see or judge.1'9 But, if this is right,
then we cannot confidently solve the imminence "problem" by replac-
ing imminence with necessity, or by claiming priority for necessity, or
by demanding that imminence means the pacifist rather than the lib-
ertarian version of necessity. Each of these positions simply poses the
question; it does not answer it."O
C. Necessity, Excuse, and Justification
If we cannot answer the imminence question by assuming one
side of the necessity debate, neither can we answer it by referring to
the distinction between excuse and justification. Some argue, for ex-
ample, that if we can only decide whether self-defense is an excuse,
then we might be able to resolve the problems of subjectivity and the
198 Dicey, Law of the Constitution at 489 (cited in note 196).
199 Jurors often find the law of self-defense quite confusing and, in their questions, reveal
conflicts. In Bechtel v State, 1992 Okla Crim 55, 840 P2d 1, 5-6 (1992), a case involving questions
about whether a battered wife killed during an extended physical fight, where she claimed that
the defendant had raised his arms as if to attack again after a lull in the battle, the jury was un-
clear about whether this was enough or whether there had to be an "active" confrontation. They
not only asked about "fighting and bickering at the time" (the imminence question), but also
about necessity: "Self-defense is permitted a person solely because of necessity. (1) Does this
mean or imply when no other options are available; or from (2) Defendant's viewpoint & circum-
stances." Id at 1, 13-15 (emphasis added). These two options represent the distinction between a
pacifist theory (no other options) and a libertarian theory (defendant's needs).
200 Implicit in my claim here and below is that we need a relational theory of self-defense.
Unfortunately, current contenders for legal theories of self-defense do not do a very good job of
considering the influence of relational norms, preferring to posit "end-states" of affairs (for ex-
ample, the pacifist's world of no violence) from which to reason. Meanwhile, doctrine shuttles
back and forth between an idea of necessity as described by a relationship of fault between at-
tacked and attacker and an idea of necessity as a relationship of citizenship that demands that
even the attacked withdraw. Both views are as dichotomously sketched as the early common law
distinction between the prevention of a felony and se defendendo. Neither helps in the difficult,
in-between cases (most appellate self-defense claims). If we are to resolve this dilemma we must
reconsider self-defense in a different key, not as a set of values or functions or end-states but as a
question of the key relationships involved between citizens and between citizens and state.
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battered woman, giving her an "excuse," and leaving "real" self-
defense for other claims. Objectivity is then left to the justified side of
the debate, subjectivity to the excuse side.
In my view, this confuses two different claims. Every criminal law
defense implicates two different relations: the relationship between
the defendant and the victim and the relationship between the defen-
dant and the state. °' The libertarian theorist focuses almost exclusively
on the relationship of "wrong" between the defendant and the victim,
making the relationship of the defendant to the state irrelevant. By
contrast, the pacifist focuses primarily on the relationship of the de-
fendant to the state, emphasizing that the defendant should defer to
state law enforcement processes (and that this is essential to maintain
respect for others' right to life). In my own view, both relationships
must be considered, not balanced or pitted against each other. Any-
time a defendant makes a claim of defense, whether it is a claim of
self-defense or duress or provocation, he claims in part that he did no
wrong or should be excused from any wrongful harm he did to that
victim. But, in considering such defensive claims, there is always the
fear that, by recognizing the defense, we grant the defendant the
power to legislate, to set the rules. This is, after all, what we mean, pre-
sumably, when we claim that Goetz and Menendez and Norman took
the "law" into their own hands-that their actions not only risked
harm to other human beings but also risked a world in which the de-
fendants' norms were law.
This distinction is important for a number of reasons. But here it
is important in defusing the claim that we can solve the problems of
self-defense by categorizing the defense as excuse or justification. One
of the rarely considered premises of the excuse/justification debate is
that defenses are naturally unified. If defenses point toward different
audiences, and instantiate different relations, however, then this unity
may be illusory. If Bernhard Goetz must not only claim that the boys
"wronged" him but also that his use of violence did not offend the
state, then it is possible that he is making a claim both of justification
vis-A-vis the boys (they were in the wrong relative to him) and a claim
of excuse vis-A-vis the state (I should have called the police but the
state had failed me in the past). We need not resolve such claims to
201 This is a fairly large theoretical claim. I have also discussed this in the context of provo-
cation. A fuller explication must await publication of a work in progress, V.E Nourse, The Politi-
cal Structure of Criminal Law (on file with author). George Fletcher is absolutely right when he
maintains that the law of self-defense is related to political theory. See Fletcher, 57 U Pitt L Rev
at 570 (cited in note 2) (arguing that the imminence rule "falls into the domain of political rather
than moral theory"). Indeed, I believe that until we understand the proper relationship of the
defendant to the state implied by the criminal law, we cannot possibly have a working theory of
the criminal law consistent with a democratic order and its commitments to equality.
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see that two different issues are at stake, to see that self-defense may
be simultaneously a claim of justification with respect to the victim (a
question and relation of wrong) and a claim of excuse with respect to
the state (I was wrong not to the call the police, but please excuse
me).2" Put another way, self-defense may (in any individual case) be a
claim both of excuse and of justification. And, if that is right, then we
cannot confidently claim that the excuse/justification debate solves
the problem of either the proper theory of necessity or the meaning of
imminence.
D. Self-Defense and Objectivity
In the end, what does this tell us of the objectivist position on
imminence? It tells us that it is not enough for the objectivist to claim
that imminence or even necessity is objective without completing the
thought: objective about what? Of the many meanings that imminence
might reflect, what meaning is it objective about? Similarly, of the
many meanings that necessity might have (I "need" to do this because
I want to, my choices are restricted, or I have no choices at all) what
meaning are we claiming as objectively determinate? To answer these
questions, in the end, requires less of the insistence one tends to hear
in the voices of those who cry "but imminence is objective," and more
of a tempered and nuanced understanding of the content of the law.
Until and unless we can define necessity with some greater degree of
coherence, we are relegating ourselves to a law that risks both doc-
trinal and theoretical incoherence.
Perhaps more importantly, however, this very project requires an
acknowledgment that, to be truly objective, one must consider one's
relation to the knowledge at issue. Put another way, one must have the
humility to consider the possibility that, in another age or social posi-
tion, in another world, necessity might look quite different. Once, to a
charge of murder, the duelist had a valid claim of necessary, justified
202 Debates about Goetz and Norman tend to confuse these two relationships. For example,
feminists have charged that to lump Norman in with Goetz is to suggest that a life of virtual
slavery is morally equivalent to a request, even a threatening one, for a few dollars. I agree, but I
would also add that the feminist claim is focusing on the defendant's relationship to the victim
and that there is a separate relationship to consider-between the defendant and the state. Both
Goetz and Norman made similar claims about their relationship to the state: both claimed, in es-
sence, that the state had failed them. Goetz claimed that he had been beaten up before, that the
state had done nothing, and so he "had" to take the law into his own hands. Far more compel-
lingly, given the history of the state's failure to protect women, Norman argued that the state had
failed her. Both were making claims that I would characterize as claims of excuse vis-a-vis the
state-claims that they should have called the police in theory but their choices were so severely
constrained as to merit compassion for their failures. Whether and how to resolve these latter
claims of state failure is a difficult question, but it seems to me it is a better question, and a more
interesting one, than those currently asked about these cases.
1276 [68:1235
Self-Defense and Subjectivity
self-defense. 23 Ask the nineteenth-century aristocrat whether, when
the glove was thrown, he "had" to act and he will say that he had "no
other choice," that it was "necessary"; ask him whether his reasons
were "objective" and the answer will be "yes." Today, we are more
skeptical about our aristocrats: we think the duelist could easily have
walked away; we think (from our distance) that his opinion was, for
that reason, subjective (contingent); we see quite easily (from our so-
cial and temporal distance) that the duelist "needed" to fight to sus-
tain his social position, one contingent upon a political theory we now
disavow. Put more abstractly, we see the "logic" of objectivity in the
social and political relations that completed his claims of necessity.
With this humility in mind, we might even pause to consider the
possibility that time-so apparently objective-may, from another po-
sition, seem more capable of meaning, more contingent, more reflec-
tive of social relations than we thought. This is not a claim of crude
relativism or even that we give up on the notion of objectivity (at
least, as aspiration or even intellectual method). It is a claim that ob-
jectivity requires an acknowledgment of its own limitations. Put more
pointedly, a more humble aspiration to objectivity might see that there
is always the risk that objectivity is simply a "projection racket," one
that projects onto the world that which we take for granted-indeed,
that objectivity assumes that which it seeks to prove. '
IV. SUBJECrIVITY AND FEMINISM
If the objectivist claim may now appear more contingent and
complex than we imagined, I would like to take the argument further
and also suggest that what we have seen as subjective may be more
objective than we thought. The hope of many, liberals and feminists
alike, has been that if only we soften the focus a bit, if we situate the
doctrine, if it becomes more sympathetic to the individual, then the
law will become more just. In this part, I argue that the subjectivist
view tends, much like its objective antagonist, to avoid the problems of
self-defense law in its present form. Perhaps more importantly, I urge
that, to the extent that subjectivism is associated with the feminist po-
203 Russell Hardin reports that in 1822 a duelist was acquitted based on necessity: The
court's justification for the acquittal was "the necessity, according to the existing law of society, of
acting as he did." Russell Hardin, One for Al: The Logic of Group Conflict 94 (Princeton 1995),
quoting V.G. Kiernan, The Duel in European History 208 (Oxford 1989) (emphasis added by
Hardin).
204 Those who urge the "objectivity" of the existing law of imminence believe that they are
proving its objectivity when, in fact, my argument suggests that they are assuming it. Of course, I
must perform the same experiment, and consider whether I have chosen a method, reading the
language of cases, that distorts my conclusion in favor of "meaning." Because of this self-
referential risk, I have tried to triangulate my method, looking at history, contemporary law, and
work in other disciplines to support the claim that imminence may have meaning.
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sition, it has tended to occlude, rather than expose, certain gender ine-
qualities. I say this because I think that the feminist position is a good
deal stronger, and more disturbing, than critics have assumed.
A. The Promise of Subjectivity
When battered woman self-defense cases first emerged in the late
1970s, litigators eagerly reached out to the notion of subjectivity to
help juries and judges understand the causes and incidents of batter-
ing.'O° This approach, pioneered by the important work of Elizabeth
Schneider, revolutionized self-defense law 2° and led to the wide accep-
tance of battered woman syndrome evidence. ° The theory was that if
only juries and judges could understand the individual woman's ex-
perience, then self-defense law could be reformed to accord more jus-
tice to women. Doctrinally, the reformers suggested that "imminence"
is really a question of the battered woman's "perspective" on immi-
nence, i.e. that a battered woman-because of her experience-is
more sensitized2 to the "cues" signaling violence.206
205 See, for example, Elizabeth M. Schneider and Susan B. Jordan, Representation of Women
Who Defend Themselves in Response to Physical or Sexual Assault, 4 Women's Rts L Rep 149,
156-57 (1978) (discussing courts' emphasizing subjectivity in self-defense cases with female de-
fendants).
206 See, for example, Ann Shalleck, Theory and Experience in Constructing the Relationship
between Lawyer and Client: Representing Women Who Have Been Abused, 64 Tenn L Rev 1019,
1019 (1997) (asserting that feminist activists such as Schneider have "transformed society's un-
derstanding of abuse against women by their intimate partners"); Peter Margulies, The Violence
of Law and Violence against Women, 8 Cardozo Stud L & Lit 179, 181 (1996) (arguing that bat-
tered woman self-defense law is an "origin story" in the struggle for women's equality under the
law).
207 It is worthwhile noting that, early on, Professor Schneider raised important questions
about the syndrome, arguing that the testimony was important because it described the experi-
ence of battered women but that it could also prove problematic if it focused exclusively on
women's victimization. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense
Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 Women's Rts L Rep 195, 197, 220
(1986).
208 Battered woman syndrome evidence often relies upon this sensitivity. See, for example,
People v Humphrey, 13 Cal 4th 1073, 921 P2d 1,15-16 (1996) (Brown concurring); Developments
in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 Harv L Rev 1498,1582 (1993) (explain-
ing that battered woman syndrome testimony may involve experts testifying that "because a bat-
tered woman is attuned to her abuser's pattern of attacks, she learns to recognize subtle gestures
or threats that distinguish the severity of attacks").
209 One can be quite sympathetic to these perceptual claims as a psychological matter
(which I am) and still wonder whether they really help resolve the problem. Mark Kelman has
asked some very tough questions about the notion of heightened perception, suggesting that it
may not really differentiate the battered woman from claimants like Bernhard Goetz who simi-
larly rely upon a history of violence to support their claims of imminent and serious threat. Mark
Kelman, Reasonable Evidence of Reasonableness, 17 Critical Inquiry 798,813-14 (1991). My own
view is that our intuitions differ in these cases not because of the prior history (the law has al-
ways conceded that history may have some effect upon the propriety of a self-defense claim), or
necessarily perception, but because the normative baseline of the relationships involved colors
our view of the relevance of the history. In Goetz, we suspect that the defendant sought to domi-
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This approach appealed to many because it unified criminal law
theory's focus on individuation of the criminal law (emphasizing the
210individual characteristics of defendants) with the needs of women.
And, for that reason, it met with a great deal of initial success. Jurisdic-
tions flirted with or adopted "reasonable woman" standards; " indeed,
a majority have, by legislative fiat if not judicial decision, permitted
the admission of expert syndrome testimony based on the defendant's
"subjective state," known as battered woman syndrome."' And, if
there has been some moderation in this effort, yielding for the most
part standards that are both objective and subjective, it has been in-
creasingly successful in sensitizing courts to the dilemmas of battering
as well as constructing the academic debate along the lines of "subjec-
tive" versus "objective" standards.
More recently, however, the subjectivized approach has come un-
der substantial, and in some cases, intemperate, attacks from the
criminal law academy. Some have insisted that a subjective approach
towards self-defense encourages lawlessness by allowing battered
women to kill with impunity long after the threat has subsided." ' Crit-
nate his attackers because of a view of his inherent racial and other superiority toward his vic-
tims; in the battered woman case, we see the woman as seeking to assert her dignity in the face of
an assertion of superiority by her attacker/mate. Because the history of violence purports to be
neutral with respect to these relationships (both have a history of violence and have a height-
ened awareness of its cues), neither history nor perception appears.to provide a distinction be-
tween the cases, unless one views the nature of the relationship at issue.
210 See David A.J. Richards, Introduction to Symposium on Self-Defense and Relations of
Domination: Moral and Legal Perspectives on Battered Women Who Kill, 57 U Pitt L Rev 461,
463 (1996) (noting that Schneider pioneered self-defense arguments for battered women in
terms of principles of individualization).
211 See, for example, State v Wanrow, 88 Wash 2d 221, 559 P2d 548, 559 (1977) (noting that
self-defense instructions must "afford women the right to have their conduct judged in light of
the individual physical handicaps which are the product of sex discrimination"). See generally
Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory
and Practice, 77 Cornell L Rev 1398 (1992) (surveying and critiquing this development).
212 As of 1994, one study found that "[e]xpert testimony on battering and its effects" had
been held admissible, at least in part, in "each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia" and
that "[t]welve states have enacted statutes providing for the admissibility of expert testimony."
The report noted, however, that "18 states have also excluded expert testimony in some cases."
Janet Parrish, Trend Analysis: Expert Testimony on Battering and Its Effects in Criminal Cases, 11
Wise Women's L J 75, 83 (1996). A subsequent government study had somewhat different find-
ings, noting potentially greater diversity among the states, but concluded that nearly 70 percent
of the states have found expert testimony "relevant to supporting a self-defense claim" and to
the defendant's "state of mind." See The Validity and Use of Evidence Concerning Battering and
Its Effects in Criminal Trials: Report Responding to Section 40507 of the Violence against Women
Act, NCJ 160972 (May 1996), cited in Clare Dalton and Elizabeth Schneider, Battered Women
and the Law 746 (Foundation 2001).
213 See, for example, Richards, 57 U Pitt L Rev at 464 (cited in note 210) (explaining that
facts concerning battered women, when properly introduced under an individualized standard,
help juries understand how and why a battered spouse might reasonably kill in self-defense).
214 See Dershowitz, Abuse Excuse at 5 (cited in note 3) (suggesting that battered woman
nonconfrontational claims "threaten the very fabric of democracy").
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ics from the left and right have no hesitation in likening battered
women to executioners. 2" Nor do they-and a good many others-
have any hesitation in linking this development with unhappy trends
in the law."' In the late 1990s, for example, there was a growing aca-
demic chorus charging that the problem with the criminal law was that
it had become too soft and subjective, and that battered woman cases
were, at least in part, responsible for that development.217
B. Imminence as Retreat Rule
The feminist emphasis on subjectivity has appeared to be a claim
that there is nothing really wrong with the "objective" rules that "sub-
jectivity" cannot cure. If my survey is right, though, there may well be
things that are "wrong" with the rules, at least where the rules are con-
sidered as reflective of relational norms. Consider what we know from
my discussion of imminence and retreat. The feminist position has
generally been hostile to retreat rules on the theory that they too eas-
ily dissolve into questions about why the woman did not leave the re-
lationship rather than whether the knife was poised above her head."'
By the 1990s, feminists had largely given up the battle, however, think-
ing that it had largely been won. "
There were good reasons for thinking retreat was not such an im-
portant doctrinal issue. For one thing, most jurisdictions do not re-
215 Fletcher, 57 U Pitt L Rev at 556 (cited in note 2) (discussing the case of Judy Norman,
who killed her sleeping husband, as one in which she put herself "in the position of judge and
executioner"); Wilson, Moral Judgment at 62-66 (cited in note 3) (discussing battered women's
nonconfrontational killings and suggesting that transformation of the concept of necessity would
authorize "private, paid executions" in such cases). Appellate judges have often engaged in this
rhetoric as well. See, for example, State v Stewart, 243 Kan 639,763 P2d 572, 579 (1988) (stating
that allowing a self-defense claim for the killing of a sleeping husband would "in effect allow the
execution of the abuser for past or future acts and conduct").
216 See, for example, Faigman and Wright, 39 Ariz L Rev at 79 (1997) (cited in note 4) (ar-
guing that "[t]he integrity of legal doctrine has suffered immensely" from the spread of syn-
drome evidence aimed at aiding battered women).
217 For general discussions, see Wilson, Moral Judgment (cited in note 3); Downs, More
Than Victims (cited in note 3); Dershowitz, Abuse Excuse (cited in note 3).
218 See, for example, Cynthia K. Gillespie, Justifiable Homicide: Battered Women, Self-
Defense and the Law 187-88 (Ohio State 1989) (arguing that rules requiring retreat in the home
are especially unfair to women defendants); Christine A. Littleton, Women's Experience and the
Problem of Transitions: Perspectives on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U Chi Legal F 23,36 (ar-
guing that retreat rules fail to comprehend the danger of attempting to leave the abusive situa-
tion and thus make "a mockery of the standard self-defense analysis regarding 'duty to re-
treat"').
219 In her survey, for example, Holly Maguigan found the doctrine of retreat led to few
"bad" trial outcomes. See, for example, Maguigan, 140 U Pa L Rev at 419 (cited in note 5) (find-
ing that "[a] survey of the cases analyzed shows that the duty to retreat was generally not the
cause of bad trial outcomes and that, in most of those cases where it was outcome-determinative,
it was the result of the rule's application rather than its definition").
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quire retreat "in the home," 0 where most battered women kill."' For
another, to the extent jurisdictions had exceptions to the castle rule
for "cohabitants" (which would require a battered woman to retreat
against her husband), courts have increasingly rejected such rules as
unfair to battered women, leaving the "retreat" problem to a few non-
conforming jurisdictions.m  Finally, almost all jurisdictions adopting
syndrome evidence have accepted the position that leaving is not the
proper question in these cases.
If, however, my survey is right, eliminating "retreat" rules is not
necessarily going to solve the "retreat" problem. If, as we have seen
above, imminence (or necessity or any other factor),may operate as a
proxy for a retreat rule, then we are back at square one. It is still pos-
sible that in battered woman cases a jury or judge will ask, via immi-
nence, whether the defendant should have run through the kitchen
door, or had a "five-minute head start," even if there is no retreat rule.
More importantly, once it becomes possible that imminence (or neces-
sity or other factors) can act as a silent retreat rule, the retreat prob-
lem is no longer limited to a few jurisdictions but applies to a vast ar-
220 Retreat is generally not required in one's home. See State v Thomas, 77 Ohio St 3d 323,
673 NE2d 1339, 1343 (1997) ("The majority of jurisdictions in the United States have held that
there is no duty to retreat when one is attacked in one's own home, regardless of whether or not
the assailant has a right to be in the home equal to that of the one being assailed."). See also
Maguigan, 140 U Pa L Rev at 419-20 (cited in note 5) (finding that most jurisdictions imposing a
duty to retreat "exempt from the duty to retreat those defendants who are attacked in their own
homes"); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separa-
tion, 90 Mich L Rev 1, 83 n 373 (1991) (same).
221 See Maguigan, 140 U Pa L Rev at 420 n 141 (cited in note 5) (finding that over two
thirds of confrontational and nonconfrontational cases studied occurred in the home).
222 See, for example, Thomas, 673 NE2d at 1343 (holding there is no duty to retreat from
one's own home before resorting to lethal force against a cohabitant with an equal right to be in
the home); Commonwealth v Derby, 451 Pa Super 100, 678 A2d 784, 785 (1996) (same); State v
Brown, 117 NC App 239, 450 SE2d 538, 540-41 (1994) (same); Bechtel v State, 1992 Okla Crim
55, 840 P2d 1, 13 (noting that a person has no duty to retreat where he is not an aggressor and is
"in a place he has a right to be"). But see State v Gartland, 149 NJ 456, 694 A2d 564, 569 (1997)
(stating that "New Jersey is among the minority of jurisdictions that impose a duty of retreat on
a woman attacked by her cohabitant spouse").
223 See, for example, Smith v State, 268 Ga 196, 486 SE2d 819, 822 (1997) (reporting that
"[e]xpert testimony was admitted to explain 'why a person suffering from battered woman syn-
drome would not leave her mate, would not inform police or friends and would fear increased
aggression'), quoting Smith v State, 247 Ga 612,277 SE2d 678,683 (1981); State v Koss, 49 Ohio
St 3d 213, 551 NE2d 970, 973 (1990) (stating that "'[e]xpert testimony on the battered woman
syndrome would help dispel the ordinary lay person's perception that a woman in a battering re-
lationship is free to leave at any time"'), quoting State v Hodges, 239 Kan 63, 716 P2d 563, 567
(1986); State v Kelly, 97 NJ 178,478 A2d 364,377 (1984) (noting that "[t]he crucial issue of fact on
which this expert's testimony would bear is why, given such allegedly severe and constant beat-
ings, combined with threats to kill, defendant had not long ago left decedent"). See also Com-
monwealth v Watson, 494 Pa 467, 431 A2d 949, 951-52 (1981) (stating that "[a] woman whose
husband has repeatedly subjected her to physical abuse does not, by choosing to maintain her
family relationship with that husband and their children, consent to or assume the risk of further
abuse").
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ray of jurisdictions. The syndrome may provide some counterweight to
this by instructing the jury about the difficulty of leaving, but since this
is offered as scientific fact and character trait rather than as legal
proposition, it may be inapplicable to any individual defendant not fit-
ting the appropriate psychological profile.
Indeed, in some jurisdictions, the conflict between imminence and
retreat sits on the face of the rules. For years, Ohio's lower courts
struggled with the question whether, in cases arising in the home, co-
habitants should have to retreat. Eventually, the state supreme court
decided, following the trend in other jurisdictions, to adopt a rule that
seemed "friendly" to the battered woman."' It said that battered
women do not have to retreat in their homes. But in that very case, the
court approvingly quoted jury instructions requiring a finding that the
defendant had no "other alternatives ' ' m - albeit through the definition
of an "imminent" threat. What may seem, then, on the surface to be a
gain for battered women in retreat rules may not be the gain it prom-
ised to be, if a court may take back with imminence what it has given
on retreat.2'
The conflation of retreat and imminence is particularly problem-
atic in battered woman cases because of the role that "leaving" plays
in common intuitions about these cases. As courts themselves have
made clear, the practice, if not the law, of battered woman cases re-
volves around the question whether "she should have left." As the
court put it in State v Kelly, 2 "the crucial issue ... is why, given such
allegedly severe and constant beatings, combined with threats to kill,
defendant had not long ago left decedent."229 In this atmosphere,
where experts and lawyers and judges are all thinking, if not talking,
about the question of leaving, retreat becomes the kind of "uncon-
scious" of the battered woman's case, driving the lawyers' arguments
224 Thomas, 673 NE2d at 1343. See also text accompanying notes 220 and 222.
225 Id at 1344 (recounting jury instruction stating that, to find for the defendant on the ques-
tion of self-defense, the jury on the "imminence requirement" must find that "Teresa Thomas
[the defendant] had an honest belief that she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily
harm and that her only means of escape from that danger was in the use of such force") (empha-
sis added).
226 This problem should not be seen as limited to those jurisdictions with an overt inconsis-
tency, such as Ohio. Even if there is no explicit doctrinal inconsistency, there is no guarantee,
given courts' ability to tolerate this at an explicit level, that it might not be tolerated in any indi-
vidual case at the application stage. More importantly, this is not the only kind of inconsistency
possible; it is only the most dramatic, the one that has the starkest implications given the continu-
ing debate about the wisdom of a retreat rule.
227 See text accompanying note 223.
228 97 NJ 178,478 A2d 364 (1984).
229 Id at 377 ("Whether raised by the prosecutor as a factual issue or not, our own common
knowledge tells us that most of us, including the ordinary juror, would ask himself or herself just
such a question.").
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and the jury's deliberations.m Overwhelmingly, courts have attempted
to thwart such assumptions by embracing battered woman syndrome
testimony-testimony intended, in large part, to explain that such as-
sumptions fail to describe the situation of the battered defendant. 1
The problem extends further, however, than the potential ques-
tion of "leaving"- it extends as well to the ways in which imminence
may absorb other norms disfavoring battered women. Courts have re-
fused to accept, as law or fact, the proposition that battered women
naturally invite this violence or provoke the attack or that the bat-
tered woman's situation reduces fear. 2 And, yet, if imminence is ca-
pable of absorbing meanings of motive and provocation, meanings as-
sociated with responsibility for the violence, it should not be surpris-
ing to find that these norms may be recapitulated in battered woman
cases-despite testimony or instructions to the contrary."' Put another
way, the jury instructed that it cannot assume women provoke vio-
lence may find that there was no imminent threat, not because the gun
was not pointed at the defendant, but because they believe the defen-
dant was in some sense responsible for "dating other men..2.And, if
that is right, shouldn't these same courts worry that they are creating
230 See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of
Self-Defense, 15 Harv CR-CL L Rev 623, 624-27 (1980); Mahoney, 90 Mich L Rev at 7 (cited in
note 220).
231 See text accompanying notes 212 and 223.
232 Battered woman syndrome testimony is seen not only as relevant to the question of why
the defendant did not leave, but also to the question of provocation and fear. See, for example,
People v Humphrey, 13 Cal 4th 1073, 921 P2d 1, 8-10 (1996) (indicating battered woman syn-
drome testimony relevant to rebut the prosecutor's argument that the threat on the day of the
killing was no more serious than it previously had been and therefore should not have inspired
fear of imminent danger); Brooks v State, 630 S2d 160, 161-62 (Ala Crim App 1993) (recounting
the testimony of an expert on battered woman syndrome that "[f]or a long time women who
stayed in battering relationships were felt to be either masochistic or to be emotionally disturbed
or else why would they stay. And the literature has not supported either of those theories. It ba-
sically says they stay because they are afraid."). For a general discussion, see Parrish, 11 Wisc
Women's L J at 75 (cited in note 212) (providing trend analysis on expert testimony concerning
battered woman syndrome).
233 See, for example, Bonner v State, 740 S2d 439,441-44 (Ala Crim App 1998) (recounting
that "the State countered the appellant's claim of self-defense by arguing that she continued in
the allegedly abusive relationship with the victim, thereby creating an inference that she was not
afraid of the victim," and rejecting the state's argument); Humphrey, 921 P2d at 11 (noting that
the state argued that the victim's threat on the day of the killing "was like so many threats be-
fore," with the implication that she had no reasonable ground for fearing inuninent deadly vio-
lence; ordering the lower court to allow battered woman syndrome evidence in opposition to this
argument); Ibn-Tamas v United States, 407 A2d 626, 633-34, 640 (DC App 1979) (stating that
"the government implied to the jury that the logical reaction of a woman who was truly fright-
ened by her husband (let alone regularly brutalized by him) would have been to call the police
from time to time or to leave him"; remanding for a redetermination of the admissibility of bat-
tered woman syndrome evidence to rebut this proposition).
234 See Stonehouse, 555 A2d at 781 & n 5 (noting and rejecting the prosecutor's argument
that the defendant provoked violence by dating other men).
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the same rule, via imminence, that they have disavowed under other
guises?
This is not a claim of disparate treatment or impact in the con-
ventional sense. That the law may impose on the battered woman a re-
treat rule in non-retreat jurisdictions, or embrace a variety of other
potentially contradictory meanings, is not unique to battered woman
cases -as we have seen, it may happen in barroom brawl cases as well.
Moreover, I can make no claim that there is a statistically disparate
impact of such a rule-neither I nor anyone is likely to know how of-
ten this kind of inconsistency happens in real life, as opposed to what
happens in reported cases. Instead, this is a claim of constitutive femi-
nism-a claim that an objective inconsistency in the rules depends
upon and thus constitutes relational inequality for women. As I show
below, the problem for the battered woman is not simply that immi-
nence bears undeclared meaning but that its meaning may be created
in the image of her relation to men, a relation that may become more
powerful than the rules.
1. A pre-retreat rule for battered women?
It is one thing for jurors or judges to confuse imminence with
"leaving the confrontation"; it is another to confuse it with "leaving
the relationship." A retreat rule may require the defendant to with-
draw once the confrontation has begun,"3 but a rule that demands the
defendant "avoid the confrontation" is an entirely different require-
ment; such a "pre-retreat" rule is far more severe and, indeed, has
never been part of standard self-defense law. There is no general duty
to avoid violence before the confrontation." The man who goes for
the fiftieth time to the violent gang-bar is not deprived of his self-
defense claim because he "should have left" before the violence
erupted. Indeed, as one of the critics of such a rule acknowledges, the
common law of self-defense protects the freedom to move. To be
235 See LaFave, Criminal Law § 5.7(f) at 497-99 (cited in note 6).
236 As Richard Rosen has colorfully summarized the law:
No matter how clear it was to Gary Cooper that somebody would end up dead if he did not
leave before the train carrying his enemy arrived at "High Noon," our culture allows him to
stay in town and affords him the right to kill in self-defense when the bad guys come after
him.
Rosen, 71 NC L Rev at 396 (cited in note 181). See, for example, State v Bristol, 53 Wyo 304, 84
P2d 757, 766 (1938) (holding that the defendant had no duty to avoid entering a bar where he
knew his adversary, who had threatened to attack him, to be drinking); Ball v State, 29 Tex App
107, 14 SW 1012, 1013 (1890) ("Defendant's presence at the place where the killing occurred
could not, under the circumstances, constitute provocation to the deceased.").
237 As Andrew Ashworth has put it, American law respects the defendant's autonomy even
to a greater degree than does British law, which excepts from a duty to avoid violence claims in
"those cases where [the defendant] is acting lawfully in remaining at, or going to, a place." An-
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sure, the law of self-defense does reject the self-defense claims of
those who "provoke" the violence or "create the conditions" of their
own defense.7 The only problem is that, when applied to the relation-
ship (and not the violence), these principles create a rule that the law
has never announced-that a defendant can be said to have "pro-
voked" a confrontation simply by "staying"-in this case, in a relation-
ship. That is a norm that courts have openly and consistently denied.2'
To say that the application of a common sense "pre-retreat" rule
is contrary to the law of most jurisdictions is, of course, not to say that
one might not urge one, as scholars have. Stephen Schulhofer has ar-
gued, for example, that we should ask of women why they did not
leave.2. More generally, Andrew Ashworth has argued that avoidance
of violence should be the proper norm for all cases, although he ac-
knowledges that this is not the rule in America where the law of self-
defense has always jealously protected the defendant's autonomy. 1
One need not resolve that question (a deep one about the theory of
necessity) to argue that there may be a problem with applying an im-
plied "pre-retreat" rule in battered woman cases if American law does
not apply that rule to the man in the dangerous bar or neighborhood.
To ask of battered women that they leave-in whatever doctrinal
guise (imminence, retreat, threat, etc.)-raises serious questions about
whether the law of self-defense treats battered women less favorably
than others.
2. Seeing confrontational cases as confrontational.
The argument is really deeper, however, than whether the rules
are consistent, or whether objectivity predicts differential treatment. It
is a question in the end of practice -of what happens before the rules,
what happens in our images of life that makes us apply one rule rather
drew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law 119 (Clarendon 1991).
238 Robinson, 2 Criminal Law Defenses § 131(b) at 74 (cited in note 38).
239 See, for example, Commonwealth v Watson, 494 Pa 467, 431 A2d 949, 951-52 (1981)
(stating that "[a] woman whose husband has repeatedly subjected her to physical abuse does not,
by choosing to maintain her family relationship with that husband and their children, consent to
or assume the risk of further abuse"). See text accompanying note 223 (discussing battered
woman syndrome's rebuttal of the stereotype that women are masochistic or must leave to be
believed).
240 Schulhofer, 7 Soc Phil & Pol at 128-29 (cited in note 180) ("[W]e cannot forgo all pun-
ishment if the circumstances afforded the [abused] woman some alternative .... Conviction and
some punishment remain appropriate so long as the social and economic circumstances ... did
afford some reasonable alternative to the use of deadly force."). Schulhofer does go on to note
that "tangible barriers to flight" should be relevant to the question of a "reasonable available
remedy" short of violence. Id at 129.
241 See, for example, Ashworth, 34 Camb L J at 296 (cited in note 187) (urging that the de-
fendant in such situations should be made to inform the police even if that is not the prevailing
English rule).
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than another and recreate that life in those rules. Battered woman
cases are in general not seen as "real fights"-it is assumed, at the
start, that one is referring to the killing of a sleeping man. 2 The impor-
tant point my survey suggests is that even when the cases are confron-
tational-when the gun is pointed at her-they still are not seen as
confrontational. Imminence is one of the ways in which the threat is
not seen: in Watson, 3 the trial court literally cannot "see" the hands
around her neck, not because the judge has not heard the testimony,
but because the judge implicitly places responsibility on her for those
hands-she should have left before the hands got there. "
Put another way, courts and commentators have trouble seeing
confrontational cases as confrontational because of their normative
assumptions about what the parties' relationship entails; the structure
of the parties' relation determines the post hoc view, the "objective"
view of not only the temporal transaction but also its confrontational
character. When the gun is pointed at the male defendant in the bar,
there is an imminent confrontation; when it is pointed at Barbara
Stonehouse, who was stalked by an ex-boyfriend, there is a question
about whether the threat was imminent and serious.' ' Similarly, when
the beer bottle is about to be thrown after a barroom brawl, few doubt
that a self-defense instruction is appropriate. But when it is about to
be thrown at Betty Hundley by the husband from whom she fled, the
court talks of imminence and the dissenting judge insists she could
have had a five-minute "head Start."2
The point is that the norms of the relation are more powerful
than the law in shaping our intuitions about self-defense cases.1' Im-
minence and confrontation are concepts formed in the image of social,
pre-legal, norms about the relative responsibility of the parties. Di-
vorced from their relational context, the battered woman cases look
242 See notes 8, 30. See also text accompanying note 30 (discussing the assumptions of
scholars that most battered woman cases do not fall into the standard self-defense paradigm).
243 494 Pa 467,431 A2d 949 (1981).
244 To say that the victim needed to leave before the hands were around her neck opens the
time frame to the past-away from the confrontation. The judge in Watson cannot "see" that
there is a confrontation because he has judged fault from a perspective that has projected the
self-defense claim back into the history of the relationship. She was at fault for hours, days, and
weeks before the hands were around her neck. Here, time-framing is a function of social
norms-we look back because we believe that she is somehow responsible for the relationship.
245 Commonwealth v Stonehouse, 521 Pa 41,555 A2d 772,780,783 (1989). See note 147.
246 State v Hundley, 236 Kan 461,693 P2d 475,478-80 (1985). Id at 481 (McFarland dissent-
ing).
247 Here is the intellectual progression: The judge says that the defendant has no claim of
self-defense because of the "objective" requirement of "imminence." But it turns out that by
"imminence" he cannot mean time, because the hands are around her neck. It turns out that im-
minence means for him that she "had alternatives." Her response was not "necessary," where ne-
cessity and imminence, and its objectivity, are all constructed, and completed, by an unacknow-
ledged claim that women need to leave-a pre-retreat rule.
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very much like the male cases-they are cases of weak threats in a
violent context. The defendant says that there was a "glint" of a gun,
or it looked like the victim was reaching for a gun, or the victim's
hands were raised as if to attack.2 8 Surely, the man who claims that he
heard a rustle in the bushes outside his cabin has a weak self-defense
claim. "' But few say, automatically, that he could have had a five-
minute head start, or that he should never have bought the house in
such an isolated spot. Even fewer say that to grant a self-defense
instruction in his case is to risk the downfall of the criminal law. In the
end, the battered woman cases tell us that it is her relationship to the
victim that may be the most powerful influence, affecting whether we
see the threat as imminent, the case as confrontational, or her re-
sponse as necessary. Put another way, it is her relation that silently
completes the law's claimed objectivity.
C. Battered Woman Syndrome
If I am right, then the arguments for battered women cannot sim-
ply be dismissed as claims for "subjectivity" or "special treatment."
Critics will respond that objectivity cannot account for battered
woman syndrome evidence-evidence that is synonymous, for many,
with increased "subjectivity" in the law. I believe there is good reason
to reach just the opposite conclusion, that syndrome evidence is not
the enemy, but the essential ally, of an "objective" law of self-defense.
If that is true, then traditionalists may need to reexamine whether
their fears of the syndrome may well be exaggerated, and subjectivists
need to examine whether the argument of subjectivity is really too
weak a defense of the normative propositions contained in the syn-
drome.
Scholars, writing for both academic and popular audiences, have
reviled the syndrome, urging that it lacks scientific validity and wreaks
havoc with the law of self-defense.2° And yet battered woman syn-
248 See, for example, State v Fuller, 297 SC 440,377 SE2d 328,331 (1989) (reversing for fail-
ure to instruct that the defendant could have acted in self-defense based on the fact that he saw
the victims "open the trunk of their car and also thought he saw a shiny object in Dixon's hand").
See also People v Spencer, 51 Cal App 4th 1208, 1216 (1996) (describing the claim that the defen-
dant shot when the victim "reach[ed] down to the floorboard of the car"; defendant convicted of
voluntary manslaughter).
249 State v Negrin, 37 Wash App 516, 681 P2d 1287, 1290 (1984) (describing claim in which
defendant shoots into woods because he hears noise).
250 See, for example, Wilson, Moral Judgment at 48-58 (cited in note 3) (arguing that expert
testimony on battered woman syndrome is replacing individual accountability). See also
Faigman, Note, 72 Va L Rev 619, 631-40 (cited in note 30) (stating that battered woman defen-
dants "seek to stretch self-defense doctrine's imminence requirement almost to infinity" and
criticizing the scientific methodology of Lenore Walker's research on battered woman syn-
drome).
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drome testimony is widely accepted across the nation. 5 ' Indeed, courts
in many jurisdictions have applied syndrome evidence to a wide array
of claims-claims of siblings and children, and the odd battered
male. 2 Whether those rulings are correct, they exist and are not par-
ticularly controversial for courts, raising the question why courts (not
typically dominated by radical feminists or subjectivists) have been so
welcoming to the syndrome, while the critics remain so insistent that
the syndrome is not only bad science but also bad law. 
2 3
I think some explanation can be found for this by recognizing, at
the start, how conventional the syndrome is (something its critics rec-
ognize, I believe). But, to do that, one must first put claims of psychol-
ogy and cycles aside. As its earliest advocates have told us, efforts to
inject battered woman syndrome into criminal trials sought to tell a
different normative tale than the one society had long used to under-
stand this kind of violence. In the form of a description about battered
women, the syndrome really offers reasons why the law should not
blame women for the battering. It tells us that women who suffer prior
threats are likely to suffer future violence, implying that we should be-
lieve her when she claims the threat was serious. It tells us that women
are not masochistic, implying that women should not be assumed to
have provoked the violence. It tells us that women are attuned to
threats, implying that the threats are real and well understood. It tells
us that women are afraid, implying that they did not act out of re-
venge. It tells us that it is very difficult to leave, implying that women
should not be blamed for failing to leave. 4
251 See note 212.
252 See, for example, People v Colberg, 182 Misc 2d 798,701 NYS2d 608,608-10 (County Ct
1999) (holding battered person syndrome evidence admissible in case of father accused of mur-
dering adult son); State v Nemeth, 82 Ohio St 3d 202, 694 NE2d 1332, 1334 (1998) (finding bat-
tered child syndrome evidence admissible in case of child accused of murdering parent); State v
Janes, 121 Wash 2d 220, 850 P2d 495, 501-03 (1993) (same); Commonwealth v Kacsmar, 421 Pa
Super 64,617 A2d 725,730-33 (1992) (holding battered person syndrome evidence admissible in
case of fratricide), disapproved in part on other grounds, Commonwealth v Miller, 430 Pa Super
297,634 A2d 614 (1993).
253 See Faigman and Wright, 39 Ariz L Rev at 75 (cited in note 4) (claiming that the syn-
drome is bad science); Wilson, Moral Judgment at 58 (cited in note 3) (stating that the syndrome
is unnecessary); Fletcher, 57 U Pitt L Rev at 571 (cited in note 2) (stating that the syndrome is
inconsistent with the question of justification). Of course, as a legal matter, there is no separate
"battered woman" defense. Or, at least, courts continually so state. See, for example, State v Koss,
49 Ohio St 3d 213,551 NE2d 970,974 (1990) ("Thus, admission of expert testimony regarding the
battered woman syndrome does not establish a new defense or justification. Rather, it is to assist
the trier of fact [in determining] whether the defendant acted out of an honest belief that she
was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm.").
254 Even those who reject the syndrome acknowledge that the cycle theory addresses "es-
sential aspects of the law of self-defense," including "the defendant's knowledge of the aggres-
sor's history of violence," the "reasonableness of the amount of force used," her "perception of
harm," and "why battered women fail to leave violent relationships." Faigman and Wright, 39
Ariz L Rev at 73,75 (cited in note 4).
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If we reduce the syndrome testimony to the normative proposi-
tions associated with these descriptions-if for example, we imagine
them to be jury instructions rather than expert testimony 5-then the
syndrome is consistent with some very standard propositions in the
law of self-defense, so standard, they could all be supported by nine-
teenth-century law citations. Take, for example, the proposition that
prior threats and violence increase the credibility of a claim of future
violence. Since the nineteenth century, past threats and violence, in-
cluding the victim's character for violence, have been considered
highly relevant to a claim of self-defense, on questions of imminence
and aggression, and the nature of the threat.' Or consider the propo-
sition that a woman's claims should be judged from her position, ac-
cording to her situation. In 1888, courts would charge juries that the
reasonable person is not to be judged by some "ideal" standard but
that the members of the jury were to put themselves "in the position
of the assailed person, with his physical and mental equipment, sur-
rounded with the circumstances and exposed to the influences with
which he was surrounded, and to which he was exposed at the time.2.7
255 I make absolutely no claim about the psychological validity of the syndrome; my claim is
purely based on its normative propositions.
256 See, for example, Allison v United States, 160 US 203,215 (1895):
Here the threats were recent and were communicated, and were admissible in evidence as
relevant to the question whether defendant had reasonable cause to apprehend an attack,
fatal to life or fraught with great bodily injury, and hence was justified in acting on a hostile
demonstration and one of much less pronounced character than if such threats had not pre-
ceded it. They were relevant because indicating cause for apprehension of danger and rea-
son for promptness to repel attack.
See also People v Thomson, 92 Cal 506,28 P 589,590 (1891):
Under these circumstances, all the acts and conduct of the deceased, either in the nature of
overt acts of hostility, or threats communicated or uncommunicated, were proper evidence
to be considered by the jury as shedding light-to some extent at least-upon the issue as
to whether the deceased or the defendant was the aggressor in this fatal affray. These prin-
ciples are elementary in criminal law, and a citation of authorities not demanded.
See also Marts v State, 26 Ohio St 162, 168 (1875) ("[T]he court erred in ruling out the evidence
of the violent, vicious, and dangerous character of the deceased.") (emphasis added).
257 The court charged the jury that in determining whether the defendant's apprehension of
imminent death or grievous bodily harm was reasonable, the "jury are not to conceive of some
ideally reasonable person." United States v King, 34 F 302,309 (E D NY 1888) (emphasis added).
See also United States v Lewis, 111 F 630,636 (W D Tex 1901) (employing very similar language);
Carleton v State, 43 Neb 373, 61 NW 699,710 (1895) (instructing the jury to ask, "What would a
reasonable person, a person of ordinary caution, judgment, and observation, in the position of
defendant, seeing what he saw and knowing what he knew, suppose from this situation and these
surroundings?"); People v Bruggy, 93 Cal 476,29 P 26,27 (1892) ("The rule in such a case is this:
What would a reasonable person,-a person with ordinary caution, judgment, and observation-
in the position of the defendant, seeing what he saw, and knowing what he knew, suppose from his
situation and his surroundings?") (emphasis added); People v lams, 57 Cal 115,119 (1880) ("The
rule in such cases is this, What would a reasonable person-a person of ordinary caution, judg-
ment, and observation -in the position of the defendant, seeing what he saw, and knowing what
he knew, supposed from this situation and these surroundings?") (emphasis added).
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Consider the claim that it is the defendant's perception or perspective
that counts rather than the actual threat. It was well-established in the
nineteenth century that the defendant's perception of the victim's
threat (what is today called the "subjective" perception), rather than
an actual threat, was sufficient to establish self-defense if the percep-
tion was reasonable (indeed, this was and still is known as the "ap-
pearances" rule). Finally, it was assumed that one does not automati-
cally provoke an incident or become an aggressor by walking into a
dangerous situation or staying in a dangerous place-whether that
dangerous situation is a barroom brawl or a shootout 
9
I am not arguing that battered woman syndrome is unnecessary
because it fits so clearly with existing self-defense law. I am question-
ing why battered woman syndrome has gotten so many scholars so
very aggravated at absurd "subjectivism," despite the fact that, from a
doctrinal perspective, its legal tenets are so conventional. Oddly, the
critics know of the conventionality of the legal norms of the syn-
drome; they cite this, however, as a reason to increase suspicion of the
syndrome as trumped-up psychology."O The answer to that, of course, is
simply to take off the veneer and get to the substance of the norms.
And, if one gets there, I think it possible to make an argument-from
traditional self-defense law itself-that something like the norms in
battered woman syndrome testimony may be necessary to reconcile
the law to its own aspirations. Under this reconception, the syndrome
becomes a kind of normative equalizer, a reminder that there is no
such thing as a "pre-retreat" rule or an "assumed-provocation" rule or
a rule that says the victim must have left the relationship to defend
against a knife hovering over her head. Put another way, the syndrome
rebuts the prosecutor's arguments that she provoked the violence be-
258 King, 34 F at 309 ("If, with these tests applied ... the jury are satisfied that there was
then an apparently imminent danger of death or grievous bodily harm to the person assailed, he
is entitled to act upon the appearances.") (emphasis added); People v Fitchpatrick, 106 Cal 286,
39 P 605, 606 (1895) ("It was not a matter of fact, but a matter of appearance, which measured
defendant's right of self-defense."); Bruggy, 29 P at 29 ("the right of the defendant to act upon
appearances was fully and clearly stated to the jury by the court. The doctrine of apparent dan-
ger was repeatedly explained to the jury."); Maher v People, 24 I11 241,243 (1860) ("This court...
[has previously] held that a person when threatened with danger, must determine from the ap-
pearances and the surrounding circumstances as to the necessity of resorting to self-defense.")
(citation omitted).
259 See, for example, Ball v State, 29 Tex App 107, 14 SW 1012, 1013 (1890) ("Defendant's
presence at the place where the killing occurred could not, under the circumstances, constitute
provocation to the deceased."). See also State v Bristol, 53 Wyo 304, 84 P2d 757,766 (1938) (hold-
ing that the defendant had no duty to avoid entering a bar where he knew his adversary, who had
threatened to attack him, to be drinking).
260 See, for example, Faigman and Wright, 39 Ariz L Rev at 88-89 (cited in note 4) ("[T]he
syndrome so closely parallels the law of self-defense that its basic parameters appear to be con-
trolled more by legal convenience than by psychological observation or theory.").
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cause she dated someone else, or that she could not have feared se-
rious violence because she weathered it before, or that she faced no
imminent threat because of the "parties' relationship."26 Even if a syn-
drome may not be the preferred method of addressing these problems,
it is at least some protection against applying rules to battered women
that do not apply outside intimate relationships.
Rethinking the syndrome as a set of relatively innocuous and per-
haps necessary normative propositions may explain the odd status of
the syndrome-controversial among academics because of its "bad"
science, but readily embraced by politicians and judges. At the same
time, however, it also raises serious questions about the intemperate
claims made by some scholars. It is no exaggeration to say that some
have suggested that battered woman syndrome will bring down the
criminal law in its entirety. 64 But if one can find reasons to support the
syndrome's norms within traditional self-defense law, then opposition
toward it takes on a different, and more suspiciously anti-feminist,
character. Indeed, feminists must wonder whether all the controversy
is about making women's claims of subjectivity strange and political so
that men's claims of subjectivity may appear normal and uncontest-
able.
D. Subjectivity and the State
One of the deepest oddities in all the apparent concern about
subjective defenses is that the objection is something of a phantom
when it comes to self-defense law. There is no jurisdiction in the
United States that adopts a purely subjective self-defense standard
(for women or anyone else).65 Indeed, there are other defenses with
261 Stonehouse, 555 A2d at 781 n 5.
262 Humphrey, 921 P2d at 11.
263 Watson, 431 A2d at 951.
264 See Dershowitz, Abuse Excuse at 45-47 (cited in note 3) (charging that battered woman
syndrome "began" the abuse excuse and that the "abuse excuse poses real dangers to our safety
and to the integrity of our legal system"). See also id at 5 (suggesting that battered woman non-
confrontational claims are vigilantism that "sow[] the seeds of anarchy and wrongdoing").
265 Even in State v Wanrow, the case frequently cited as involving a "subjective" standard,
the court adopted, by quoting, a rule from a 1926 case that required the honest beliefs of "rea-
sonably and ordinarily cautious and prudent men." 88 Wisc 2d 221,559 P2d 548,558 (1977), quot-
ing State v Miller, 141 Wisc 104, 250 P 645, 645 (1926). A purely subjective standard would, pre-
sumably, excuse a defendant based on her own fears (whether or not the fear was reasonable),
and without respect to the crime charged. Although treatises, see LaFave and Scott, Criminal
Law § 5.7(c) at 494 (cited in note 6) sometimes suggest that there are a few "subjective" jurisdic-
tions, the typical citation is to the Model Penal Code formulation which, in fact, includes a rea-
sonableness qualifier. MPC § 3.04 provides a defense that is based on the subjective belief of the
defendant, but takes back that subjectivity with a qualifier that eliminates a complete defense if
the defendant's subjective belief was unreasonable. See MPC § 3.09. Even if the defendant be-
lieves that self-defense was necessary, under MPC § 3.04, he is not entitled to a complete defense
if his belief in the necessity of self-defense was reckless or negligent under MPC § 3.09; instead,
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far greater claims to nearly complete subjectification -defenses about
which few have complained.'6 It is widely accepted, for example, that a
man who kills his wife in a "heat of passion" deserves to have his sub-
jectivity considered favorably. As I have written elsewhere, if one is
concerned with subjectivity, then one's first target as an "abuse ex-
cuse" should be the provocation defense.26 The only problem is that
standard criminal law scholarship has defended, or at least assumed as
natural, the emotional subjectivity of men who kill because their wives
268
cheat or leave them.
The claim against subjectivity typically made by the objectivist-
that it contradicts established law -simply dissolves once we consider
provocation. Writing (quite sympathetically) of the disturbing events
that led Judy Norman to kill her husband, George Fletcher complains
that Norman "put herself in the position of judge and executioner,"
imposing a "death penalty" that no authority would have imposed. He
concludes: "there may be justice in his dying, but it is not a form of jus-
tice that the legal system can readily accommodate.... The very same
arguments, however, might be said of Kenneth Peacock.2 When Ken-
neth Peacock found his wife in bed with another man, he got his shot-
gun and scared his rival off; several hours and a gallon of wine later,
Peacock shot and killed his wife. Certainly, Peacock acted as "judge
and executioner." We could insist, with even more fervor than
Fletcher, that one does not deserve the death penalty for having sex
with another. The only thing that we could not conclude is that the le-
gal system cannot readily accommodate this kind of justice: provoca-
tion claims of Peacock's variety are an everyday affair, sanctioned in
many states and by the criminal law academy. Subjectivity is neither
new nor foreign to what most consider well-established and, for that
reason, "objective" criminal law.
he may be convicted of a lesser crime, equivalent to his level of mistake.
266 1 refer, in particular, here to the Model Penal Code's version of the provocation defense.
See MPC § 210.3 cmt 3. See also Nourse, 106 Yale L J at 1339-40 (cited in note 85) (explaining
that the Code drafters "created a defense remarkably sensitive to context and the defendant's
peculiar perspective").
267 V.E Nourse, The New Normativity, 50 Stan L Rev 1435, 1453 (1998) (noting that provo-
cation cases cast doubt on the argument that women's claims promote abuse excuses).
268 Nourse, 106 Yale L J at 1364-65 (cited in note 86).
269 Fletcher, 57 U Pitt L Rev at 556 (cited in note 2).
270 See Karl Vick, Md. Judge Taking Heat in Cuckolded Killer Case, Wash Post Al (Oct 30,
1994). To the judge assigned to this case, there was no question that Peacock suffered an ade-
quate provocation resulting in "uncontrollable" rage: he sentenced Peacock to eighteen months
to be served on work release, based on a plea of voluntary manslaughter. See Ann G. Sjoerdsma,
Justice: 18 Months for a Wife's Life, Chi Trib 21 (Nov 14, 1994) ("Within two weeks of sentencing,
the man is back on the road, driving his rig."). See also Lynn Hecht Schafran, There's No Ac-
counting for Judges, 58 Alb L Rev 1063,1063-64 (1995) (discussing Judge Cahill's sentence in the
Peacock case).
271 Here, I refer to claims of provocation based on infidelity.
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My argument is not tit-for-tat. Indeed, I have some sympathy with
the notion that, in a confessional age, subjectivity quickly occludes
grave wrongs. What I am insisting upon is a completion of what per-
sons mean by "objectivity." In the Watson and Peacock cases, it is
rather easy to see that "time" is more than an objective reference to
the clock, that, instead, it absorbs beliefs about the normal obligations
of intimate partners. The Watson trial judge applied an objective
rule-imminence-but meant that a woman should leave. The Pea-
cock trial judge applied an objective rule-a continuous passion-but
meant that it was not "right" to let women go unpunished for affairs.
Curiously, these meanings are openly disavowed by the law-the law
does not punish women for having affairs and loudly announces that
we should not ask why she did not leave.
Unfortunately, there is a good deal at stake in this kind of
claimed objectivity. This is not about two cases with bad judges but
something a bit larger; it is about how the criminal law constitutes us
and our relationship to the political order. Deeply held views about
women and their relationships to men as well as their position as citi-
zens reside in the criminal law. As I have argued above, every claim of
defense is a claim not only between victim and defendant but also be-
tween the defendant and the state (was she a vigilante, a traitor to the
law, an aristocrat reenacting her superiority?). When, in Watson, the
trial court bars the woman's defense because she had the time to
leave, this is not only a claim that she should have left her husband,
but also that she failed to defer properly to the state (by choosing law-
ful alternatives). ' Similarly, the judgment of the court in Peacock is
not only that he was "right" to punish his wife but that he was right-
did not offend the state-by "taking the law into his own hands. 273
Watson is a traitor and Peacock is a loyalist because the state meas-
ures allegiance by reference to relational norms. The common law's
overt judgment that a woman who kills her husband is fully traitor-
ous,274 and a man who kills to defend his marriage is partly patriot, re-
272 One might complain that the Watson and Peacock cases are not comparable because
Watson involved self-defense (a full defense) and Peacock involved provocation (a partial de-
fense). This difference does not change the claims made in this paragraph. My argument still
holds if we imagine that both claims were partial defenses.
273 According to an article quoting the transcript of proceedings, the trial judge, in sentenc-
ing Peacock, stated that "the most difficult thing that a judge is called upon to do ... is sentenc-
ing noncriminals as criminals ... I seriously wonder how many married men, married five years
or four years would have the strength to walk away, but without inflicting some corporal pun-
ishment." Schafran, 58 Alb L Rev at 1063-64 (cited in note 270).
274 According to Blackstone, a wife who killed her husband was guilty of petit treason and
subject to be drawn and burned (rather than hanged as might a man who killed a stranger). See
Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at *203-04 (cited in note 49). If a husband killed because provoked
by infidelity, and thus to defend or avenge his marriage, the crime was not murder, but
manslaughter. Id at *191-92:
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mains two hundred years later. Time transforms self-defense into a
woman's treason; man remains aligned with the state."' Blackstone:
meet Catharine MacKinnon.
If what is wrong with the law, for women, is the law's lack of sen-
sitivity, its failure to sympathize, women's claims may be true but they
will fail to persuade. If subjectivity simply means that "my view counts,
yours doesn't," it is as intolerant as an empty objectivity; it can never
go beyond an "apprehension of the world as self-evident, 276 and risks
becoming the privileged knowledge of a special body of the clairvoy-
ant. It is not sympathy that is required but humility (from both men
and women), a recognition of the ways in which the law absorbs and
constitutes popular norms that it does not disclose and may even dis-
avow.
V. WHY Do WE TALK THIS WAY?
If there is a grammar of argumentation in criminal law, it is a
grammar dominated by the "objective" and "subjective." It is not only
that the current debate about self-defense is created in its mirror; it is
negligence and provocation, necessity and duress, that are shaped by
the demands of this opposition. The ideas of objectivity and subjectiv-
ity are pervasive and yet inarticulate. Most people assume vaguely
that a subjective standard is the more progressive and an objective
one the more conservative. But this overtly political consensus is a
fragile one and has increasingly led to heated debates in which other-
wise polite scholars have been left trading insults. In the end, I suggest
in this Part that we might be better off jettisoning this discourse. Put
another way, it is time to stop blaming the downfall of the criminal law
on subjectivity and the battered woman; she has not created new
So if a man takes another in the act of adultery with his wife, and kills him directly upon the
spot ... it is manslaughter. It is however the lowest degree of it; and therefore in such a case
the court directed the burning in the hand to be gently inflicted because there could not be
a greater provocation.
As one of Blackstone's nineteenth-century editors put it, with regard to these rules, "it is difficult
to find any substantial grounds upon which to support Blackstone's conclusion that the female
sex is a favorite of our laws." J.F. Hargrave, ed, William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws
of England *445 n 27 (Harper & Bros 1859).
275 If Peacock committed premeditated homicide, the verdict was too compassionate; he
was guilty of murder, not manslaughter. If Watson acted in self-defense, her trial court sentence
of manslaughter was too harsh; she deserved acquittal. Moreover, the separate sets of rules that
make this possible suspiciously parallel the situations in which men and women are, in fact, likely
to kill: men tend to kill their spouses in situations where the spouse leaves or is unfaithful;
women tend to kill their spouses in cases of physical violence. See Nourse, 106 Yale L J at 1342-
52 (cited in note 86) (explaining various statistical claims concerning this basic difference).
276 Bourdieu, Logic of Practice at 25 (cited in note 1).
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problems, but simply reminded us of the importance of resolving old
controversies.
A. Confounding the Standard Distinctions
Let us start by asking whether we really have a good idea of what
the opposition between subjectivity and objectivity means. If these are
taken as evaluative positions (subjective is bad, objective is good),
then the distinction raises some obvious problems. One set of critics,
the conservative ones, seems to believe that subjectivity is bad because
it departs from good old-fashioned standards. The only problem is that
good old-fashioned criminal law includes subjectivity; indeed, it has
revered the subjectivity of defenses like provocation."' Another set of
critics, generally the liberal ones, complains that feminists have un-
dermined liberalism's aim to protect defendants by taking the law too
far, pushing the law to embrace absurd and abusive defenses.Y8 The
only problem is that the syndrome gains legitimacy because it relies
upon the traditional liberal emphasis on defendant-friendly individua-
tion.
The distinction between objectivity and subjectivity fares little
better at an analytic level."9 My survey was intended to be something
of a test of the distinction. And, indeed, my hypothesis was borne out.
What seems uncontestable and empirical, the clock, becomes ques-
tionable and normative (should Mrs. Watson have left?). What seems
nondiscretionary and relatively determined becomes discretionary: we
find that imminence chooses among possible meanings. What seems
contextless turns out to depend upon context: imminence is structured
by our assumptions about social relationships. What should be exter-
nal may refer to the classically internal, the defendant's mental state
(fear), and what seems so internal, a subjective standard, might actu-
ally be judged by the external rule-like criteria embedded in social
norms.
Nor, in the end-and this may be the most important point-does
the objectivity/subjectivity distinction work at a doctrinal level. It is an
open secret that courts adopt a self-defense standard that is both ob-
jective and subjective; as a doctrinal matter, then, there simply is no
debate, except at the margins. Humor me: perform a simple test. Open
up a self-defense case using objectivity and subjectivity to describe
277 See Nourse, 50 Stan L Rev at 1450 (cited in note 267).
278 See Dershowitz, Abuse Excuse at 45 (cited in note 3) (asserting that the abuse excuse
"all began" with battered woman syndrome).
279 The standard for the analytic difference I use is taken from Alan Wertheimer, Coercion
164 (Princeton 1987) (positing three senses of objective as "(1) external as opposed to phenome-
nological or internal; (2) empirical as opposed to normative; or (3) standardized as opposed to
individualized").
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self-defense law. Now black out those adjectives.2° You will probably
be left with a better text and nothing will have been lost. The law can
still speak of state of mind and conduct, it can even speak of the rea-
sonable person and her perceptions, it can apply the age-old "appear-
ances" test in self-dcfense, and announce the proper rules of aggres-
sion and proportionality."" History makes it quite clear that the law of
self-defense does not need the discourse of subjectivity for any of that.
B. History: Of Norms and Mind
We can and have lived with reasonable persons and their percep-
tions in the law of self-defense and elsewhere for a good long time,
centuries indeed. But there has been a change in how we talk about
them. Open a casebook or a treatise before 1960 and there will be no
emphasis on objectivity and subjectivity. Yes, the reasonable man will
appear and we will call him reasonable because of both his conduct
and his state of mind, but there will be none of the discussion, in older
materials, about how to frame discussions about everything from neg-
ligence to self-defense in terms of objectivity and subjectivity. Indeed,
it almost appears, today, as if objectivity and subjectivity have come to
substitute for the content of the criminal law. But they are a very poor
substitute.
History, more than anything else, helps to explain the discourse of
subjectivity and objectivity. The debate hails from a particular time
280 I began this Article, in its doctrinal section, with State v Bellino, 31 Conn App 385, 625
A2d 1381 (1993), a typical appellate decision whose discussion of objectivity and subjectivity
bears up quite well despite these excisions. Here is an excerpt from the decision:
The trial court began its self-defense charge by providing the jury with an almost verbatim
recitation of General Statutes § 53a-19(a). This language, like that of the statute, sets forth
the appropriate subjective-objective test for evaluating the defendant's belief concerning
the danger he was facing. Immediately thereafter, the court provided the jury with addi-
tional guidance on the objective part of its inquiry by explaining how the jury would have
to determine whether the defendant's belief was a reasonable one. The court necessarily
referenced the objective, reasonable person at this stage of the instructions.
Id at 1385-86 (citation omitted). If we eliminate the references to "subjective" and "objective,"
we have the following:
The trial court began its self-defense charge by providing the jury with an almost verbatim
recitation of General Statutes § 53a-19(a). This language, like that of the statute, sets forth
the appropriate [ ] test for evaluating the defendant's belief concerning the danger he was
facing. Immediately thereafter, the court provided the jury with additional guidance on [an-
other] part of its inquiry by explaining how the jury would have to determine whether the
defendant's belief was a reasonable one. The court necessarily referenced the []reasonable
person at this stage of the instructions.
281 The opposition of objectivity and subjectivity, to the extent that it focuses on the reason-
able man, mistakes an evaluative claim for an epistemological procedure. The reasonable man is
a way of reasoning that unifies conduct standards with particular situations. It is an intellectual
procedure (much like the Rawlsian original position) in which we imagine ourselves reflectively
"alternating between the defendant's position and that of his fellow citizen.
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and place and has a particular problem of law in mind. Once upon a
time (in the late nineteenth century), the deep normative question of
self-defense -whether and how much pacifism the law must require -
was explicitly before the Supreme Court of the United States.2 Justice
Holmes, ever the advocate of the objective criminal law, easily side-
stepped the question.2 Refusing to decide whether retreat was re-
quired, Holmes, in one of his more famous passages, concluded that
"[d]etached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an up-
lifted knife."2 With this move, Justice Holmes transformed the social
and political question of necessity into a question of imminence and
voluntariness, leaving retreat rules dangling and the basic question of
necessity unanswered.""
Holmes's intellectual move-transforming a question of norm
into one of mind-is not unique to self-defense. It is a strategy
adopted by Herbert Wechsler and embodied over and over in the
Model Penal Code. Consider the Model Penal Code's approach to-
ward self-defense and imminence. Rather than eliminating the refer-
282 The parties' arguments in Brown v United States, 256 US 335 (1921), put the retreat
question quite clearly to the Supreme Court. See id at 336-37 (arguing on behalf of petitioner
that there was no duty of retreat at common law for a justifiable homicide-where one was felo-
niously attacked). See also id at 337-38 (arguing on behalf of the government that "[t]he com-
mon law never recognized two species of homicide in self-defense, one justifiable and the other
excusable; one dispensing with avoidance of, or retreat from, an assault with a deadly weapon,
the other requiring it").
283 Id at 343. Holmes was not alone in this of course. During the second half of the nine-
teenth century, the term "imminence" takes on importance in courts' attempts to avoid the re-
treat issue. At common law, the defense of "prevention of a felony" did not require retreat; se de-
fendendo did. Faced with two apparently conflicting common law rules-retreat or no retreat-
at least some courts found in imminence the way to "resolve" the contradiction. (Note that the
contradiction really arises from a different source-doubts about allowing individuals to "pre-
vent" a felony when there are public police forces.) If the threat was imminent, the courts rea-
soned, the retreat controversy really did not matter since the "suddenness of the attack puts him.
to the wall." People v Hecker, 109 Cal 451, 42 P 307, 313 (1895), superseded in part on other
grounds by statute, as stated in People v Hardin, 85 Cal App 4th 625, 102 Cal Rptr 2d 262, 268
(2000).
284 See Brown, 256 US at 343 ("It is useless to go into the developments of the law from the
time when a man who had killed another no matter how innocently had to get his pardon,
whether of grace or of course"-this referring, of course, to the fact that se defendendo required
a kingly pardon not required by prevention of a felony).
285 Id.
286 After refusing to resolve the historical dilemma on the theory that times had changed,
Holmes stated as follows: "Many respectable writers agree that if a man reasonably believes that
he is in immediate danger of death or grievous bodily harm from his assailant he may stand his
ground and that if he kills him he has not exceeded the bounds of lawful self-defense." Id
(emphasis added). From there, he concluded that one presented with "an uplifted knife" should
not be deprived of a self-defense instruction because he had failed to retreat. Id. On retreat and
the Holmesian position, see Kahan, 113 Harv L Rev at 430 (cited in note 10) (stating that
Holmes believed "it would [have been] a waste to punish a man for not taking flight in the face
of deadly aggression").
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ence to time altogether (as the drafters had done in other places),'
the draft code places the old imminence rule firmly within the mind of
the defendant. Section 3.04 specifically provides a defense for those
who honestly believe the need to use force is "immediately neces-
sary. '  Time thus depends upon a reasonable "belief in time," and
controversies about time become controversies about the reasonable
man and his view of time, objective or subjective. This satisfies the lib-
eral ideal of individuation by transforming all normative questions
into questions of individual minds, but it does little to resolve the
meaning of necessity."'
This is but a single example of a more general trend in which the
criminal law has sought to attain neutrality by avoiding difficult nor-
mative questions. This was also the preferred "neutral" solution pro-
vided by Wechsler's model code: the theory was that, if one drafts neu-
tral laws in abstract terms and makes them clear, then we will be pro-
tected from injustice. To talk of norms in this atmosphere was thought
to risk imposing the unwise and unjust judgments of the community
upon a lonely and weak individual. As George Fletcher has written,
the Model Penal Code was an experiment in a criminal law that pur-
ports to be precise and neutral but is without content,2" a contentless-
ness driven by a naive desire to prevent injustice by positive prescrip-
tion.
The problem is that, as feminists have exposed, the criminal law
not only oppresses openly and in positive law, but quietly and consti-
tutively. Injustice may originate from the bottom up in the way that
members of society treat each other and the ways in which this behav-
287 Indeed, the Model Penal Code is notable for its rather casual jettisoning of almost all of
the commnon law's timing rules-in duress, necessity, and provocation. MPC § 3.02(1) (defining
justifiable conduct as "[c]onduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil
to himself or to another," without requiring that the harm or evil be "imminent"); MPC § 2.09
(defining duress as an offense committed because the defendant was "coerced to do so by the
use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the person of another, which a per-
son of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist," without requiring
an imminent threat); MPC § 210.3 (defining provocation without regard to "cooling time" as "ex-
treme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse").
288 MPC § 3.04(1) ("Subject to ... Section 3.09, the use of force upon or toward another
person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the pur-
pose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present
occasion.") (emphasis added). This self-consciously styled "subjective" provision is then modi-
fied, in later sections, by testing whether the defendant's perceptions were mistaken and, if so,
imposing liability for the negligence or recklessness of the mistake. MPC § 3.09(2) (providing
that if "the actor is reckless or negligent in having" the "belief' in the necessity of force de-
scribed in § 3.04, he may be prosecuted for a crime "for which recklessness or negligence ... suf-
fices to establish culpability").
289 This is not my characterization alone-George Fletcher would, I think, agree with me on
this point about the strategy involved. See George P. Fletcher, Dogmas of the Model Penal Code,
2 Buff Crim L R 3,14 (1998).
290 Id at 7-10.
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ior constructs human relationships. The criminal law theory of the past
was obsessed with the problem of imposing state morality. What theo-
rists failed to notice was the possibility of oppression achieved by pri-
vate means sanctioned by public law. They failed to consider the pos-
sibility that, for all the worry about a misdemeanor penalty for sod-
omy, the law then and now may allow private persons to kill others for
their homosexuality and claim, with the law's sanction, that this was
"partially" justified. What is worse, a state that criminalizes sodomy or
a state that allows its citizens to kill each other because they are gay?
What is worse, a state assault law that omits explicit reference to bat-
tering, or a state that assumes that there are no hands around her
neck? Injustice, as Judith Shklar made so clear, is as much about indif-
ference as evil.29'
C. Protecting the Status Quo?
If history may foretell our current obsession with subjectivity and
objectivity, the present should tell us of the risks of this way of argu-
ing. It is not only that our arguments are incomplete -that we are ar-
guing about things we are defining quite differently, leading to inevi-
table misunderstanding. It is that, unless the argument is completed, it
reduces to a question of power and a claim for recognition. The dis-
course of subjectivity and objectivity says most not about the law of
self-defense or any other rule of criminal law, but about the politics of
criminal law scholarship. It has become a fight between some scholars
and their critics, in which each side claims that the other is guilty of
exaggeration and partiality: a claim of power in which some voices say
about subjectivity, "You are too soft and weak-minded to argue about
the law," and the others say about objectivity, "You are too rigid and
dense to see law's injustice. ' '29
The risk is not only that we will insult each other, but that we will
ignore the ways in which law embraces contradiction and injustice.
The kind of objectivity demanded by contemporary theory is doctrine-
preserving. Objectivity narrows the possibilities of argument in ways
that make all other normative claimants appear illegitimate, as if they
were political arguments asking for special favors (because it implic-
itly defines objectivity as existing rules)."' This not only perpetuates
291 Judith Shklar, The Faces of Injustice 55 (Yale 1990) ("We all tend to be passively un-
just.").
292 Objectivity is one kind of power, subjectivity another. Objectivity is a claim of authority,
indeed a demand of recognition that relies on its author's claimed impartiality. When one says
that something is "subjective," one is claiming a different kind of power. One is "right" not by
distance (as the objectivist claims) but by experience.
293 This is the story of battered woman syndrome. The syndrome fit quite nicely with the
ways in which liberal theory would allow normative change. And yet once this shift grew popular,
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the kind of debates we see between feminists and their critics (people
say the same things over and over again) but it perpetuates the con-
tentless nature of the criminal law. Everyone is all wrapped up in sec-
ond-order arguments that look "smart" because they are abstract and
no one reads the cases any more. As a result, we know less, rather than
more, about the meanings, social and legal, of the substantive criminal
law.
One might argue that the discourse of subjectivity and objectivity,
however obfuscatory, helps to civilize our debates about self-defense
294law. If this is true of political argument, I am not sure it is true of le-
gal argument, which in my opinion must be open about its ontological
normativity. The experience of the academic debate about self-defense
has not been, in my view, civilized by the discourse of objectivity and
subjectivity. This way of talking has not kept scholars and courts from
arguing about protecting "executioners"; indeed, it may well have en-
couraged such claims. There is a difference between emptiness and
tolerance. If the discourse of subjectivity and objectivity represents
empty claims of power, then it means that we will argue at a higher,
more politicized pitch. If, however, it aims at tolerance then we must
give it some content. If "objectivity" and "subjectivity" are to be more
than adjectives "without portfolio," we need to talk more, rather than
less, about the meanings of the criminal law.
CONCLUSION
The criminal law is not some technical arena, separated from the
public institutions of our time; it is quintessentially public law, describ-
ing not only the relationship of citizens to each other but also their re-
lation to the state. We know this, but we simply do not think of it this
way. We know that no government, no constitution, no separation of
powers, can protect a state from the roving band bent on private
vengeance. At the same time, a state that denies the opportunity for
it took on the character of the "political." As soon as it lost its appearance as a fine respect for
individuality and became a syndrome, the cries of special privilege came stronger and stronger.
Put another way, the objectivity/subjectivity debate has not been kind to feminism, even though
it has been perpetuated in part by feminists.
294 Dan Kahan has argued, for example, that we should not be so quick to claim that all
"norms" are worth revealing or acting upon, and that the open clash of norms may undermine
claims to public reason. See Kahan, 113 Harv L Rev at 487-88 (cited in note 10) (discussing the
manipulation of norms). My answer here is that this has not been the case in debates about the
objective and subjective-these debates have increased rather than decreased battle. My more
abstract, and more complicated answer (briefly put) is that the transparency of normativity in
law is a different claim than the transparency of normative content; wise restraint may prevent us
from calling each other names but, in the end, claims denying that the character of an argument
is normative (rather than factual) a claim of power with false intellectual pretenses. It is one
thing to talk "deterrence," to keep us all in the same room. It is another to claim, and insist, that
deterrence is a question of verifiable fact.
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self-defense, that asks its citizens to die rather than protect themselves,
recreates the very same fears that citizens will become the slavish vic-
tims of the strong. When critics call Mrs. Norman an executioner, they
are calling her a traitor, telling us that she has acted above the law;
they are making, in other words, a classic political argument about the
failings of citizens and their relation to the state. If one were arguing
politics, the proper response would be to point to Mrs. Watson and ask
whether she was a patriot to stand before an uplifted knife and risk
death or imprisonment for a country that has historically failed to pro-
tect her. As lawyers and legal scholars, however, these arguments are
unlikely to get us much of anywhere. Ours is the responsibility to ex-
plain, in tempered terms, what we mean about how the law of self-
defense constructs our relations to each other and the state, to civilize
this discourse of necessity by something better, and more articulate,
than irritated claims of "subjectivity." In a world in which more and
more are investing in the power of the criminal law to determine pub-
lic morality, we should take care that people may be listening.
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APPENDIX: METHODOLOGY
The survey was conducted in two phases after an initial pilot
search."" The first phase focused on decisions in which the term "im-
minen!" appeared at least five times (the "multi-hit" phase).2 The
second phase focused on "single-hit" cases, in which the term "immi-
nen!" might appear only once (the "single-hit" phase). The numbers
that appear in the text combined phases one and two, which should
represent, as nearly as possible, a universe of trial and appellate opin-
ions on homicide and self-defense in which imminence appears as a
legal issue covering the years from 1979 to 1999. The same search was
conducted for both phases; the multi-hit phase was conducted in the
stand-alone LEXIS database; the single-hit phase was conducted using
Lexis.com.2n
A. General Terms of the Survey
1. Cases outside the scope of the search.
Because LEXIS searches for words, it often brings up cases that
are irrelevant to the inquiry but, for fortuitous reasons, involve the
search terms. This requires an initial inquiry as to whether the case is
within the scope of the study. For example, this search brought up civil
cases as well as criminal cases that ranged from "fighting words" to la-
bor strikes to abortion clinic boycotts.
295 The pilot search experimented with various combinations of words to avoid the "over
1000 case" message on LEXIS in the state courts database. The pilot phase began with a search
from 1988 onward ("atl5(imminen!) and date(aft 1988) and "self-defense") that was found to in-
clude many irrelevant cases because it included assaults, etc. The search was refined to eliminate
anything except homicide cases by adding the words ("and (homicide or murder or manslaugh-
ter)"). The search for this multi-hit phase was "atl5(imminen!) and "self-defense" and (homicide
or murder or manslaughter) and date (aft 1988)" and was conducted in the "states"/"courts" da-
tabase of the LEXIS-NEXIS stand-alone software.
296 The initial multi-hit phase was conducted in three different date sequences. The
"vanessa" search yielded a total of 171 cases from the years 1989 to 1999.To complete a twenty-
year period, additional searches were done to cover the years 1982 to 1988 (the "adam"
searches) as well as to complete the years 1979 to 1982 and 1999, as the first search was done
during that year (the completion searches).
297 Because of changes in the Lexis.com format and the vast number of cases, the search in
the second phase was conducted by jurisdiction in the most relevant database available. The
search was the same ("date(aft 1978) and imminen! and "self-defense" and (homicide or murder
or manslaughter)). I say "most relevant" database because the Lexis.com platform organizes
state databases differently than did the LEXIS-NEXIS stand-alone software. For example, a
search in Connecticut would be done in "CT Cases, All Courts." Other states have other varia-
tions. To the extent these databases brought up cases in "irrelevant" categories, they were simply
eliminated in the first cut of the coding as not relevant to self-defense or homicide.
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2. Cases unrelated to self-defense.
Cases involving claims unrelated to self-defense were excluded as
outside the scope of the inquiry. For example, if a case raised only is-
sues of other defenses, such as provocation or duress, it was elimi-
nated. Only if a case involved a claim of self-defense was it included
within the scope of the search (other defenses could be raised, of
course). It was not enough, for example, if a case involved the term
"self-defense" but the defendant was not making a self-defense argu-
ment. "Self-defense" was defined to exclude claims based on defense
of others, but not imperfect self-defense.
3. Cases not involving homicide.
To limit the search to similar doctrinal circumstances, the search
base was further limited to cases involving homicide. That was defined
to include any form of murder or manslaughter, including negligent
homicide. Cases were eliminated if they involved lesser crimes, such as
assault or mayhem. Attempted homicides, conspiracy to commit homi-
cide, and cases involving accomplice liability were also eliminated.9 8
4. Cases deemed "relevant" on the question of imminence.
Again, because LEXIS searches for word usage, a case in which
the term "imminence" appeared would not necessarily raise an issue
of imminence, even if the case was about self-defense in the homicide
context. For example, it was possible that "imminence" might arise be-
cause the court was discussing the nature of self-defense in another
context, such as evidentiary challenges that mention self-defense. "
Similarly, "imminence" might appear in a case because the appellate
court cited the jury instructions and imminence was never raised again
298 One might argue that this would eliminate nonconfrontational cases arising from
"hired" killings and skew the nonconfrontational sample by eliminating cases involving battered
women who hire others to kill. That may or may not be true depending upon the law of the juris-
diction and the way in which charges are drafted (that is, whether the defendant is charged as a
principal or an accomplice). Moreover, it would also eliminate any case involving a man who
hired another to kill, claimed self-defense, and was charged as an accomplice. In fact, my survey
did include cases involving battered women who hired others to kill. See, for example, People v
Yaklich, 833 P2d 758, 760 (Colo App 1991) (holding that a self-defense instruction was not avail-
able in a contract-for-hire situation). I know of only one case involving a battered woman that
was eliminated on this basis-it was a case, involving the killing of a sleeping man, in which it
was unclear whether the defendant acted as principal or accomplice. The issue on appeal con-
cerning imminence arose solely in the context of whether she was entitled to an instruction on
self-defense in the context of the accomplice charge. See Springer v Commonwealth, 998 SW2d
439,453-54 (Ky 1999) (holding that the battered woman defendant was "entitled to instructions
on self-protection as a defense to both the principal and accomplice theories of liability").
299 See, for example, People v Coad, 181 Cal App 3d 1094, 226 Cal Rptr 386, 392-93 (1986)
(discussing imperfect self-defense in the context of a decision about the impeachment of a wit-
ness by his conviction for manslaughter) (coded as irrelevant).
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in connection with the case. Such a case was not considered "immi-
nence-relevant." Relevance here was defined broadly, however. It was
not necessary that the court discussed imminence at any length or
separated imminence from other issues.
A clearly relevant case would be one in which the court discussed
imminence and its meaning at length or even briefly. It was also con-
sidered relevant, however, if the court discussed imminence in terms
of other issues. For example, if a defendant argued that the jury in-
structions were too "objective" on appeal and the "objectivity" related
to imminence, this was considered an "imminence-relevant" case.
Similarly, if a defendant argued that he or she was entitled to expert
testimony and the trial or appellate court found the expert testimony
relevant-in part because of imminence-then the case was immi-
nence-relevant. Finally, a case was considered imminence-relevant re-
gardless of whether the imminence issue was resolved or simply re-
turned to the lower court.
It is important to remember that a case did not need to address
imminence directly in any lengthy manner to be imminencerrelevant.
Imminence might arise in the context of a discussion of the propriety
of a question by the prosecutor, in the context of the admission of
prior threats, or in the context of an argument about inconsistent de-
fenses. These cases, as a general rule, do not discuss imminence at any
length. Imminence-relevant cases are clearly not limited to cases in
which imminence is considered the central or even an important issue.
The case might be presented in any procedural posture, including
challenges to jury instructions, appeals of sentencing, or even an appli-
cation for witness fees.
Finally, it should be noted that the search was focused on the
term "imminen!" rather than "immediate." "Imminence" and "immi-
nent" are the terms typically used in the debate about self-defense and
subjectivity. Searches for the term "immediate" proved difficult be-
cause the term bears both technical and nontechnical meanings. Inter-
estingly enough, however, some jurisdictions tend to use the terms in-
terchangeably, although this was not the intent of the Model Penal
Code formulation from which the "immediately necessary" terms
originate." Some cases from "immediately necessary" jurisdictions
300 See, for example, State v Clifton, 880 SW2d 737, 743 (Tenn Crim App 1994) (stating that
Tennessee law provides that a person is justified in using force "when and to the degree the per-
son reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect against the other's use or
attempted use of unlawful force. The person must have a reasonable belief that there is an immi-
nent danger of death or serious bodily injury."), quoting Tenn Code Ann § 39-11-611 (1994);
McKee v State, 785 SW2d 921, 928 (Tex App 1990) (stating the relevant self-defense question as
whether deadly force was "immediately necessary to protect himself against the imminent com-
mission by the deceased of sexual assault"). But see MPC § 3.04 (defining permissible use of
force in self-protection as justifiable when "immediately necessary," as opposed to imminent).
1304 [68:1235
Self-Defense and Subjectivity
appear in the dataset, although there was not complete coverage of
states using the "immediately necessary" formulation.
5. Confrontational coding.
A case was coded as confrontational based on clock time and
given the defendant's allegations or facts as presented in the opinion.
If there were insufficient facts reported in the opinion to make an as-
sessment, the case was excluded from the survey. Cases were coded as
confrontational based on clock time, not the nature of the threat the
victim posed or any other circumstance. Thus, in some cases, the state's
allegation was that the victim's actions at the time of the killing posed
no threat. That case might still be classified as a "confrontational" case
because the issue was not time, but quality of the threat.
Most cases represented fairly straightforward questions on this is-
sue, although in a few cases there were doubts about the factual cir-
cumstances. These doubtful cases were coded as nonconfrontational.
For example, in one case the defendant testified that she "could not
remember" anything between the time of the last assault and finding
her husband dead.3' Given the doubts about whether, taking as true
the defendant's own allegations, there was a long or a short period of
time, the case was classified as "nonconfrontational." Doubts were
thus resolved against my hypothesis.
6. Counting opinions.
Opinions were "counted" by opinion, rather than by case, because
the meaning of imminence might differ from opinion to opinion in a
single case. For example, if there were two opinions in a single case,
one by an intermediate appellate court and another by the state su-
preme court, both would be counted and coded.M Furthermore, mean-
ings were coded wherever they appeared in the opinion, whether in
the majority, a concurring opinion, or even a dissent. Sometimes, for
example, imminence is not perceived as an issue by the majority; how-
ever, the dissent, which has a different view of the case, depends upon
301 See State v Koss, 49 Ohio St 3d 213,551 NE2d 970,971 (1990) (noting that the defendant
could not remember anything from the time her husband hit her to hearing a noise of gurgling
blood).
302 In one instance, several appellate opinions in one jurisdiction were consolidated on ap-
peal in the state supreme court. The court's decision was counted as one "opinion" rather than as
an opinion in each of the several cases it reviewed, on the theory that we were counting legal
meanings (in this case; one opinion), rather than cases. See State v Studd, 137 Wash 2d 533, 973
P2d 1049, 1051-54 (1999), consolidating appeals of State v Studd, 87 Wash App 385,942 P2d 985
(1997); State v Cook, 1997 Wash App LEXIS 1145; State v Bennett, 87 Wash App 73, 940 P2d 299
(1997); State v McLoyd, 87 Wash App 66, 939 P2d 1255 (1997); State v Ameline, 1997 Wash App
LEXIS 1187; State v Fields, 87 Wash App 57,940 P2d 665 (1997).
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imminence in reaching its conclusions. It would have seemed to be an
inaccurate measure of the relevant "legal" meanings to discount the
dissent's usage. In the interest of comprehensiveness, all opinions were
counted. Opinions were not rejected from the sample because they
were officially unpublished or reversed by a higher court. The point of
this exercise was not to obtain controlling authority, but to measure
legal meaning. Opinions at all trial and appellate levels were included
in the survey. Finally, cases were coded without regard to the source of
the meaning; even if a case was quoting another case, that was in-
cluded as a "meaning" of the case reviewed.
B. Case Coding Distinctions
What follows explains how decisions were made to determine the
meaning of imminence. Coding in both phases was done initially by
legal research assistants, subject to my review0 3 Coding for both itera-
tions was completed in March 2000 and was reviewed again in Janu-
ary-February 2001.
1. Threat.
Cases classified as ones of threat were ones in which the court
equated imminence with the severity or probability, rather than the
timing, of the threat. A key indication here would be, for example, a
statement that there was no imminent threat followed by a sentence in
which the court recounts that the victim was not carrying a weapon.
Also included in this category were claims that the use of violence by
the defendant was disproportionate.
2. Emotion/motive.
Cases classified as ones of emotion or motive were typically those
in which the claim was made that there was no imminent threat be-
cause the defendant acted not from fear, but revenge or deliberation.
Not all references to fear or deliberation were included, but only
those that could be directly tied to the question of imminence. In-
303 I made no attempt to assess coding error rates, nor to exclude my role in case review, for
several reasons. First, this was a qualitative study of legal meaning, not an attempt to predict a
particular quantitative usage of imminence in self-defense cases. Second, there were significant
checks built into the survey in terms of the overall hypothesis (that imminence has legal meaning
other than the clock). If the case was in fact confrontational, imminence was likely to bear some
meaning other than the clock. Third, I sought to triangulate my research on this general hy-
pothesis, finding work in other disciplines and within the history of the criminal law to support
my general claim that time had meaning. Finally, to assure consistency of particular meanings, I
required coders to support their decisions by pointing to specific text in the opinion (e.g. the
term "imminence" followed by text about a lack of a weapon). I then reviewed coding decisions
for consistency.
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cluded within this set of cases were claims that the defendant intended
to kill if this was meant as a reference to deliberation. . The term "in-
tent" itself was specifically avoided for this category because of its
ambiguities.
3. Perception/appearances.
One might argue that perception, unlike emotion or threat, does
not constitute a meaning of imminence but rather an approach or an-
gle on imminence that itself must mean time or threat. The purpose of
this inquiry, however, was to try to see how courts treat the question of
imminence and whether the treatment focused on time. A focus on
perception is obviously not a focus on the clock but, instead, one that
focuses on the defendant's mind. Perception, however, proved to be
one of the trickiest of categories. It was not enough, for example, that
the case simply talked about the defendant's subjectivity in connec-
tion with imminence (that might cover a healthy majority of these
cases). Instead, cases in which imminence was categorized as a ques-
tion of perception were cases where the meaning of imminence was
not time (the case is confrontational) but really mistake-even if the
victim did not have a gun, the question was whether the defendant
acted on reasonable appearances. In some of these cases, the emphasis
on perception seemed to be closely allied to threat. For example, the
defendant and the court appeared to be assuming that the term immi-
nence might convey the meaning of actual threat when the law only
requires an apparent threat. Such cases differed, however, from those
that focused on the severity of the threat, which is the standard mean-
ing of imminence (there was no gun, therefore there was no imminent
threat). In the case of situations involving perception, the question in-
volved real versus apparent, or mistaken, threats.
4. Alternatives.
Cases in which imminence appeared as an alternative were cases
in which the court found the threat not imminent because the defen-
dant had other choices-running through the bathroom door, taking
advantage of other opportunities for escape, etc.
5. Aggressor/provocation.
Cases classified under the heading of aggressor or provocation
treated imminence as encompassing the principle that one who cre-
304 See Lancaster v State, 472 S2d 363,365 (Miss 1985) ("He freely admits at this time he in-
tended to kill Deputy Kirby. Under these facts .. . Lancaster had no reason to believe himself to
be in any imminent danger.").
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ates the conditions of the defense (provocation) or is at fault for the
altercation (aggressor) should be denied the right of self-defense. On
more than one occasion courts treated questions of provocation or
aggression, instead, as questions of imminence. Imminence does not
carry the notion of "time" in these cases but instead questions about
the relative fault of the parties for the lethal altercation.O
305 See Lancaster, 472 S2d at 365 ("The appellant returned now as the aggressor and, using
the corner of his house and a refrigerator as obstructions between him and the deputy, fired
three additional shots.... Under these facts, a reasonable jury would not disagree that Lancaster
had no reason to believe himself to be in any imminent danger of bodily harm or death.").
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